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ABSTRACT
BRAIN DRAIN OR GAIN: MIGRATION OF KNOWLEDGE WORKERS FROM
INDIA TO THE UNITED STATES
Anjali Sahay
Old Dominion University, 2006
Director: Dr. Xiushi Yang

This dissertation looks at the topic of brain drain from a new lens. It departs from
the traditional literature to include discussion on brain gain and brain circulation using
Indian migration to the United States as case study. While it cannot be denied that host
countries have policies that encourage or provide the necessary conditions for brain drain
to take place, it must be taken into account that many source countries now benefit from
out-migration of their workers and students. These are usually measured as remittances,
investments and savings associated with return, and network approaches that, with a
connectionist approach, link expatriates with their country of origin. In addition,
Diaspora members, through successes and visibility in host societies, further influence
economic and political benefits for their home countries. This type of brain gain can be
considered as element of soft power for the source country in the long term. Three
hypotheses are tested in this dissertation to argue the points above. Using India as source
country, the first hypothesis positively tested that benefits outweigh the cost o f out
migration, with India as the highest remittance receiving country in the world with
multifaceted connections in the Silicon Valley. The second hypothesis accessed the
leverage of the Indo-American community as strong in terms of wealth and education.
However, the possibility of this changing the asymmetrical interdependent relationship
between India and the U.S. in favor of India remains at best a possibility in the long term.
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The third hypothesis also positively tested that a more active role played by the state in
the sending country determines the level of return and non-return benefits. The
dissertation also notes that while these hypotheses may be true for a country like India,
where many other factors play a role, it may not necessarily affect other less developing
countries in a similar vein. Additionally, third generation Indo-Americans may not
necessarily retain the same ties as were seen by the first and second generations. Thus
direct benefits in the long term may differ in result.
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1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

“Today, as never before, there is a common market for brainpower which transcends
national boundaries. And with improved transportation and communication, market information
has been readily available, immobility reduced, professional training standardized, and the
allocation mechanism for talent rationalized. ”
Walter Adams (1968)
As early as 1968 Walter Adams had rationalized the movement of skilled labor or
human capital as one that would be determined not by countries and immigration policies
but dictated by open, global markets. With the advent of the new millennium, an
increasing role for the migration of people has taken on new proportions in the context of
economic globalization. Migration, as a discipline has been intellectually welcomed for
many years and a number of subfields have been developing within the field including:
migrations associated with the activities of multinational companies; migration of
students and researchers; brain drain and return; the emergence of an international skills
market; illegal immigration and many more.
Within the field of migration, the movement of the ‘highly skilled’ has received
increased attention besides that of refugees and political asylum seekers. Like trade and
capital, international labor flows dominate many academic discussions as such flows
offer great potential benefit for both the sending and the receiving countries. Migrants
have often been viewed as more productive than other workers since they reduce labor
costs in the host countries and also send remittances to their home countries.

This dissertation follows the format requirements o f A Manual fo r Writers o f Term Papers, Theses and
Dissertations 6th edition by Kate L. Turabian.
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The developed countries', however, are made the subject of a whole series of
complaints where they have been accused of draining the less developed countries
(LDCs)2 of their professionals, and thus, holding back their development. Popularly
termed as ‘brain drain’, policymakers, particularly those in the United States have been
targeted for importing brain gain from source countries and accumulating human capital.
Brain drain with its pejorative ring, captured the attention of policy-makers
worldwide beginning in the decade of the 1960’s. The conventional view of the
‘talented’ international migrant, a young man of modest backgrounds crossing the high
seas began to take definite shape and form with increased migration streams entering
traditional receiving countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia.3 The
United States remained dominant in the field of immigration statistics since Americans
did most of the early analysis on migration. Concerns about brain drain were heightened
when the United States abandoned the national quotas enacted in the 1920’s and changed
its immigration laws in 1965 from one of discrimination, based mainly on national
origins, to one of discrimination based on skill. As a result, brain-drain statistics almost

1 Developed nations are countries that have achieved (currently or historically) a high degree o f
industrialization, and which enjoy the higher standards o f living which wealth and technology make
possible. In most cases, countries with high per capita GDP are “developed countries”; sometimes a high
GDP can be achieved (usually temporarily) through natural resource exploitation (e.g. Saudi Arabia, oil;
and Naum, phosphate) without the country becoming developed.
2 Countries in the process o f change directed toward economic growth, that is, an increase in production,
per capita consumption, and income. The process o f economic growth involves better utilization o f natural
and human resources, which results in a change in the social, political, and economic structures.
3 For many decades the United States was the main receiving country, with Canada and Australia a close
second. Whereas migration studies in the United States have concentrated on the impact o f immigration on
the nation’s demographic situation, in Canada, the discussion o f immigration has broadly concentrated on
policy and its justification. In Australia, the so-called Borrie Report has analyzed the growth o f population
from both natural increase as well as from immigration. This however, does not mean that no one went to
other British dominions and various parts o f Latin America and Asia.
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immediately reflected an increased number of ‘talented persons’ entering the country migration o f the educated and migration fo r education.4
Consequently, policy-makers throughout the world asked for several
recommendations for moderating the immigration of talent to the United States.5
However, more pressing international problems in the 1970s such as the international oil
crisis of 1973 (and international debt) pushed brain drain issues into the background
allowing it to continue into the decade. Writings by theorists and scholars subsequently
concentrated on the literature associated with counter-measures to ‘brain drain’ i.e.
various policy options that might compensate this loss. Three such policy options,
namely, taxation (compensatory financial measures), regulation (financial flows through
international norms), and conservation (control of emigration) were explored. These
policy choices could not have much of an impact on the movement of professionals since
this migration of the ‘highly skilled’ reflects the operation of an international market for
specialized human capital. Furthermore most countries follow a laissez-faire policy, i.e.
non-interference with migration6 in tandem with the ‘internationalist model ’ that holds
the perspective that human skills should be put where they can be best utilized.7
Sending countries, on their part, also began recognizing the global benefits of the
mobility of their skilled labor. In the first place, emigration of talent provides a positive
4 See Robert G. Myers, Education and Emigration: Study Abroad and the Migration o f Human Resources
(New York: David McKay Company, Inc, 1972).
5 For a detailed discussion o f the subject see Barry R. Chiswick, The Gateway: U.S. Immigration Issues and
Policies (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise, 1982); Jagdish Bhagwati, The Brain Drain and Taxation
II: Theory and Empirical Analysis (New York: American Elsevier, 1976); and T. K. Oommen, “India:
Brain Drain or the Migration o f Talent?” International Migration 27 number 3 (September 1989): 411-425.
6 For a better analysis see Barry R. Chiswick; and Sharon S. Russell, “Remittances from International
Migration: A Review in Perspective”, World Development 41 number 6 (1986): 677-696.
7 Much o f the knowledge-based developments in the world have been the contributions by the immigrants’
through Research and Development (R&D) carried out in the developed countries o f the West.
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signal that motivates others in the sending country to acquire more education, thereby
raising “human capital” and possibly promoting growth. Second, emigrants could, in due
course, return8, form knowledge networks, or resource repatriation (such as remittances),
and provide essential inputs to new businesses and activities in the sending country.9
Third, emigration could actively promote a more effective flow of knowledge and
information. And last, the rapid development in information technology (IT) and
communications limits the extent to which skills may actually be lost.10
Consequently, sending countries formulate policies for maintaining productive
bilateral relations between their diaspora communities and the country of origin. As a
result, two policy choices have been explored to derive maximum benefits from this lost
human capital. These include both the return and diaspora options where the former aims
at the return of human capital and the latter at their potential contribution through
remittances, financial know-how, and technology flows without altering their physical
location. These ‘options’, often termed as ‘carriers of gains of migration’ have been
categorized by some scholars as: (a) money: remittances, financial investments; (b)
machines: direct foreign investment in high-tech equipment, know-how; and (c) labor:
skill transfer through return migration. For simplification, this dissertation will look at

8 Return refers broadly to the act o f going back from a country o f presence (either transit or destination) to
the country o f previous transit, or origin. There are numerous sub-categories o f return which can describe
the way it takes place, e.g. voluntary, forced, assisted or spontaneous return; as well as subcategories which
can describe who is participating in the return, e.g. repatriation (for refugees). Voluntary return is based on
an informed decision freely taken by the individual; assisted voluntary return includes organizational and
financial assistance for the return and where possible, reintegration measures offered to the individual.
Involuntary, or non-voluntary, or forced return: return that is not undertaken by the individual voluntarily.
9 These contributions have been mainly financial resource flows in the form o f monetary remittances,
portfolio investment and technological know-how through direct foreign investment.
10 The network industry in ‘software’, being a case in point
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these options as either return (labor) or diaspora options (money and machines). Network
approaches will also be explored.

Return and Diaspora Options as Brain-Gain Strategies
In much of the migration literature, return has been associated with gain for the
sending country and non-return with a loss (economic) as emigration has traditionally
been seen as a cost that poor countries incur when they lose some of their most valuable
people.11 The thousands of dollars spent on educating a doctor or an engineer disappears
when they take their skills abroad. With return, it is assumed that the students,
professionals, and scientists who have migrated to the advanced developed countries
would not only acquire superior training but also convert it into better jobs at home when
they return, or in the case of medical doctors, invest in more lucrative private practices in
their home country. Gain is therefore associated with return with the hope that through
studying and working with outstanding scientists and research teams in prestigious
institutions abroad, migrants would be able to bring back the skills and knowledge
acquired and apply them in the home country.
Taiwan serves as a good example to enumerate the point above. Once considered
as a classic case of ‘brain drain’ during the 1970s and 1980s, Taiwan has a return rate of
only twenty percent for its college graduates who had gone abroad for higher studies. At
the peak of the brain drain in 1979, only eight percent of students who went abroad

11 Valuable here is accounted for people who went to the best schools and colleges and who were in the
primary working years.
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returned upon completing their studies.12 In spite of the political anxiety created by the
exodus of its scholars, the Taiwanese economy was not much affected by this and the
economy grew at a remarkable rate. Furthermore, the brain drain slowed and partially
reversed in the 1980s and 1990s with the return rate for students climbing up to thirtythree percent between 1985 and 1990. Today, these migrants come home with high levels
of education, partially subsidized by foreign governments and universities, and
significant business experience. The expertise they bring has helped to fuel a boom in the
domestic high-tech sector. Although Taiwan remains a country of net emigration today,
the brain drain is looking more like a gain with higher rates of return, and brain
circulation with knowledge and technology networks.
Notwithstanding these gains, I argue that caution should be exercised with respect
to ‘return’ and ‘gain’ primarily because of three counterarguments. First, return of
expatriates adds to the problems of increased population pressure in the home country;
second return is not always profitable in economic terms (for the individual); and third,
non-return has also yielded benefits (the Diaspora option explained in the next section).
In the first counter-example there is an underlying assumption that several of the largest
LDCs will be able to provide jobs for their rising generations and join the ranks of the
‘Newly Industrializing Countries’ (NICs). In the second there is an assumption that
return is always beneficial, however, in most cases there is a definite loss to the
individual as there are much higher scales of remuneration for them in the host country as

12 In the case o f Taiwan some scholars have argued that since ample employment opportunities had existed
at real wages comparable to the United States, it has been relatively difficult to explain why students might
have preferred to live abroad. Thus theoretically speaking, even if there are returns, brain drain would
continue to exist. See V. Kwok and J. Lenald, “An Economic Model o f the Brain Drain”, American
Economic Review 72 number 1 (January 1982): 92-100.
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compared to their own. Hence non-return has been attributed to the lower levels of
income as compared to what they would have earned in the receiving country. Thus
‘return’ as ‘gain’ for the country may not convert automatically as ‘gain’ for the
individual. Researchers, such as Khadria13 find that in general, there have been very few
benefits from migrants residing in the receiving countries and a low number o f actual
returns to the sending country. And in the third, migrants, by circulating knowledge and
skills remotely, also benefit the sending country. Thus gain, may be associated with
return but return is not a prerequisite condition. Additionally, such reinvestment by
migrants in the sending country has been directed towards projects that have resulted in
greater material wealth for investors, but benefit only a small sector of the population.
Although scholars have attempted to look at the types and motives for return
migration, most agree that return migration is the most difficult aspect of the migration
cycle to quantify. This is primarily because most countries gather information on
incoming aliens than on returnees and secondly, the analytical framework in which
geographical movements have been viewed so far has focused in one direction alone rural to urban - or South to North (Figure 1 and Figure 2 in Chapter II). In many other
cases, pecuniary (economic) and non-pecuniary (political) reasons have been cited for
either return or non-return, making it more difficult to have a general theory for return
migration.
The other, known as ‘diaspora option \ is the most recent policy that has come
under full implementation with regards to migrations of highly qualified human
resources. Popularly termed as ‘brain circulation’, it differs from return in the sense that it

13 See Binod Khadria, The Migration o f Knowledge Workers: Second-Generation Effects o f India’s Brain
Drain (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000).
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does not aim at the physical repatriation of the nationals living and working abroad. Its
purpose has been the remote mobilization of the Diaspora’s14 resources and their
association to the country of origin’s programs (for example, China, Colombia, India and
some African countries).15 Thus scientists and engineers have extended the benefits of
their educational qualifications irrespective of their physical location. Usually done
through a formal, institutionally organized network, the “Scientific Diasporas” and
“Immigrant Entrepreneur Networks” have helped to capture both benefits and know-how
of the emigrants overseas.
The concept of the Diaspora as a ‘brain bank’ from which knowledge can be
borrowed takes on new and promising dimensions with the growth of ‘knowledge
networks’ in the last ten years. Expatriate professionals promoting the exchange of skills
and knowledge between their countries of origin and residence have become important
channels for knowledge transfers through what the ‘International Organization for
Migration (IOM)’ calls “virtual return migration” as opposed to physical travel. In
addition, deregulations o f international financial markets coupled with new technologies
have made sending money home easier and cheaper than before. Both remittances and
foreign direct investment (FDI) initiated and processed through Diaspora communities
negate preconceived notions of ‘brain drain’ and mobility of skilled people in one
direction.
Grass roots initiatives in South Africa and some countries in Latin America have
been developed to link researchers abroad to networks in their home countries. At the
14 The term ‘Diaspora’ refers to the dispersion or spreading o f something that was originally localized (as a
people or language or culture). Here we are referring to it as people.
15 Explained in detail in later chapters
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beginning of the 1990s, Colombia started to systematically and consistently apply the
diaspora option, through the creation of ‘the Colombian Caldas Network of Scientists and
Engineers Abroad’. This experience has been studied during the last four years by
Franco-Colombian research teams who identify certain indicators and methods that could
help develop it elsewhere. The research first contextualizes the Diaspora option and the
Colombian experience by putting it in historical perspective along with other policies
designed to tackle the issue of professionals’ migration. It then describes what the S&T
diaspora is in terms of actors and dynamics.16
In Singapore, where migration of professionals has been seen as an act of
disloyalty to the nation, new studies show how the Diaspora option can be effectively
utilized to help the country and convert its brain drain into a gain. One study on
emigrants from Singapore draws attention to the fact that brain drain from Singapore is
now being seen not as an act of disloyalty to the nation but one that has led to the
building up of Singaporean overseas business ventures that benefit the home country.
This has been supported by the fact that Singapore has shifted its economic strategy from
a focus on high technology, high value added industries to a program of building an
external economy through overseas expansions and the promotion of offshore activities.
In this regard the Singaporean government has issued recent statements that increasingly
identify the overseas community as a ‘valuable link’ to Singapore and to the world
economy. The Singapore example suggests that, in an increasingly borderless world, the
relationship between emigration, citizenship and national loyalty requires
reconsideration.

16 See J.B. Meyer, “Network Approach versus Brain Drain: Lessons from the Diaspora,” International
Migration 39 number 5 (2001): 91-110.
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Overseas nationals, in addition to being a brain gain for the receiving countries
have often been able to leverage a network in their host country to raise funds, get
mentorship, and access distribution channels, all benefiting the country of origin,
economically and politically. This has primarily been achieved through their successes
in the countries o f residence and promoting the image o f their home country to spawn
more enterprise. As an example, a human development report talks about the success of
the Indian Diasporas in the Silicon Valley (in the United States) who appear to be
influencing how the world views India, by creating a sort of ‘branding’. The new
transnational demand for information technology specialists from India has led to a rapid
expansion of training at home, increasingly by the private sector. In addition, many
Indian-launched firms that have “front offices” in the U.S. have also opened
manufacturing plants back home, making increasing investments in hi-tech training for
local workers. The 264-page United Nations Development Program (UNDP) study
identifies Bangalore
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as one of a number of world-class technological hubs that have

emerged to challenge Silicon Valley and other centers in Europe and Japan.18
In addition to economic benefits, this power has also been translated into political
benefits with large expatriate communities holding key economic and political positions
in the host societies. The achievement and status of the Diasporic communities or ‘soft
power’ have been crucial for forging closer ties between countries of origin and
destination. Thus emphasis on the uses of migration as a policy instrument may be
17 Out o f the 10,000 industries that Bangalore (capital o f the state Karnataka in southern India) boasts of,
Information Technology industry has made the city the fastest growing one in Asia. Out o f an annual
average growth rate o f 58% in IT, Bangalore alone contributes about 40%. In recent years, Karnataka has
emerged as the Computer State, and the centre for high-tech industries, especially in the area o f the
computer hardware, software, electronics, instrumentation, and telecommunication.
18 UNDP, TOKTEN, Brain Drain and Human Development Report, (2001). Available
rOnlinel:<http://www.undp.oi'g.lb/tokten/braiiidrain.html>[4 October 2005],
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extended, to two broader questions. Why do certain kinds of states choose to promote
migration? And what can be said of the long-term consequences, for the regimes and
persons involved, of using migration as a policy tool?
So far, studies on ‘role of the state’ have been limited to immigration policies of
the receiving countries. Largely concerned with the affect of illegal immigration on
demographic composition, very few studies have focused on the role played by legal
migrants. The role of the state of sending countries in facilitating return has been
remarkably understudied as a field. In this dissertation there will be an attempt to focus
equally on the role of the state in both the receiving (encouraging and facilitating brain
drain, Chapter IV) as well as the sending countries (encouraging return or diaspora
options as brain gain strategies, Chapter VII).
Receiving societies, both historically and contemporarily welcome global citizens
who contribute most to their economy. For a long time, there has been a general
awareness of the various benefits to the U.S. population by capturing the mobile, skilled
foreign professionals. The reasoning behind this statement lies in the assumption that
individuals increase or at least do not decrease the per capita income of the receiving
societies. Empirical evidence proves that immigration, being selective through a set of
laws and regulations, prefers legal migrants with a definitive skill set. The absorption of
human capital in host societies is thus seen as gain with transfer o f knowledge acquiring
primary importance. Growth models have also made distinctions between ‘skills’ and
‘knowledge’ and how the usage of these terms constitutes completely different meanings.
Whereas skills are tied to people and can constitute as a subset of brain drain, knowledge
is not tied to the individual, is not firm specific and can be circulated to create spillover
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effects for a larger economy. The basic assumption behind this strategy, in line with the
‘New Growth Theory’ suggests that increasing the level of human capital in a region
produces positive externalities that spill over to other sectors and regions of the host
economy. Some of the most common reasons for out-migration is the level are the
political and bureaucratic hurdles in the home country. In addition, higher salaries, better
working conditions, and in some cases even political freedom contribute to the
phenomenon.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
So far, the essential position developed with respect to brain drain has been badly
defined, loosely measured and generally misinterpreted in much of the literature. It has
been too simplistic in its approach and finer nuances have not been focused on. In the
last couple of decades, the debates and issues associated with brain drain have undergone
a transformation with both emigration and immigration being viewed in a more positive
light.
Although the drain of the skilled and the educated has accelerated over the last
decade, scholars and academicians now focus on the economic benefits of brain drain as
a development strategy for the LDCs and provide insights for policy recommendations.
In light of this aspect of the brain drain phenomenon, this dissertation looks at the
linkages between ‘human capital’, and ‘brain gain’ strategies for the sending countries.
Touching on core issues such as development, it sheds light on the core-periphery
discussions where knowledge, and thus capital, flows to the periphery. In an era of
economic globalization, the movement of people (like goods and services) no longer
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remains unidirectional. Undoubtedly, the discourse on brain drain needs reconsideration
both within the fields of ‘international migrations’ and that of ‘international relations’.
The central research questions explored in this dissertation have been developed
to better understand whether the mobility of human capital constitutes a brain gain for the
sending country. How can a Diasporic community promote the image of their home
country to spawn benefits? To what extent can intellectual Diaspora networks bridge the
gap between the developed and developing countries? What has been the ‘role of the
state’ in harnessing return of expatriate professionals? And finally, to what extent can
‘human capital’ redefine theories o f ‘power’ and ‘development’?
The hypotheses statements proposed in this dissertation are “directional1,19 as
they mainly make an attempt to guess about the nature of the relationship between
concepts such as ‘human capital’ and ‘development’. For a long time the use of soft
power or people has been understudied as influencing hard politics and politics of
development. With new roles emerging for transnational migrant communities, their role
in fostering development needs to be further explored. Brain gain strategies and benefits
(either direct or indirect) have been postulated with the help of hypotheses statements
below:
a. Diasporic communities can become agents o f development fo r their home
countries by direct benefits that will outweigh the costs.
b. Skilled migrants with high levels o f education and income are more likely to
influence (economic and political) investments fo r their country o f origin and can

19 Janet Buttloph Johnson and Richard A. Joslyn, Political Science Research Methods, 3rd edition
(Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995), 54-57. There are four different types o f
hypotheses: (1) null hypothesis states that there is no relationship between two variables; (2) correlative
hypothesis states that there is a relationship between two (or among more) concepts; (3) directional
hypothesis makes a guess about the nature or direction o f the relationship between concepts; and (4) causal
hypothesis makes the boldest claim about the relationship between two or more variables, and also the most
difficult to confirm.
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be utilized as soft power to redefine asymmetrical relationships between country
o f origin and destination.
c. A more positive role played by the state in the sending country determines the
level o f return and non-return benefits.
The methodology used in this dissertation will be the use of countries (India and
the United States) as case studies and observing migration patterns between them over a
defined period of time. Using case studies does not only appear as an ideal methodology
when a holistic, in-depth investigation in migration patterns has been needed but also
helps to maximize what can be learned in the period of time available for the study.
Scholars have identified different types of case studies20. The case studies used for this
dissertation would be both intrinsic (when the researcher has an interest in the case) and
instrumental (when the case is used to understand more than what is obvious to the
observer). Notwithstanding a frequent criticism of case study methodology in its
dependence on a single case to generalize conclusions, the study of a single case can be
representative of a wider population. As argued by both Mitchell (1983) and Yin (1984),
case studies should be evaluated in terms of the adequacy of the theoretical inferences
that are generated at the end of a research. The case studies used in this dissertation
draws upon both quantitative and qualitative research that has involved collecting data
from more than one source. Data on immigration statistics is primarily taken from the
United States Census bureau and the Immigration and Naturalization Services. Although
labor flows from India have continued unabated for a long time, it has been surprising
that there exists no information, let alone a primary source of data, on these migration
20 R. K. Yin, Applications o f Case Study Research (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publishing,
1993) identifies some specific types o f case studies: exploratory, explanatory, and descriptive; and R.
Stake, The Art o f Case Research (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1995) has included three others:
intrinsic, instrumental and collective.
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flows from India. Whatever analysis has been carried out till date on the composition of
these flows is thus based upon immigration statistics of the countries of destination.21

Choice o f Countries
The choice of India and the United States as case study for the brain drain
phenomenon not only seems pertinent but also very important since Indian migration to
the United States has been fairly consistent over the decades. After India’s independence
in 1947, the number of Indian students migrating to the United States increased
dramatically bringing in their wake, high levels of academic attainment and valuable
scientific and engineering skills. By the early 1970s the small but influential Indian
minority were estimated at having the highest per capita income of any ethnic group in
the United States. With the end of the Cold War and advent of globalization the
migration of Indians increased four-fold with breakthroughs in information technology
and other professions.
Visibility of the Indians in the U.S. has been fairly consistent with IndoAmericans growing not only in strength but also in terms of educational and income
levels. Close to two million people, this community boasts of various achievements in
the host country. Emerging as the single largest as well as the fastest growing component
of the legal migrants (after Mexico) also makes them distinct from other communities in
the United States. Specifically in the last decade, three critical trends have been
witnessed with important implications for the international relations between India and
the United States. First is a sharp increase in their numbers. Second the emergence of a

21 See Deepak Nayyar, Globalization and Migration: Retrospect and Prospect (NOIDA: V.V. Giri National
Labor Institute, 1999).
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large number of financially powerful and politically well-connected Indian Americans.22
And third, increase in their activities in the US political arena to promote issues
concerning India.

COMMON ASSUMPTIONS WITH BRAIN DRAIN
Economic theory stressing the ambivalence in the field of migration makes
common generalizations and assumptions almost impossible to make. The research
questions designed in this project have been based on some common assumptions
associated with economic theories. In an emerging global world where the immediate
future is viewed as the ‘age o f migration’, it is imperative that attempts are made to
examine the implications of the contemporary migration flows to evolve a more
purposeful migration policy framework.

Assumption # 1) Innovation and inventions have no national boundaries.
With the revolution in information and technology and reduced costs of traveling,
a major breakthrough has been achieved in labor mobility, especially in the skilled labor
market. Public-private partnerships have started investing in technical universities and
communications infrastructure to create cutting-edge technology parks in places like
Bangalore, which does not fall in the global north. This not only makes LDCs more
competitive and alluring to investors and multinational companies, but also facilitates
labor flexibility, free flows of capital, and desperately needed infrastructure
improvement. The fact is that emerging countries are churning out more scientists,

22 The Pakistani American community, by contrast, was only about one-tenth the size o f the Indian
American community
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engineers and technology workers to staff their nascent industries, while the numbers of
students entering these fields in the United States has remained flat. The United States
has also been cutting R&D funding while foreign governments have been creating publicprivate partnerships to invest in R&D projects and persuade their brightest youth to
pursue high-tech careers. And although the United States continues to be a hot
destination for brains around the world, the often-repeated question is whether the US
policymakers, the media, and the public is underestimating the emerging competitive
threat of nations like China and India, countries that increasingly offer skilled, educated,
professional knowledge-based workers as lower wages.
Nancy Birdsall, a UNDP adviser has rightly pointed out that, “in a global market,
people with the right skills will naturally migrate to the high-tech, high-wage frontier,
wherever it is.” Thus brain drain, and its counter-measures, solutions and benefits calls
for a major paradigm shift in the discussion put forward so far. Given the globalization
of human capital, borders and boundaries need new definitions.

Assumption # 2) Economic globalization and the mobility o f capital have made movement
o f skilled labor multi-directional.
Economic globalization and the mobility of capital have now given corporations
the freedom to move businesses and investments from one part of the world to another.
In other words, this had ended almost three hundred years of the phenomenon of ‘the
tyranny of location’ whereby businesses had no alternative but to locate in certain places
drawing in skilled labor, preferably the best and the brightest, to these locations. This
trend, more than any other discussed above has brought into question all previous
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discussions on brain drain and gain since migration of people has been replaced to some
extent by the migration or outsourcing of jobs. There are reasons to believe that the U.S.
and the UK private companies, which generate almost all of India’s outsourcing business,
will locate an increasing share of their operations in India and other developing countries
in the coming years. First it is the size of cost savings that off shoring has generated for
the companies that have already moved a significant chunk of their operations to India.
This applies both to India’s mainstream software development sector, which is primarily
located in Bangalore, Hyderabad, Mumbai and New Delhi, and to its call center industry.
A recent report by the McKinsey Global Institute has estimated that companies
that have so far failed to shift operations to India - whether it is software development, IT
systems integration, customer support, back office work, or personal management - will
be at a large and growing competitive disadvantage. This implies in a nutshell that Indian
‘brains’ may be better utilized in a macroeconomic perspective without altering their
physical location. Seen from the lens of ‘brain drain’ and ‘migration of talent’ from India
to the U.S., this outsourcing now takes on unprecedented importance in the debate.

Assumption # 3) The core o f the interest in the migration o f the highly skilled remains
‘economic
In all of the discussion on brain drain, brain gain and future trends of migration
flows (either capital or people) the core of the interest in the migration o f the highly
skilled remains ‘economic ’. Immigrant selection systems in most receiving countries
prefer employment-based classifications that consist of members holding advanced
degrees or having exceptional ability in the sciences, arts or businesses. In other words,
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people who can contribute to the economy in some way. National complaints about
losses through emigration are also couched in economic terms with the presence of a
substantial and growing number of educated members of the diaspora in the West. Gains
- either through the Diaspora or the return option - are also measured with respect to
economic benefits for the home country. The discourse on brain drain or gain, in short,
has revolved around ‘economic’ aspect of the migration in general and education in
particular.

Assumption # 4) In large source countries, emigrants normally do not affect the well
being o f the remaining population.
Economic theory establishes a very strong presumption that emigrants do not
affect the well being of the remaining population, especially in largely populated
countries. According to the marginal productivity theory of wages and interest,
emigrants take along both their contributions to and claims on production, thus leaving
the other incomes unchanged. Also in terms of free government services, emigrants
cease to claim them when they stop paying taxes.
A point to be considered in any debate on brain drain needs to hypothesize about
the role these professionals would be playing in their home countries had they not chosen
to migrate. If these professionals were to just join the considerable number of
unemployed in the country (irrespective of the fact that they were formerly employed),
the probability of an even greater drain on the country’s resources would become a
possible likelihood. If they would all be virtually unproductive, emigrants could in fact
hamper the well being of the remaining population. Finally from the point of view of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

20
costs involved in their training, to the possible employment of their skills, one must take
into account the fact that countries cannot prevent their professionals from leaving even if
they wanted to. Some developing countries in fact rely on the foreign exchange of the
expatriates that is remitted from abroad. Despite concern about the loss of talent through
migration, the single most significant circumstance remaining for almost all sending
countries is the relatively little impact of their departure on the economic progress and
development of their countries.

OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION
After providing a brief introduction to the discourse on brain drain in this chapter
and clearly identifying the central concepts, research questions, hypothesis statement,
units of analysis and methodology, the remaining chapters of this dissertation will extend
the current discussions on mobility of the skilled people to brain gain strategies by
providing the necessary theoretical and empirical evidence.
Part 1 (chapters I - IV) of the dissertation discusses brain drain issues in
theoretical and historical perspectives. Chapter II outlines the framework for
understanding the brain drain and brain gain perspectives in a theoretical context. Tying
in concepts of soft power and development, the positive externalities related to the
immigration of skilled people are redefined to argue a macroeconomic reasoning behind
brain gain strategies.
Chapter III serves as a background reading with respect to the relationship
between the two countries selected for examining the issue of brain drain. The choice of
India as the sending and the United States as the receiving country serves as an
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interesting study in international relations in light of their growing synergies and
partnerships. As a two-part study, the first looks at the historical relationship (political
and economic) between them and the second, examines the level and scope of migration
flows.
A central point to be discussed in any discourse on brain drain revolves around
the immigration policies of the receiving countries. Chapter IV is intended to provide a
general overview of the policies governing the temporary and permanent admission of
aliens into the United States with emphasis on aliens admitted for higher education or
skilled labor jobs. Notwithstanding the much celebrated push-pull theory in migrations,
this chapter is purely an attempt to view immigration policies in the United States
positively and observe the future of brain drain itself.
Part 2 of the dissertation (chapters V - VII) tests the three hypotheses
statements by providing empirical evidence for the role played by the Indian Diaspora in
offsetting some o f the costs associated with migration with benefits for India. The direct
benefits of human capital are measured in chapter V as remittances, return, and
transmitting technological know-how by creating knowledge networks between the
countries of origin and destination and return.
In chapter VI, it is argued that high levels of education and income provide
visibility to the Indo-American community making successes in the host societies easier.
Regarded as one of the most important features possessed by them, the large and highprofile presence o f Indo-Americans in the IT and Health sectors, the number of CEO’s of
Indian origin in multinationals, and their presence in the world of international finance
and management consultancy has created a new image for them enabling them to
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strengthen their position vis-a-vis their county of residence, the United States, as well as
their country of origin, India. This chapter brings to the fore concepts of ‘soft power’
where people are seen as wielding power as opposed to military or economics, although
in this case economics is closely connected to people. The Indian diasporic community
in the United States has on many occasions mobilized their opinion on important issues
and played a crucial role in generating a favorable climate of opinion in the Congress.
One of the most important roles played by them is the facilitation and promotion of the
ongoing Indo-U.S. relations.
Chapter VII discusses the role of the sending country in promoting return and
investment. Since ‘return’ poses serious problems with respect to magnitude and
accountability, this chapter almost entirely focuses on the role of the state and their
policies vis-a-vis their diasporic community. Recent initiatives by the Indian state
towards their Diaspora; the economic and political bottlenecks prevalent in the country;
and future policy options are explored.
Finally, Chapter VIII offers an assessment of the main findings of this
dissertation in the case study of Indian migration to the United States to offer a brief
overview of the phenomenon of brain drain and consequently, brain gain strategies. I
conclude with the theoretical and policy implications of this dissertation and offer
avenues for future research.
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CHAPTER II
ALTERNATE THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO BRAIN DRAIN

INTRODUCTION
Discourses on brain drain first appeared in the 1960s with the publication of
Gary Becker’s book on human capital1 and Walter Adams’ classic book on brain drain.
Vastly different in their contents, the former discussed theoretical bases of the human
capital while the latter approached the study of brain drain asking the basic question
‘what’ since the term itself was “loaded, suggestive, pejorative, and indicative of a loss of
a vital resource without compensation.”2 Adams’s book also focused on ‘when’ and’
how’ since the movement of people has been going on for centuries and is not a recent
phenomenon. Subsequent writings have generated very diverse, and sometimes even
opposite approaches to the brain drain issue (the nationalist versus the internationalist
models). With a better understanding of the international market for labor, later studies
picked on solutions to brain drain making and made way for alternate analyses.
With increasing migration flows from countries in the south to the north, brain
gain approaches have been explored in the various policy circles of sending countries.
Although the literature linking migration to brain drain is fairly abundant, the literature
on brain gain is less visible in migration vocabulary because of conceptual and empirical
problems. For example: (1) studies made on migrant remittances and savings suffer from
measurement problems, (2) gains through return migration are beset with methodological

1 See Gary Becker, Human Capital (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1964).
2 Walter Adams, The Brain Drain: Problem (New York: Macmillan Company, 1968), 1.
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problems due to lack of reliable data with returnees, and (3) the literature on migrant
network approaches has not gone beyond the stage of conceptual theorizing.
This chapter treats four major themes or questions that have emerged in the
study of international migration of the highly skilled people. The first theme looks at the
literature available on brain drain (origin, concepts, theoretical models, and counter
measures) and at the various theories put forward in the field so far. Secondly, brain gain
strategies such as remittances, network approaches, and return explore new methods of
development for the sending country. Investments in human capital are also linked to
gain strategies with knowledge networks emerging in a borderless world transformed by
economic globalization. Here the focus is on ‘the role of the sending countries’ as most
of the literature on the “politics of control” of population movements, have previously
focused on receiving societies.
The third theme links the interdependencies between migration and
development. The brain drain discussion is argued against the backdrop of ‘divergence
theory’ where the drain of human capital is seen to cause underdevelopment of the poor
periphery. In recent times, ‘convergence and growth theories’ have emphasized benefits
for sending countries through out-migration policies, which bring to the fore new
paradigms for discussing the brain drain issue.
The last theme discusses migrant or diaspora networks as an important
contribution in bridging the gap between international migrations and international
relations theories. Within this context, it is argued that the migration of the highly skilled

3 James F. Hollifield, “The Politics o f International Migration: How Can We Bring the State Back In?” in
Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines ed. Caroline B. Brettell (New York: Routledge, 2000), 139.
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can be effectively utilized as soft power for their countries of origin, redefining notions of
asymmetrical interdependence between two countries.
The final section of this chapter integrates all the above themes (brain drain,
brain gain, development, and soft power) to give us a comprehensive idea on whether
brain drain can be reversed as a brain gain strategy by the sending countries who could
use migration as a cure4 for development. This chapter further adds to our understanding
of the complexities involved in the mobility of the highly skilled people and examines the
forms, types, processes, actors, motivations, socio-economic, and cultural contexts
associated with brain drain.

BRAIN DRAIN: CONCEPTS AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Prior to the twentieth century, mass migrations occurred either through the
transportation of captured slaves in ancient times (involuntary movement of people) or
through the practice of large-scale colonization. The sixteenth century is commonly
accepted as the starting point of international migration movements in the modem world.5
Although colonialism was not strictly draining the skilled from the colonies to the
developed western world, it did represent the mobilization of people - skilled and
unskilled —to work in their countries (labor itself is a draining). The concept of drain
probably begins during colonialism mostly in terms of economic (raw materials and

4 The literature linking migration and development have often labeled migration as causing
underdevelopment in a country.
5 Except for the Bantu migration in Africa and Vietnamese migration in Asia. By 1000 BC, in a series o f
migrations, Bantu speakers had spread south to the savanna lands o f Angola and east to the Lake Victoria
region. Over the next 1500 years they scattered throughout central and southern Africa, interacting with and
absorbing indigenous populations as they spread. Vietnamese migration southwards had begun way before
the 16th century.
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bullion) and population (transportation of slaves and convicts) to America and Australia
respectively.
The twentieth century departs in its explanation of ‘drain’ with people migrating
to distant lands to seek livelihood and search for better opportunities or commercial
gains. Essentially, while “migration was predominantly forced and coercive during
colonialism,”6 it became voluntary during post-colonialism.7
With immigration laws relaxing in most developed countries, migrations further
took the form of ‘brain drain’ with mass exodus of highly skilled labor taking place
from the developing to the advanced, industrial, democracies in the West. The term
‘brain drain’ is an expression of British origin commonly used to describe one of the
most sensitive areas in the transfer of technology. It refers to skilled professionals who
leave their native lands to seek more promising opportunities elsewhere. The term is
usually defined in its most simplistic form as the emigration of highly educated workers
from developing countries to the developed countries. It can also be worded as the loss
of skilled intellectual and technical labor through the movement of such labor towards
more favorable geographic, economic, or professional environments. Nationalists in the
sending countries’ often view this as the depletion or loss of intellectual and technical
personnel to the advanced countries of the West.

6 Nikos Papastergiadis, The Turbulence o f Migration: Globalization, Deterritorialization and Hybridity
(Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2000), 26.
7 In the 20th and 21st centuries there have been involuntary movements o f people. Generally referred to as
politically displaced persons or refugees, who have been the outcome o f civil wars or international
conflicts. However, this study focuses on the movement o f people at the individual level. Thus
implications for brain drain becomes pertinent when specifically look at voluntary migration by
individuals. People who migrate can be broadly put in two categories: those who emigrate to work abroad
(both skilled and semi-skilled) and those who migrate for higher studies.
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The migration of skilled labor during the 1960s and 1970s inspired substantial
amounts of literature under the title ‘brain drain’, indicating primarily the source
country point o f view.8 This was hardly surprising as migration tended to mirror both
the overall climate of the period and the characteristics of migration flows. Figures 1
and 2 reflect the South to North migration flows from 1960-65 to 1980-85 with
countries in Latin America and later Asia as dominant source continents.
Brain drain has also been associated with the phrase ‘migration of talent’
although they differ greatly in scope and meaning.9 Where brain drain emphasizes a
one-way movement of professionals, ‘migration of talent’ indicates both migrations
from the LDCs as well as their return. Thus, scholars have cautioned readers about the
indiscriminate use of these phrases as the two concepts carry very different emotive and
pejorative connotations.
Walter Adams’ thought provoking book is perhaps one of the best approaches in
giving us a balanced attitude towards the international migration of scientists, engineers
and workers. Other essays in the book bring to light trends, facts, and complications
associated with migration currents. Brinley Thompson’s paper addresses migration
flows, its impact on the sending country and the reverse flow of technical assistance to
LDCs. Harry Johnson, Don Patinkin, Kenneth Boulding, and Hla Myint appraise the

8 These works included among others mentioned above such as Adams 1968, Bhagwati 1976, and Kwok
and Leland 1982: H.G. Grubel and A.D. Scott, “The Immigration o f Scientists and Engineers to the United
States: 1949 - 1961 "Journal o f Political Economy 74 number 4 (1966): 368-378; H. Johnson, “Some
Economic Aspects o f Brain Drain,” Pakistan Development Review 1 number 3 (1967): 379-411; R. A.
Berry and R. Sologi, “Some Welfare Aspects o f International Migration,” Journal o f Political Economy 11
number 5 (1969): 778-794; C. Rodriguez, “International Factor Mobility: Nontraded Goods, and the
International Equalization o f the Prices o f Goods and Factors,” Econometra 43 (1975): 115-124; and
Jagdish Bhagwati and Martin Partington, Taxing the Brain Drain I: A Proposal (Amsterdam: NorthHolland Publishing Company, 1976).
9 See article by T. K. Oommen.
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Figure 1. South to North Migration Flows: 1960- 65
Source: Tomas Hammar, Grete Brochmann, Kristof Tamas, and Thomas Faist, International Migration, Immobility, and Development:
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Figure 2. South to North Migration Flows: 1980- 85
Source: Tomas Hammar, Grete Brochmann, Kristof Tamas, and Thomas Faist, International Migration, Immobility, and Development:
Multidisciplinary Perspectives (New York: Oxford International Publishers Ltd., 1997) 5.
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gains and losses from migration. Johnson proposes a more positive aspect and
postulates that free movement of people, like free movement of commodities, will
normally increase world output. According to him, if the world output is increased, the
gainers - the individual migrant and the country of immigration —can compensate the
losers and still be better off. He specifies the conditions under which this will not be
true but thinks that such a combination of conditions is unlikely to occur in practice.
For example, educational costs could be repaid either by the migrant or the government
of the country to which he moves. He does however end on a negative note since other
scholars seemed less optimistic that such compensation schemes could be made
effective.
Beyond Adams, the voluminous literature on brain drain gives us a broad idea
on the types of studies and research done in this area. First of all, some studies offer
definite data on the subject of migration.10 The literature in these studies talks about the
migration of professionals and consists of essays specifying the nature of the problem.
At the same time, a number of hypotheses offer insights into the causes and consequences
of migration. Other studies focus on the statistical magnitude of the flow.11 A lot of
research further attempts to understand the consequences for both the sending and
receiving countries, by estimating the cost of the professionals’ training and the value of
their work. And finally, scholars have attempted to quantify the loss incurred by the
home countries by losing these professionals and the gain accrued by the host countries.

10 See Stevan Dedijar and L. Svenningson, Drain and Brain Gain: A Bibliography on Migration o f
Scientists, Engineers, Doctors and Students (Shurcliff: University o f Lund, 1967).
11 See Goran Friborg, Brain Drain Statistics: Empirical Evidence and Guidelines (Gotab: Stockholm,
1975).
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However, all these studies remain hypothetical in nature, since they lacked
questionnaire responses from the migrant professionals themselves. Another problem
was the lack of consistent data. Although there was definite data available in the
developed countries, there was little or no data available from the countries of origin.
Consequently, a large group of scholars wrote about the brain drain phenomenon
depending on data collected from receiving countries. Furthermore, since there was no
way of quantifying the return of some of these professionals and students, gains could not
be easily verified.
The economic approach to questions related to brain drain is well summarized
by Borjas, 1989.12 The neoclassical economic theories that mainly focus on the
determinants of migration base their tenets on factors such as (a) rational choice; (b)
utility maximization; (c) expected net returns; (d) factor mobility and (e) wage
differentials. Here mobility is treated as human capital investment where migration
occurs if the benefits outweigh the costs. However, neoclassical economic explanations,
although sufficient as theory, do not explain many contemporary realities such as why do
few people move and why do some countries have relatively high out-migration rates.
Therefore, theorists have disregarded this one-dimensionality aspect to focus on new
factors that affect migrations.
Brain drain has also been discussed in terms of laissez-faire economics and in
terms of disengagement i.e. “if brain drain is seen as a result of integration into an
international market in professional skills then the only way of achieving a substantial
impact on the drain (and on the more serious internal distortions that it reflects) is

12 G. Borjas, “Economic Theory and International Migration,” International Migration Review 23 number 3
(Autumn 1989): 459.
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disengagement from that market.”13 Attention has also been drawn to the fact that while
on the one hand brain drain reduces professional manpower in the developing countries it
can also have the effect of easing population and employment problems there and act as a
safety valve.
Other theories have explained the ‘brain drain’ phenomena in terms of
asymmetric information regarding the skill levels of immigrants: that is, the host country
has more information about immigrant skill than the home country.14 Finally, some
studies have focused on the supply-demand model and argue that the immigration of the
professionals from the third world is related to job vacancies, opportunities in other host
countries, the flow of other immigrants, and the number of movers in the sending country
under consideration.15
In search of an analytical framework many scholars have tried to come up with
models to better explain the brain drain phenomena. In this regard, two contrasting views
appear prominent in the debate on brain drain. The first assumes that the enormous
investment of scarce resources on higher education in the LDCs is lost through the
migration of skilled people from their countries. This is the ‘nationalist’ model,16 which
regards human capital as indispensable to a country’s economic development. This

13 William A Glaser and G. C. Habers, The Brain Drain: Emigration and Return: A UNITAR Study
(Pergamon Press: Oxford, 1978), 6.
14 See V. Kwok and J. Lenald.
15 For more details see: D. Devoretz and D. Maki, “The Immigration o f Third World Professionals to
Canada: 1968-73,” World Development 11 number 1 (1983): 55-64.
16 Patinkin, Don. “A Nationalist Model,” in The Brain Drain: Problem, Walter Adams, (New York:
Macmillan Company, 1968), p 65.
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model suggests that a loss of skilled personnel would ultimately result in the economy
being gravely affected and development programs being jeopardized.
However, the ‘nationalist model’ recognizes the fact that the movement of
people or brain drain would occur, as developing countries need to take advantage of the
training opportunities in the developed world. Thus it makes various suggestions for both
the developed and the developing countries to “minimize the brain drain.”17 For the
developed world it suggests that the rich countries should enforce restrictions on
immigration (without becoming racial and discriminatory at its borders) and give out
research grants to universities in all countries suffering from brain drain.
For the LDCs, this model suggests various policies to diminish brain drain.
First, it suggests that these countries encourage a high degree of identification of their
skilled and scientific manpower with the development of their country. Second, they
must demonstrate to their manpower that they can fulfill a vital role in promoting
development. And third, the state must provide for its skilled manpower the conditions
necessary to fulfill their scientific aspirations to at least a minimum extent. The
nationalist model mostly regards brain drain to be the developing countries’ problem
since these countries can deal with it “not by the use of force but by persuasion, appeals
and a sense of patriotic responsibility.”18
The ‘internationalist model,’19 in contrast, contends that the LDCs exaggerate
the problem of migration of the skilled, and only a few of their professionals migrate at

17 Ibid, 94-99.
18 Ibid, 108.
19 Harry G. Johnson, “An Internationalist Model,” in The Brain Drain: Problem, Walter Adams (New
York: Macmillan Company, 1968). Harry G. Johnson is a Professor in the London School o f Economics
and Political Science, and the University o f Chicago.
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any given point of time, making very little impact. The internationalist model further
contends that the migration of professionals only reflects the operation of an international
market for specialized human capital and considers the transfer of talent as mutually
advantageous to both the sending as well as the receiving countries and that a laissezfaire policy, i.e. non-interference with migration should be followed.20
The internationalist model, notwithstanding previous arguments put forward by
the nationalists, questions their assertions and asks whether and in what circumstances,
does migration lead to a loss to the world as a whole? Moreover, they want to know
whether and in what circumstances does it impose an uncompensated loss on the
remaining residents in the countries of emigration?
For the former, the internationalists argue that migration of educated
professionals does not produce world losses and on the contrary produces substantial
increases in the world economic welfare. For the latter, it is generally believed that the
country of emigration obtains some gains in the form of indirect compensations, mostly
in the form of emigrant remittances. Past this, the discussion becomes fairly general
since ‘significant losses’ in economic terms is rather fallacious.
Writings by theorists and scholars subsequently concentrated on counter
measures to ‘brain drain’ including various policy options that might compensate this
loss. Three such policy options, namely: taxation (compensatory financial measures),
regulation (financial flows through international norms), and conservation (control of
emigration) were explored.

20 See: Barry R. Chiswick.
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These were:
■ Taxation received much attention and culminated during the later part of the
1970s and the first part of 1980s by theorists such as Bhagwati. However, the two
volumes by him (1976), although classic in its economic study of migration and
human capital, need stronger infusions of international trade theorizing before
they can be turned into an applicable policy or received theory.
■ Regulations through international norms had been proposed within the United
Nations system (UNCTAD 1983/84, Pires 1992). However, these
recommendations could not be enforced and the developed countries continue to
apply selective immigration policies regarding highly qualified manpower.
■ Conservation (restrictive) policies aiming at the retention of skilled people have
been and still are implemented in many developing countries. However, their
scope and success has been limited since many governments fail to address the
basic question of why these individuals might want to migrate in the first place.

Since the mid-1970s, the traditional literature on the subject has experienced
considerable renewal, reflecting changes in the brain drain debate. This is largely
attributed to the globalization process and the opening up of national resources in a
knowledge-based economy. Transfer of money as remittances, as well in investments
and savings measures gains. The return of migrants, although negative in the literature,
now looks at the positive side and is also better quantified. Also, in the last two decades
network approaches or brain circulation have led many conceptual and empirical
developments in the studies of brain drain.
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BRAIN GAIN: REMITTANCES, RETURN, AND DIASPORA NETWORKS
While many policy makers in the LDCs have been in a panic about the ‘brain
drain’ - the departure of skilled professionals for more lucrative jobs and opportunities
abroad - recent studies have triggered many debates on whether ‘brain drain’ can be
converted into a ‘brain gain’ for the sending country. Almost all of the brain drain
literature, coming from a nationalist perspective, talks about economic losses to the
sending countries. As an alternative, ‘brain gain’ approaches look at how migration of
professionals can eventually benefit the sending country. These have been identified as
(1) remittances and savings; (2) return migrations; and (3) Diaspora networks (Figure 3).
(1) Remittances and Savings
Migrant remittances and savings represent one of the most direct and measurable
benefits of international migration in migrant-sending areas. Generally they represent
both direct and indirect contributions to incomes in remittance-receiving households
having profound influences on production, income inequality, and poverty. Remittances
also contribute to the national economy when they are measured in a balance of payment
framework, compensation of employees21, workers’ remittances22, and migrants’
transfers

(see Figure 4).

21 Compensation o f employees comprises wages, salaries, and other benefits earned by individuals— in
economies other than those in which they are residents— for work performed for and paid for by residents
o f those economies.
22 Workers ’ remittances covers current transfers by migrants who are employed in new economies and
considered residents there. A migrant is a person who comes to an economy and stays there, or is expected
to stay, for a year or more. Workers’ remittances often involve related persons.
23 Migrants ’ transfers are contra-entries to the flow o f goods and changes in financial items that arise from
the migration o f individuals from one economy to another.
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Figure 3. Brain Gain: Remittances, Return, and Diaspora Network
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Figure 4. Workers’ Remittances and Other Inflows for Developing Countries
Source: Quarterly Magazine o f the International Monetary Fund, December 2005, volume 42, number 4,
prepared by Dilip Ratha, Senior Economist, Development Prospects Group, and Task Manager, Global
Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications o f Remittances and Migration, World Bank.
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According to estimates by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2002,
remittance income accounted for more than $80 billion to developing countries making
migrants the chief export of many countries in terms of the foreign exchange they
generate. To compare, “migrant remittances equaled more than one half the value of total
merchandise exports to the Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Jordan, Yemen, and
Greece.”24 Several developing countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Philippines,
and Sri Lanka hope for and obtain substantial amounts of savings from migrants through
remittances. However, it remains unclear how much these countries as a whole gain from
remittances.
Region-wise, Latin America and the Caribbean receive the lion’s share of
remittances in nominal terms with $25 billion followed by South Asia with $16 billion, as
per estimates in 2002. Remittance flows also constitute 14% for East Asia and Pacific
and 5% for Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of global remittance receipts. For Africa, this
picture is heavily skewed by underreporting or complete lack of data as almost two thirds
of Sub-Saharan African countries lack data.25 In terms of GDP, South Asia is the largest
recipient with remittance receipts amounting to 2.5% of its GDP.26
This dissertation is primarily concerned with remittances coming from legal
migrants (skilled, semi-skilled, and highly skilled), as there is an attempt to quantify gain
from migration of the highly skilled labor to offset some of the costs associated with

24 Douglas Massey and E.J. Taylor, International Migration: Prospects and Policies in a
Global Market (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 1.
25 Data obtained from Cerstin Sander, Migrant Remittances to Developing Countries (London: Bannock
Consulting, 2003) 1.
26 In the South Asia region, remittances as a share o f GDP were most significant for Nepal where they
accounted for 14.8 percent o f the country’s GDP in 2003, according to World Bank statistics.
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brain drain. However, as the beneficial effects of remittances and savings on households
is primarily the same for both legal and illegal migrants, examples from Latin America
(mainly Mexico) will be provided for better understanding the subject. Also the balance
of payment manual published by the IMF does not differentiate between a ‘worker’ and a
‘migrant’, though they differ in definition.
Traditionally, the vast majority of research available on remittances takes on a
pessimistic note and paints a negative picture of the implications of remittances and
savings for the sending country. For example, Reichert calls the US-Mexico migration the world’s largest international migration flow27 - an ‘illness’ or ‘syndrome’ that
undermines local development; Weist calls it an ‘addiction’; and Stuart and Kearney
characterize it as a ‘dangerous dependence’.28 Given the overwhelming use of
migradollars for consumption rather than production, prior investigators have concluded
that migration to the U.S. perpetuates a state of economic dependency that undermines
the prospects for development at both the regional and national levels in Mexico.
However, Taylor gives three reasons for why these studies are unduly pessimistic.
First, the sheer magnitude of migrant remittances is large and often underestimated.
Second, in the few studies that attempt to measure the effects of international remittances
on non-remittance income in migrant-sending households, the effect was positive in

27 Mexican migrants working in the United States annually send or bring back around $2 billion. Known as
migradollars, they would nearly equal: (a) M exico’s 1990 earnings from export agriculture; (b) 78 percent
o f its direct foreign investment; (c) 59 percent o f its tourist revenues, and (d) 56 percent o f its earnings
from maquila production.
28 See: Joshua S. Reichert, “The Migrant Syndrome: Seasonal U.S. Wage Labor and Rural Development in
Central Mexico,” Human Organization 40 (1981): 56-66; Raymond E. Weist, “Implications of
International Labor Migration for Mexican Rural Development,” in Migration Across Frontiers: Mexico
and the United States, eds. Camara Fernando and Robert Van Kemper, 85-97 (Albany, New York: Institute
o f Mesoamerican Studies, State University o f New York, 1979); and James Stuart and Michael Keamey,
Causes and Effects o f Agricultural Labor Migration from the Mixteca o f Oaxaca to California (San Diego:
La Jolla Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University o f California, 1981).
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stimulating local production. According to Massey and Parrado in 1994, at least $84
million dollars per year are invested in Mexican business activities as a direct result of
migration to the United States.
Finally, migrant remittances create local income multipliers that are often quite
large. For example “migradollars have potentially strong multiplier effects throughout
the Mexican economy.”29 In addition to raising the incomes of migrant households
directly, migradollars also generate a demand for workers to produce the goods and
services sought by migrants and their families, and the salaries earned by these additional
workers, in turn, raise Mexico’s national income. Multiplier effects also confirm the
importance of inter-household linkages in villages in India.30
International financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, compile statistical data that illustrates world distribution of remittances
among top remittance receiving countries. With increasing migration flows as a result of
globalization, remittances have grown steadily from 1990 with “the United States (US$
39 billion) as the highest for outward flow, followed by Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, and
Germany (see Figure 5).”31 For example, India, a country that did not even feature in the
top ten remittance recipient countries in 1990 has become the world’s largest recipient of

29 See Jorge Durand, Emilio A. Parrado, and Douglas S. Massey, “Migradollars and Development: A
Reconsideration o f the Mexican Case,” International Migration Review 30 number 2 (Summer 1996): 423432.
30 Shankar Subramanian and E. Sadoulet, “The Transmission o f Production Fluctuations and Technical
Change in a Village Economy: A Social Accounting Matrix Approach,” Economic Development and
Cultural Change 39 (1990): 131-73.
31 Samuel Munzele Maimbo and Dilip Ratha, When Money Really Matters: Remittances Vital to South
Asia, (2005). Available [Online]:<http://www.worldbank.lk/ > [22 October 2005].
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remittance inflows in 2003-2004, rising to over US$17 billion in 2003, up from almost
US$14 billion in 2002, and over US$ 11 billion in 2001.
Interestingly, India and China, two countries with the largest global migrations,
report substantial differences in remittance figures. While remittances into China were
about one-eighth those to India between 1992 and 2001, foreign direct investment (FDI)
from overseas Chinese communities was ten to twenty times more than FDI from the
Indian Diaspora. Many policymakers in India attribute this to a lack of interest on the
part of the Indian Diaspora coupled with highly bureaucratic procedures and rules.
Figure 6 illustrates the top twenty countries in 2004, which received remittances in dollar
terms. Interestingly, although the top three recipients of remittances in 2004 were India,
China, and Mexico, it were the smaller countries, such as Tonga, Moldova, and Lesotho,
that top the list when taken as a share of GDP (Figure 6).
Less developed countries’ governments often view emigration as a potential
source of savings and foreign exchange. The rise in officially recorded remittances is
seen as the result of economic policy changes in many developing countries, which
encourage remitters to shift from informal to formal channels to transfer their funds.
Efforts to curb money laundering and terrorist financing have also brought more transfers
into the official fold. However, estimating the size of international migrant remittances is
still a huge problem owing to transfers that take place informally or in kind (Massey and
Parrado, 1994). Micro-level studies do gather data, but they are not able to provide
information on total incomes within surveyed households. While the level of
international migration and remittances continues to grow, data on international
migration remains unreliable.
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Figure 5. Top Twenty Countries as Sources of Remittances
Source: Quarterly Magazine o f the International Monetary Fund, December 2005, volume 42,
number 4, prepared by Dilip Ratha, Senior Economist, Development Prospects Group, and Task
Manager, Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications o f Remittances and
Migration, World Bank.
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Figure 6. Top Twenty Countries as Recipient of Remittances
Source: Quarterly Magazine o f the International Monetary Fund, December 2005, volume 42,
number 4, prepared by Dilip Ratha, Senior Economist, Development Prospects Group, and Task
Manager, Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications o f Remittances and
Migration, World Bank.
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However, migrant remittances do constitute a large and important source of
capital for many developing countries, contributing to domestic savings, easing foreign
exchange constraints, and offering a means to finance trade deficits. In 2003, remittances
to developing countries totaled some $93 billion, exceeding development aid from all
other sources. Current research is focusing on ways to reduce the cost of remitting funds
and on increasing their social impact, by examining six areas, namely: i) the level of
remittances; ii) the transfer channels and fees charged; iii) uses to which remittances are
put and their impact on recipient families and communities; iv) incentives used by
developing countries to attract remittances; v) how the level and use of these remittances
are affected by the recipient country’s macroeconomic policies and conditions; and vi)
the consequent impact on the recipient country.
For an increasing number of labor exporting countries, a lot of attention has been
focused on the relationship between international migration, brain drain, and economic
growth. Some of the economic costs associated with migration of the highly skilled and
the educated are reduced through remittances. Not only are remittances critical to the
foreign exchange position of many labor-exporting countries but also play a vital role in
the consumption and investment behavior of migrant households themselves. Perhaps
because of their importance to both labor-exporting countries and households,
remittances tend to be the best measured and recorded aspect of the migration experience.
(2) Return Migrations
International migration today differs in character and scope as compared to the
last century when migration was generally seen as a one-way movement primarily from
Asia, Africa, and Latin America to Australia, Canada and the United States. It was
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generally assumed that those who left the old world never came back to their origin.
Since then, migration theory has undergone a fundamental change, moving from the
classic “individual relocation” genre initiated by Ravenstein32 a century ago. However,
even Ravenstein had noted the principle of return migration in his publicized list of
migration laws: “Stream and Counterstream: Each main current of migration produces a
compensating counter-current.”33
Return migrations are usually considered as the final phase of the migration
project. Periodic returns for short vacation followed by overseas employment within the
same migration project are not considered as return migration. In all of the literature on
return, there exist some underlying assumptions about return. The first assumption views
return as temporary, for example migrants who cannot renew their contracts return and
then re-migrate for new projects. The second assumption treats return as permanent but
forced to return. For instance, writings such as one by Hernandez Alvarez, who has
written about Puerto Ricans migrants in the 1960s returning to Puerto Rico from the
United States as a result of being displaced from their jobs by automation and
mechanization.34 King35 and Rhoades36 have also documented the massive return flows
of European guest workers or Gasterbeiter from Germany and other industrialized
northern European nations due to economic recessions. And third, return is chosen
32 Ravenstein, “The Laws o f Migration,” Journal o f Royal Statistical Society LII (June 1889): 288.
33 Everett S. Lee, “A Theory o f Migration,” Demography 3 number 1 (1966): 48.
34 Alvarez, J. Hemandes, “Migration, Return and Development,” Economic Development and Cultural
Change 116(1968): 574-88.
35 R. L. King, “Return Migration: Review o f Some Cases from Southern Europe,” Mediterranean Studies 1
number 2 (1978).
36 R. Rhoads, “European Cyclical Migration and Economic Development: the Case o f
Southern Spain,” in Urban Life, eds. G. Gmelch and W.P. Zenner, (New York: St. Martin’s, 1980).
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because offailure or homesickness (non-economic factors). This has been particularly
true for the Israeli, Irish, and Newfoundland migrants.
Migration studies related to ‘return’ draw our attention to typologies of return
migration, keeping in mind the basic differences between migrants intending their
departure to be permanent and those who intend it to be temporary.
In contemporary use, a wide variety of terms have been used to describe return
migration. It its various forms these are:37 (i) temporarily (from short visits to permanent
repatriation); (ii) spatially (from one’s original place of origin to a reconstructed
homeland); and (iii) legally (from voluntary to coerced movements). In its broadest
sense, “return migration has been defined as the movement of emigrants back to their
homelands to resettle.”38 Given this understanding, four types of return have been
identified in the literature on return with respect to timing and decision-making.39
In this dissertation there is an attempt to look beyond traditional theories of return
migration and explain it as a voluntary choice in response to the pull factors at origin
(fifth type of return in Table 2). In chapter V, there will be an attempt to explain return
with the help of case studies using India as source country and U.S. as host country,
where an increasing number of Indians are seen to return voluntarily in response to pull
factors at origin.

37 Lynellyn D. Long and Ellen Oxfeld, Coming Home: Refugees, Migrants, and Those Who Stayed Behind
(Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 2004). The contributors to this volume provide a series o f
ethnographic case studies to develop a comparative analysis o f return.
38 George Gmelch, “Return Migration,” Annual Review o f Anthropology 9 (1980): 136.
39 Graziano Battistella, “Return Migration in the Philippines: Issues and Policies,” in International
Migration: Prospects and Policies in a Global Market, ed. Douglas Massey and E.J. Taylor, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004) 213.
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Table 1. Types of Return Migration
1. Voluntary

At the end of the migration period

Migrants’ objectives are achieved

2. Other
factors

Intolerable working conditions,
changes in motivation or
aspirations, family issues prompting
return etc.

Setback for the original project

3. End of the
project or
contract for
which the
migrant was
hired

Project-tied workers, usually ends
with the completion of the
economic activity.

Migrants’ objectives are achieved

4. Return
generated by
crises

Retrenchment, repatriation for
health or legal reasons, or war-like
situations

Setback for the original project

5. Return
generated by
pull factors at
origin

Investments in businesses, health,
and education sectors

Migrants’ objectives are achieved after
they return

Source: Graziano Battistella, “Return Migration in the Philippines: Issues and Policies,” in International
Migration: Prospects and Policies in a Global Market, ed. Douglas Massey and E J. Taylor, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004) 213.
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In the literature associated with return, none of the theories or assumptions put
forward so far has explained the return migration of professionals as a voluntary act to
invest in home country. So far, migrant professionals have been primarily discussed as
an international class of labor operating within the preconditions of global inequality that
generate the economic incentives for individuals to leave a less developed country for a
developed one. With increased flexibility in the flow of capital and trade goods, return
migration has assumed increasing importance as an economic and social strategy for
families. It further takes on new meanings that have important political, social,
economic, and cultural consequences for the sending country.
Studies relating to return usually discuss problems of economic reintegration and
social adjustments of the returnees. In the case of Pakistan, for instance, only half of
returnees were able to find employment immediately after return and almost 30 percent
remained unemployed after two years. The same result has been found in Kerala, India,
Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.40 Even tough, social adjustments upon return are major
issues, the relatively short time spent abroad does not account for changes in community
or cultural values. The biggest problems are usually psychological owing to drops in
income levels and changes in consumption habits related to unemployment or low-wage
employment upon return. In most contexts, return migrants usually exhibit an inclination
towards consumption rather than productive investment in industry. Return migrants also

40 For Pakistan see: Ijaz S. Gilani, “Pakistan,” in Middle East Interlude: Asian Workers Abroad, eds.
Manolo Abella and Yogesh Atal (Bangkok: UNESCO, 1986); for India see Gopinathan P.R. Nair, “Asian
Migration to the Arab World: Kerala (India),” in Migration to the Arab World: Experience o f Returning
Migrants, ed. Godfrey Gunatilleke (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1991); For Sri Lanka see
Godfrey Gunatilleke, “Sri Lanka,” in Migration to the Arab World: Experience o f Returning Migrants, ed.
Godfrey Gunatilleke (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1991); and for Bangladesh see Raisul A.
Mahmood, “Bangladeshi Returned Migrants from the Middle East: Process, Achievement, and
Adjustment,” in Migration to the Arab World: Experience o f Returning Migrants, eds. Godfrey Gunatilleke
(Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1991).
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encounter difficulties in finding employment in the home country, thus preferring to
establish their own small businesses.
Thus return typologies, although useful for policy analysis, are not useful in
describing determinants of return migration.41 While economic factors are cited as the
most relevant motivation for the decision to migrate (push factors at the origin and the
pull factors at the destination), personal and family aspects seem to play an important role
in the decision to return.42 Even though a number of migration theories (Massey et al.
1993)43 explain why international migration begins, much less effort has been dedicated
to explaining return.
Economically speaking, the return of certain professional groups does have some
benefits for the home country. Investments, usually in businesses, health, and education
sectors stimulate economic growth and act as a means to counter dependency on foreign
capital. However, as illustrated by a United Nations report in 1997, “return migrations
can only have a positive impact on development when the country of origin provides a
proper social and economic environment for the productive use of the skills and savings
of return migrants.”44 It is not by accident that the most successful cases of return
policies have been found in the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs), where scientific,

41 See Rosemarie Rogers, “Return Migration in Comparative Perspectives,” in The Politics o f Return, ed.
Daniel Kubat (Staten Island, New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1984).
42 See W. Dumon, “Problems Faced by Migrants and their Family Members, Particularly Second
Generation Migrants, in Returning to and Reintegrating into their Countries o f Origin,” International
Migration 24 (1986): 113-28.
43 These include: (i) neoclassical economics: macro theory; (ii) neoclassical economics: micro theory, (iii)
new economics o f migration; (iv) dual labor market theory; (v) world systems theory; (vi) network theory;
(vii) institutional theory and (viii) migration systems theory.
44 See United Nations Secretariat, Population Division, International Migration and Development: The
Concise Report (New York: United Nations Reproduction Section, 1997).
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technological, and industrial sectors have already advanced, and where the manpower
may effectively be employed (for example, India, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan).
In addition to sending country governments, many international organizations
have also come up with programs to better facilitate the return o f the skilled migrants.
Regarded as carriers of capital, technology and entrepreneurship, skilled migrants are
seen as contributing to the development of their native communities. United Nations
Development Program’s Transfer of knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN)
helps many qualified expatriates to return to work in their countries on specific projects
on a volunteer basis. These programs, however, have been most successful when they
have been supported by their active Diaspora organizations.
(3) Diaspora Networks
The notion of migration networks has a long tradition and goes as far back as
early 20th century with Polish peasants in Europe and America.45 In contemporary terms,
it remains important in its explanation of the movement of the highly skilled people.
Migration networks have been defined as sets of interpersonal relations that link migrants
or returned migrants with relatives, friends or fellow countrymen at home. “They convey
information, provide financial assistance, facilitate employment and accommodation, and
give support in various forms.”46
For the past two decades, network approaches have led to many conceptual and
empirical developments in the studies of network analysis with important implications for

45 See W.I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, The Polish Peasant in Europe and America (Boston: William
Badger, 1918-20).
46 Joaquin Arango, “Theories o f International Migration.” in International Migration in the New
Millennium: Global Movement and Settlement, Daniele Joly (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company,
2004) 28.
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brain drain. Gains through diaspora networks are the most recent policy that has come
under full implementation with regards to migrations of highly qualified human
resources. As a brain gain strategy it differs from the return in the sense that it does not
aim at the physical repatriation of the nationals living and working abroad. Its purpose is
the remote mobilization of a Diaspora’s resources and their association to the country of
origins’ programs for example, China, Colombia, and some African countries.
Surprisingly, the abundant literature available on the migration of highly skilled
persons, in particular - the so-called brain drain - only recently refers to networks as
brain gain attempts through diaspora networks. The human capital paradigm, important
in the discussion on brain drain, with theoretical bases going back to Gary Becker’s book
(1964,1993) fails to bring operational solutions to the issue. And despite tireless efforts
of definition and standardization of categories (CNUCED/UNCTAD, 1884), there exists
no consensus on human capital models and the international allocation of resources
connected with knowledge carriers. Human capital models linked to brain drain are
based on the assumption that accumulation of skills corresponds only to the education
phase and fails to take into account when and where their skills have been developed.
Since “education and training are the most important investments in human capital”47
previous discourses in associating brain drain with human capital deserves
reconsideration. In addition, growth theories emphasize the role of knowledge in the
development process with an increasing number of skilled emigrants48 or human capital

47 Gary Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to
Education, 3rd edition (Chicago and London: The University o f Chicago Press, 1993), 17.
48 See N.U. Haque and S. Kim, Human Capital Flight: Impact o f Migration on Income and Growth, 1994,
IMF working paper, International Monetary Fund (Washington D.C., 1994); W. Carrington and E.
Detragiache, “How Extensive is the Brain Drain?” Finance and Development: A Quarterly Magazine o f
the IMF 36 number 2 (June 1999).
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forming networks of highly skilled expatriates. This vision, which emphasizes potential
gain instead o f immeasurable loss, can be considered as a paradigmatic shift from the
earlier literature on loss of human capital as contributing to brain drain.
The rise of highly skilled diaspora networks is fairly significant in the last couple
of decades. These networks link groups or individuals of expatriate intellectuals, who
have retained ties to their countries of origin. Some scholars have termed them as
transnational migration circuits, transnational social fields, transnational communities,
and even bi-national societies. Commonly referred to as Diaspora49 some generalized
relationships between migrants and their home and host country have emerged.
Diaspora members usually demonstrate a high stability factor and a commitment
to the host as well as to their home country. However links to the country of origin
remain less professionally oriented and more personal, with personal connections being
more visible in the host country. For instance, one study on South African expatriates
shows only a 37 percent professional contact with their country of origin as opposed to
54 percent maintaining personal or family contact.50
Most Diaspora members are well settled in their adopted countries and far from
being wandering intellectuals and business nomads, constitute one of the wealthiest,
educated, and professional group with employments in senior and executive positions.
Retaining strong emotional ties to their country of origin, they usually bring benefits
through extensive socio-professional networks. Usually this is done through formal,

49 See R. Cohen, “Diasporas and the Nation-State: From Victims to Challengers,” International Affairs 72
(1976): 507-520.
50 See D. Teffera, “Revisiting the Doctrine o f Human Capital Mobility in the Information Age,” in Brain
Drain and Capacity Building in Africa, ECA/IDRC/IOM, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
(London: International Organization for Migration, 2000).
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institutionally organized, networking. Overseas nationals are often able to leverage a
network to raise funds, get mentorship, access distribution channels, promote the image
of their country through their successes, and spawn more enterprise. “This kind of
network usually becomes a social project, a quasi-institutional form of community
generation instead of its by-product.”51 Diaspora networks thus provide access to the
emerging technology, financial resources and physical capital of the developed world.
The Asian tigers52, a case in point, have benefited immensely from the diaspora networks
of their professionals in research institutions and corporations abroad. The remote
mobilization of intellectuals abroad and their connection to scientific, technological and
cultural programs at home normally includes:
■ The facilitation, generation, discussion, exchange, and dissemination of ideas and
innovative approaches in various subject areas, thereby harnessing
knowledge/intellectual capital that can help to foster development;
■ The help to nurture and provide intellectual support and mentorship to young,
emerging leaders (in the case of Africa); and
■ The formation of professional, business, political, and social networks and
alliances that can serve to advance discourse and action on various issues that are
critical to progress.
The development of expatriate knowledge networks provides a unique
opportunity to study the diasporic populations. Studies done on the networks of two
countries, Colombia and South Africa: The Colombian Network o f Scientists and
Engineers Abroad (“red Caldas”) and the South African Network of Skills Abroad
(“SANSA”) provide important evidence linking diasporas to their countries of origin

51 See J.B. Meyer.
52 The East Asian Tigers, sometimes also referred to as Asia’s ‘Four Little Dragons’, refers to the
economies o f Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore; these territories and nations are noted for
maintaining high growth rates and rapid industrialization between early 1960s and 1990s.
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through networks. These transnational relationships between the diaspora networks and
their countries of origin depend on a number of factors that strengthen the link between
them. They are: (i) availability of information and communication networks; (ii) the
increasingly important role migrants play in sending country economies; (iii) attempts by
sending states to legitimize diaspora populations by providing services to migrants and
their children; and (iv) the social and political marginalization of migrants in their host
countries.53 In addition, deregulations of international financial markets coupled with
new technologies have made network connections increasingly important as brain gain
strategies.
An OECD working paper54 also identifies the application of new information
technologies as causing a reduction in the international migration of the highly skilled.
Since knowledge is transferable geographically in a number of ways not requiring
physical presence, diaspora networks become more viable than ever. Modem satellite
and fiber-optic communications, faxes and emails make it easier to establish network
links with the diaspora, highly skilled groups whose main contribution is knowledge.
Although the concept of the diaspora as a ‘brain bank’ from which knowledge can
be borrowed is not new, the concept takes on new and promising dimensions with the
growth of ‘knowledge networks’ in the last ten years (41 highly skilled diaspora networks
emerged between the late 1980s and the end of 1990s). Expatriate professionals can
promote the exchange of skills and knowledge, especially in countries where they are

53 See R. C. Smith, “Transnational Migration: Assimilation and Political Community,” in The City and the
World: New York City in a Global Context, ed. M. Crahan and A Vourvoulias-Bush (New York: Council
on Foreign Relations, 1997).
54 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Trade in Professional Services:
Advancing Liberalization Through Regulatory Reform, (Danvers, MA: Clearance Center, 1997).
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residing in large numbers such as the United States. Diaspora networks can thus be
important channels for knowledge transfers through what the International Organization
for Migration (IOM) calls “virtual return migration” as opposed to physical travel.
Thus, highly skilled expatriate networks, through a connectionist approach linking
Diaspora members with their countries of origin, turning brain drain into a gain approach
with important implications for development.

BRAIN DRAIN AND BRAIN GAIN: ROLE OF THE STATE
Theories of international migration have paid little attention to state interventions,
while the literature on international relations says relatively little about population
movements, except the refugee phenomenon that has been described as an outcome of
conflicts.55 Questions such as, how do state actions shape population movements, when
do such movement lead to cooperation and not conflict and can international migration
shape the future of international relations between countries,56 are questions that have
received far too little attention. The role of the state in initiating, selecting, restraining,
and ending international migration movements”57 has been surprisingly deficient in
international migration theories.
So far, studies on ‘role of the state’ have been limited to immigration policies of
the receiving countries. Largely concerned with the effect of illegal immigration on
demographic composition, very few studies focus on the role played by legal migrants in
55 See Aristide, R. Zolberg, A. Suhrke, and S. Aguayo, Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee
Crisis in the Developing World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
56 See Myron Weiner, International Migration and Security (Westview: Boulder, 1993).
57 Michael S. Teitelbaum, “The Role o f the State in International Migration,” World Affairs 8 number 2
(Winter 2002): 157.
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host countries and the dynamics between sending and receiving countries. For example
U.S. migration relations with major labor-sending nations such as the Philippines, Korea
and Taiwan have not been studied in detail.”58
Receiving societies, both historically and contemporarily, welcome global citizens
who contribute most to their economy. For a long time, there has been a general
awareness of the various benefits to the US population by capturing the mobile, skilled
foreign professionals. The reasoning behind this statement lies in the assumption that
individuals increase or at least do not decrease the per capita income of the receiving
societies. Empirical evidence proves that immigration, being selective through a set of
laws and regulations, prefers legal migrants with a definitive skill set.
Governments in receiving countries, more often than not, try to admit migrants
selectively, using instruments ranging from visa restrictions and border controls to
legislated criteria for admission - age, wealth, education, national origin and family
ties.59 In addition, lower costs of transportation and communication has increased free
labor mobility facilitating easy migration to take place to the rich, industrial countries of
the West. Most of these countries and continents have tried to limit this to legal migration
and the migration of the highly skilled as opposed to illegal60 or unskilled labor work
force.

58 Christopher Mitchell, “International Migration, International Relations and Foreign Policy,”
International Migration Review 23 number 3 (Autumn 1989): 694.
59 World Development Report, Workers in an Integrating World (New York: Oxford University Press,
1995), 67.
60 United States has the greatest number o f illegal migrants, perhaps as many as 4 million; Western Europe
has about 3 million, mainly from Africa.
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In the Unites States, the criteria for selection for these specialty workers suggest
that it has been designed to pull in or drain the best from the source countries. Clauses
such as, ‘must hold a U.S. baccalaureate or higher degree as required by the specialty
occupation from an accredited college or university’61 in it has fixed the ceiling for
workers with a graduate degree. In addition, the Immigration & Naturalization Services
(INS) determines whether the specialty occupation is a combination of education,
training, and/or experience. Specialty occupations usually include computer systems
analysts and programmers, physicians, professors, engineers, and accountants under the
category Hl-B. In this regard, the predominance of Asians in the “new waves”62 of
immigrants admitted to the United States has been widely documented in the literature.63
The article by Kanjanapan reveals that the recent flows of Asian professionals to the
United States based on the Immigration & Naturalization Service data for the fiscal years
1988 - 2004, possess high levels of skills and education. Recently in Germany, the
Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder also issued 20,000 green cards to computer
and software specialists from outside the European Union (EU) as a competitive strategy
vis-a-vis the United States in an obvious attempt to recruit skilled manpower to benefit
the German economy.
The role of the state of the sending country also deserves attention with respect to
brain gain strategies. This becomes important for both policy implications in general,
61 U.S. Department o f Homeland Security, 2004 Yearbook o f Immigration Statistics (Washington D.C.:
Office o f Immigration Statistics, 2006).
62 Wilawan Kanjanapan, “The Immigration o f Asian Professionals to the United States: 1988 - 1990,”
International Migration Review 29 number 1 (1990): 7.
63 J.M. Liu, I. M. Ong, and C. Rosenstein, “Dual Chain Migration: Post 1965 Filipino Immigration to the
United States,” International Migration Review 25 number 3 (1991): 487-515; and M. Wong and C.
Hirschman, “The New Asian Immigrants,” in Culture, Ethnicity and Identity: Current Issues in Research,
ed. W.C. McCready (New York: Academic Press, 1980).
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and development in particular. Both ‘return’ and ‘non-return’ yields definite benefits for
the sending countries with the roles of the respective governments being deemed as
crucial in encouraging and fostering diaspora links.
The relative success of Chinese (Taipei), Korea, and Ireland in fostering return
migration has been attributed to the opening of their economies and adopting policies that
fosters domestic investments in innovation and in R&D. Developing countries with some
infrastructure in R&D, such as India, are beginning to attract the return of their highly
skilled migrants, as well as their money and business contacts. China represents one of
the best examples of how governments can carefully cultivate their populations abroad
and convert brain drain into a gain. Popularly termed as the ‘Bamboo Network’ overseas
Chinese comprising fifty five million people, together earning about US $700 billion per
year “provide up to US $ 1.5 to 2 trillion of floating capital to Chinese diaspora
businesses around the world, investments in foreign enterprise, and investments in
China."64 Although China still suffers from brain drain, a lot of effort is being made by
the Chinese government to attract its nationals to return or remotely reinvest in China.
Hungarian scientists have also started to returning home, helping reverse years of
brain drain. According to one study,65 it has been generally observed that “scientists
come back bringing new techniques, international connections, and good publication
records, which makes them more attractive to grant agencies, so they might bring in more
support.” The ‘International Organization of Migration’ (IOM) has also discussed
extensively how brain drain can be reversed as brain circulation. IOM’s ‘Migration for
64 McKinsey & Company, Indians Without Borders (New Delhi: Federation o f Indian Chambers o f
Commerce and Industry, 2003) A3.
65 Jane Burgermeister, Brain circulation in Hungary, (2004). Available [Online] :<
http://www.biomedcentral.com/news/20041126/02 >[11 April 2005].
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Development in Africa (MIDA)’ during its 84th Council Session, held on 2nd-4th
December 2002, looked at ‘transfer of expertise’ as one possible solution for
development in the region.
Thus, “scientific diaspora” and “immigrant entrepreneur networks” can also help
sending countries capture benefits and know-how from emigrants overseas. Grass roots
initiatives in South Africa and Latin America have been developed to link researchers
abroad to networks in their home countries. Indian professionals in the US have been the
primary drivers o f knowledge and capital flows to India. The Indian government has
contributed to the emergence of these private networks through legislative and tax rules
that encourage remittances and investment from Indians abroad. The diaspora idea has
also been put to work by advanced countries, like Switzerland, whose online network
www.Swiss-List.com had been established to encourage networking among Swiss
scientists in the US and to foster contacts with peers in Switzerland.
Governments in sending countries can and have done quite a bit in addressing the
problem of brain drain. As one initiative, they are developing centers of excellence for
scientific research and framing the conditions for innovation and high tech
entrepreneurship to make their country attractive to highly skilled workers, both from
within the country and from outside. For instance, India’s investment in human resources
in science and technology and own R&D capabilities dates from the 1950s. And China
has recently launched a project to develop one hundred universities into world-class
institutions that not only provide higher education training, but also academic
employment and research opportunities.66

66 Billion-dollar initiatives such as the 2/11 campaign and the Elite University Program have boosted the
number and quality o f local universities. Through the 2/11 campaign the government spread about $2.2
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Irrespective of these initiatives, common political and bureaucratic hurdles in the
home country also goes a long way in explaining the driving force behind out-migration
flows to countries with higher income opportunities and better working conditions and a
lack of return. Some common hurdles associated with return include unattractive
facilities for work, the recruitment of people remaining selective and corrupt, and lower
salaries than what they were earning abroad.
Several scholars have put forward possible remedies for sending countries to try
and recover losses caused by brain drain. These include:67
■ Upgrading the quality and status of public services:
■ Raising the standards of tertiary education
■ Making better use of existing national capacity
■ Restricting the use of technical cooperation to where it is needed
■ Bonding of university graduates to national service
■ Immigration restrictions in receiving countries
■ Brain gain: with returning migrants bringing back foreign education, valuable
management experience, increased ties to foreign research institutions and access
to global networks.
The migration of the highly educated and skilled labor to the West for better
salaries, education, and working conditions has usually resulted in a national loss for the
countries of origin. Although remittances and other forms of investment benefit the
home country, a large part of this virtually depends on the role that sending countries’
billion among 100 universities, while the Elite University Program spread about $1.2 billion among 10 top
universities. Overall, 2.9 percent o f the country’s gross domestic product goes to education. The
government wants every middle school and most primary schools to be connected with the Internet by
2005. Source: Michael Kanellos, Tapping brainpower: New generation o f engineers. Available
[Online]:<http://news.com.com/2009-1001 -940319.html> [15th May 2005],
67 Carlos Lopes and Thomas Theisohn, Ownership, Leadership and Transformation: Can We Do Better fo r
Capacity Development (London and Sterling: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 2003) 124-126.
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states might play to stimulate this investment and development. On the whole, the ‘role
of the state’ of sending countries remains one of the most understudied fields in
international migration flows of the highly skilled.

BRAIN DRAIN AND (UNDER) DEVELOPMENT
The post-colonial era began around the 1950s with great enthusiasm and
optimism revolving around the development of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. It was
generally assumed that investment, education, and modem management would be
sufficient for their economic growth. The more prosperous countries usually helped by
donating or lending resources, as was the Marshall Plan in Europe. A lot of it involved
creating and staffing training centers in those regions and by welcoming a large number
of foreign students in their countries.68
However, by the 1960s the development process remained uneven and
international gaps between the developed and the less developed countries widened rather
than narrowed. There was also a growing demand for migrants to work in the service
sectors in the developed countries. With immigration laws relaxing in the developed
world, this migration soon became a trend with both students and educated professionals
leaving their home countries. ‘Brain drain’ thus became a common terminology with
people in the developing world protesting against the richer countries for ‘raiding’69 their
talent.

68 A study on the PhDs and their mobility has been prepared by the National Research Council, National
Academy o f Sciences, Washington D.C. in 1971.
69 See William A Glaser and G. C. Habers.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

61

Brain drain has been associated with underdevelopment since educational levels,
to a large extent, determine why some countries are rich while others are poor. With the
highly educated people leaving the country it is generally assumed that the nation incurs
substantial losses in the money it put in the training o f the individual. And with an
increasing number of scientists, engineers, physicians, and other professionals from
developing countries leaving to work in Canada, the United States, and Western Europe,
‘brain drain’ becomes a contentious issue in the North-South debate. Not only is the pool
of skilled workers in the receiving country better educated and therefore contributing
more to the host economy than the native worker but is also endorsing the fact that, by
investing in education in a developing country may not lead to faster economic growth.
Thus any discussion linking brain drain to underdevelopment needs to first ask how
extensive is this brain drain and second, how can this lost human capital be utilized to
augment development in the sending country. The first question examining ‘extent’
usually depends on the magnitude of the flow and on the international focus it received.
Despite the lack of systematic data about international migrants, William J.
Carrington and Enrica Detragiache70 try to estimate the extent of brain drain by studying
immigration into the United States by educational category. Among their most important
conclusions they find that; (a) immigration flows of individuals with no more than a
primary education are quite small, both in absolute terms and relative to other educational
groupings; (b) the largest group of immigrants into the United States consists of
individuals with secondary education from other North American countries, primarily
Mexico; and (c) the second largest group consists of highly educated migrants from Asia
and the Pacific. Among the countries in Asia and the Pacific, the majority of people from
70 See W. Carrington and E. Detragiache.
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countries such as China, India and Philippines have tertiary education. Ultimately, it
should be remembered that although the volume of skilled migration is relatively small as
compared to the migration of unqualified workers, its social and economic relevance is
high for both the sending and receiving countries.
At the international level, brain drain issues were formally addressed in the
United Nations General Assembly for the first time in 1967. The United Nations, fearing
that ‘brain drain’ issues would jeopardize the United Nations’ second decade of
development, introduced various resolutions sponsored by developing countries. These
countries essentially had the demand that its richer members, in particular the United
States, change their migration policies and encourage foreign students to learn skills that
would also be beneficial to the home country, and eventually encourage these students to
return. In this way, compensation to the developing countries could be made for the
losses accrued by this migration. Second, resolutions were adopted with a view to
obtaining reliable facts about the magnitude, causes, and consequences of brain drain.
The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) also came up with a
report that compiled facts about the outflow of trained professionals from developing
countries.71
The United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 49/127, notes the positive
impact that international migration could have on development process of both the
sending and receiving nations. In one of its resolutions on notes that:

71 See Gregory Henderson, Emigration o f Highly-Skilled manpower from the Developing Countries (New
York: UNITAR, 1970).
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“Bearing in mind that orderly international migration can have positive impacts
upon development and varied impacts upon both sending and receiving
10
countries,”

And in resolution 50/123, recognizes the importance of identifying the linkages among
the social, economic, and cultural factors that relates international migration and
development.

“Urges Member States and the United Nations system to strengthen international
cooperation in the area of international migration and development in order to
address the root causes of migration, especially those related to poverty, and to
maximize the benefits of international migration to those concerned and increase
the likelihood that international migration has positive consequences for the
sustainable development of both sending and receiving countries;”7

Through some of these studies and international efforts it may be fairly safe to
conclude that brain drain is fairly extensive and there is an overall tendency for migration
rates to be higher for highly educated individuals with negative impact for the sending
country. With the important exceptions of Central America and Mexico, the highest
migration rates are for individuals with a tertiary education.
At this stage it may also be worthwhile to examine what causes74 educated people
to leave their home countries and its implications for the core-periphery debate, since it is
closely related to development.

72 UN General Assembly, Resolution 49/127, (1994). Available
1Onlinel:<http ://www.im.org/documents/ga/res/49/a49r 127 .htmX3 September 2004],
73 UN General Assembly, Resolution 50/123, (1994). Available
[Online]:<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/50/a50rl23-htm>[3 September 2004].
74 Some o f the causes analyzed are wage differentials, differences in the quality o f life, educational
opportunities for children, and job security may also play a role, as may the desire to interact with a broader
group o f similarly skilled colleagues and in some cases an escape from the political tyranny existing in the
country.
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One of the underlying assumptions of migration theory has been that the movement
o f people from areas that had abundant labor but scarce capital to areas that were rich in
capital and short of labor.75 Modernization theory, one of the correlates of neoclassical
thought, essentially came up with a model of development that would result in balance
between resources and population pressures and the ultimate elimination of differences
between rural-agrarian and urban-industrial areas. In other words, migrants, through
savings and investment, become agents o f change in their home countries.
However this has not always been the case since a lot of the money spent has ended
up being spent on consumer items and not for economic investment, and the skills
learned abroad could not be easily applied to the rural home context.76 Thus population
movements have often resulted in migration-dependent communities and the generation
of further migration through the diffusion of consumerism. Looking at the obvious
shortcomings associated with the modernization theory, scholars have taken a more
macro-level approach when dealing with issues linking population movements and
development.
The reason why individuals respond to structural differences between countries or
regions and engage in migration is explained by the micro version of neoclassical theory
by Todaro. Migration is seen as a result of individual decisions made by rational actors
who seek to improve their well being by moving to places where the reward of their labor
75 See B.D. Lewis and E. Thorbecke, “District level Economic Linkages in Kenya: Evidence Based on a
Small Regional Social Accounting Matrix,” World Development 20 number 6 (1992): 881-897; G. Ranis
and J.C.H. Fei, “A Theory o f Economic Development,” American Economic Review 51 (1961): 533-565;
J.R. Harris and M. P. Todaro, “Migration, Unemployment, and Development: A Two Sector Analysis,”
American Economic Review 60 (1970): 47-57; and M.P. Todaro, International Migration in Developing
Countries (Geneva: International Labor Office, 1976).
76 See Katy Gardner, Global Migrants, Local Lives: Travel and Transformation in Rural Bangladesh
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); and George Gmelch.
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will be higher than that at home, in a measure sufficient to offset the tangible and
intangible costs in the move. Although this move was the result of an individual’s
decision, spontaneous and voluntary, it found resonance in the historical-structural
inspiration, with its strong Marxist overtones, embodied in dependency theory.
Dependency theory draws broadly on Marxist thought and more specifically on
the work of dependency theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank,77 and the world systems
theorists such as Immanuel Wallerstein.78 These theories frame migration in the context
of a global economy, core-periphery relations, and the development of the under
developed regions. It posits that the evolution of capitalism has given way to an
international order composed of core industrialized countries and peripheral agrarian ones
linked by uneven and asymmetrical relations, where the advancement of the former rests
on the exploitation of the latter. “Dependency theory has little to say about migration, at
least in the international context, except that one of the mechanisms through which
inequalities between countries were perpetuated and reinforced, were through brain
drain.”79
Within this perspective, concepts such as the international division of labor or the
internationalization of the proletariat have emerged to describe the inequities between
labor-exporting, low-wage countries and labor-importing, high-wage countries. “Thus in

77 See Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1967).
78 See Immanuel Wallerstein, The M odem World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins o f the
European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974).
79 Daniele Joly, International Migration in the New Millennium: Global Movement and Settlement
(Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004) 19.
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one sense development encourages migration as it creates inequality and raises awareness
•

•

about the larger society and hence enhances a relative sense of deprivation.”

sn

At the international level, various policies and agendas such as the one held in
Geneva in 2005, outlines the importance of partnership in bridging migration and
development.81 These are identified as key to fostering development in countries with
high levels of out-migration. These include:
■ The importance of partnerships in bridging migration and development
■ Partnerships for development: harnessing the potential of migration for
development
■ Bilateral partnerships between governments of countries of origin and destination
■ Partnerships between governments of origin and destination countries,
international organizations and migrants’ associations/diasporas
The overall objective of the workshop was to examine why migration should be
considered a development issue and to look at the synergies and points of contact
between migration and development agendas with special focus on partnerships and
cooperation, and the engagement of the highly skilled diaspora.
Migration both affects and is affected by socio-economic development. However,
given the multiple ways in which international migration can interact with development
and the tendency of research to focus on just a few interactions, current knowledge

80 Caroline B. Brettel, “Theorizing Migration in Anthropology: the Social Construction o f Networks,
Identities, Communities and Global-spaces,” in Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines, ed. Caroline
B. Brettel and James F. Hollifield (New York: Routeledge, 2000), 103.
81 A recent workshop on migration and development, titled ‘Mainstreaming Migration into Development
Policy Agendas’ and held on 2-3 February 2005 in Geneva
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regarding the interrelations between international migration and development is far from
complete and few generalizations are possible.
Interdependencies between migration and development primarily ask two
questions: does development trigger migration and/or does migration trigger
development?
For the former it would appear that brain drain occurs from the most poor, highly
populated and environmentally undesirable regions. In short, regions that can be
considered low in the Human Development Index (HDI) or those that are far behind in
the development process. Historically, waves of migration have occurred from LDCs
mostly as labor flows, an element that determined the rate of economic growth in both the
sending and the receiving countries.82 However, the truth is that brain drain is most
likely to occur from countries that have reached a level of development and are
advancing in the development path. The loss of ‘brains’, in particular the international
migration of scientific and technical personnel, to developed countries is termed as a loss
given the data, that the best trained and most intellectually qualified prefer to move
abroad. Economic schools of thought put forward the ‘divergence theory’, that argues
that out-migration may in effect be an obstacle for the socio-economic development of
sending countries. The brain drain discussion with loss of valuable human capital is an
important example of the divergence school.
For the latter, the classic economic theory of the so-called ‘convergence school’
argues that sending countries obtain major benefits from out-migration for their

82 There were four outstanding transatlantic outflows o f migrants from Europe - 1844-54, 1863-73, 188188, and 1903-13.
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development process. Many empirical studies

indicate that on the whole migration

seems to have positive short-term effects for the sending and receiving countries. The
long-term effects, especially for the sending countries, are much more difficult to
estimate and normally do not have a strong impact on the development process, either in
a positive or negative way. The ‘Internationalist ’ position has also maintained that ‘brain
drain’ poses a very trivial problem in developing the underdeveloped regions of the
world.
On the whole, the concern of the world should remain focused on how to increase
the efficiency of development programs in third world countries and encourage the LDCs
to participate in world economic growth through international trade. A few individual
human beings do not normally have an impact on the macro-level conditions, but do
impact the conditions in both the sending and receiving countries.
Altogether, theories are important for our understanding of the mechanisms and
predictions for development and migration. However, there exists a need for careful
case-by-case analyses based on country or region specific macro conditions. A general
theory linking migration and development cannot be adopted for countries, both in the
North and the South. Countries in the South pose particular problems given the lack of
homogeneity within the south itself.

83 See Reiner Fischer and Thomas Straubhaar, “Interdependencies between Development and Migration,”
in International Migration, Immobility, and Development: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, eds. Tomas
Hammar, Grete Brochmann, Kristof Tamas, and Thomas Faist (New York: Oxford International Publishers
Ltd., 1997).
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BRAIN GAIN AND SOFT POWER: SOME GAPS IN THE LITERATURE
The last theme in this chapter discusses migrant or diaspora networks as an
important contribution in bridging the gap between international migrations and
international relations theories. Within this context, it is argued that the migration of the
highly skilled can be effectively utilized as soft power for their countries of origin,
redefining notions of asymmetrical interdependence between two countries. Insofar as
current theories are concerned, in all of the discussion on brain drain, brain gain and
future trends of migration flows (either capital or people) the core of the interest in the
migration of the highly skilled remains ‘economic

Most of the writings on migration

and international relations utilize the concept of an interdependent, global social system
to explain the linkage between them. In the influential view of Wallerstein,84 this
transnational pattern of social interaction arises with the dynamism of market capitalism
and produces very marked asymmetries of power between states in the economic ‘core’,
‘semi-periphery’ and ‘periphery’ of the world economy. Moving beyond dependency
theory that posits the importance of brain drain taking place from the South to the North
in economic terms, current theories do not explain in detail the political implications of
contemporary South to North migrations. This is a serious gap in the literature that links
international migration and international relations.
In political terms, migration studies strictly focus on subjects such as: (a) notion
of nation-state; (b) migration and control in the welfare state; (c) forced migration and
refugee movements; and (d) legitimacy and citizenship concerns. However, very similar
to the questions raised by economists concerning the relationship between migration and
economic development is the problem of migration and political change. With increasing
84 See Immanuel Wallerstein.
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migration of highly skilled people, both sending and receiving countries realize the
importance of Diaspora communities in their bilateral dealings, serving varied roles as
stakes or instruments in state-to-state interaction. For instance, large Diaspora groups
settled in the West can use their position to lobby, both directly and indirectly, issues of
concern for their countries of origin. Usually this includes both economic and political
concerns.85 Consequently, migration, in such situations loses its traditional image as a
sector of ‘low politics’ and may alter or even advance to other priorities in international
relations. Migration thus changes nature of power between two countries and becomes
multidimensional, changing from actor to actor in specific issue areas. Diaspora
communities of highly skilled people can be regarded as elements of soft power for the
sending country.

Soft Power
International relations theories define power as the ability to do things and control
others, to get others to do what they otherwise would not. “Traditionally, the test of a
O/T

great power was ‘strength for war.”

War was the ultimate game in which the cards of

international politics were played and estimates of relative power were proven. Over the
centuries, as technologies evolved, sources of power have shifted. The origin of the term

85 At extreme levels, Diaspora groups have used their position to carry out agitation, propaganda, and other
legal and illegal services on behalf o f their separatist movements. For example, Sikhs, Tamils, and
Muslims from Pakistani administered Kashmir are settled in sizeable numbers in Britain. These Diaspora
groups have been noted to render help to their co-ethnics in South Asia, who have been engaged in
protracted armed struggles against the states in the region in a bid to carve out their own separate states.
Another powerful Diaspora force in Europe is the large Kurdish population. The Kurds have been lobbying
governments and human rights groups for support for their right o f self-determination.
86 Joseph S. Nye, Power in the Global Information Age: from Realism to Globalization (London and New
York: Routledge, 2004) 69.
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soft power can be traced to the American academician Joseph Nye Jr., where he coined
the term in his books, (Bound to Lead, 1990) and (The Paradox of American Power,
2002). Here he developed the idea of this “third dimension” of power (after military and
economic power). He defines soft power as “the ability to establish preferences that
tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as attractive culture, ideology
and institutions. He specifies that soft power is not merely the same as influence, though
it is one source of influence.”87 It is further seen as the influence and attractiveness a
nation acquires when others are drawn to its culture and ideas through knowledge-based
diplomacy, scientific and other non-military skills. Nye, who developed the concept,
argues that soft power enables a nation to achieve desired outcomes in international
affairs through attraction rather than coercion.
Until recently, soft power had largely been an American weapon. Washington had
learned to wield its soft power as intelligently as its hard, or military and financial, might.
In his recent book, (the Paradox of American Power 2002), Nye has taken the analysis of
soft power beyond the United States suggesting that other countries could also acquire it.
According to him, three types of countries in today’s information age are likely to gain
soft power and succeed. These are: “(a) those whose dominant cultures and ideals are
closer to prevailing global norms (which now emphasize liberalism, pluralism, and
autonomy); (b) those with the most access to multiple channels of communication and
thus more influential over issues; (c) and those whose credibility is enhanced by their
domestic and international performance.”

oo

87 Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox o f American power: Why the World's only Superpower C an’t go it Alone
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 9.
88 Ibid., 69.
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In recent times, in the third point mentioned above, soft power has been translated
to large diasporic communities holding key economic and political positions in their
countries of residence. For countries such as India, Nye argues “in terms of soft power,
India has an established democracy, an effective leadership of non-aligned countries
during the cold war, an influential diaspora, and the largest motion picture industry,
competing with Hollywood in Asia and the Middle East.”89 The massive Chinese and
Indian expatriate communities of highly skilled in the United States - 2.4 million and 1.7
million respectively - play a critical role in promoting the political interests and culture
of their home countries through their powerful lobbies in Washington. “The Indian
community, which is now America’s richest ethnic minority, has become particularly
effective in influencing US policy toward South Asia.”90 Although not as significant or
dramatic, the repercussions of countries such as India and China exploding into the
American cultural imagination could be as significant as the explosions that blasted them
into the nuclear club. Though neither India nor China can really challenge the United
States, their rapid attainment of strong positions in both areas is leading the US to shore
up its own position in both fields.

International Migration and Asymmetrical Interdependence (AI)
The twenty first century brings forth different faces of power, where the “proof of
power would lie not in resources, but in the ability to change the behavior of states.”91

89 Ibid., 28.
90 See Jehangir Pocha, “The Rising Soft Power o f India and China,” New Perspectives Quarterly 20
number 1 (winter 2003): 1-30.
91 See Joseph S. Nye, 2004.
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Thus a critical question for sending countries with out-migration o f highly skilled people
is not whether brain drain is a benefit or cost, but to what extent will it be able to use the
presence of its diaspora in host societies for political and economic benefits. What this
dissertation is looking at specifically is the concept of dependence and power symmetry
in an asymmetrical interdependent (AI) relationship. As can be observed, bilateral
relationships have become very important, changing the dynamics of the ‘asymmetries’
in an interdependent relationship. More often than not, (AI) has been in favor of the
developed country as the more dominating partner in an interdependent relation. Rather
than looking at the relationship in simplistic terms where one is powerful and the other
more vulnerable, it becomes important to understand this relationship from a viewpoint
where asymmetries or dependence could be a variable and not a constant. Since “power
07

•

•

•

is passing from the ‘capital-rich’ to the ‘information-rich” , countries having a high
technological capacity will have a greater role to play in international politics.
Here, it becomes imperative to look at international migration as one factor that
may be responsible for adding on to the current theories on (AI). On power distributions
and complex interdependence (Keohane, 1983), the author believes that interdependent
relations may be asymmetrical in benefits and may include the sharing of vulnerabilities,
but is doubtful that any interstate behavior patterns dealing with migration would reach
the level of ‘international regimes’ (Krasner, 1983). However, he does concede that the
existence and refinement of such models of international action may provide ideal types
in relation to which migration practices may be evaluated.

92 Ibid., 73.
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Therefore, this research is a departure from previous works in the sense that it is
not an evaluation of power distribution within the international arena but attempts to
identify international migration as changing aspects of (AI) between two countries.
Although Joseph Nye remains pessimistic regarding the importance of
transnational communications between countries, he does place special attention on
international bargaining linkages, and the creation of transnational alliances. As an
interesting example he cites:
“It is unrealistic to imagine a small group of MIT-trained sons and daughters of
Indian, Japanese, and American middle-class parents threatening to detonate a
crude plutonium bomb in Boston unless American aid to Asia is immediately
increased.”93
However, the relevance of policy decisions in future, being more domestic than
foreign, would depend to a large extent, on flow of goods or people and the leverage they
can exert on bureaucrats and congressmen in the host countries. Here, diaspora networks
play an important role in pushing forward their issues and those of their home countries
on the Congressional agenda. Too often, foreign policy is seen as formulated by the
executive branch o f the government. However, Congress, private sector institutions, and
lobby groups are fairly effective in developing the consensus needed for an effective
foreign and economic policy. Nye identifies two main roles that the Congress plays in
these interdependent issues. First, congressional activity helps to legitimize the hard-offs
involved in many of these issues, and second, congressional hearings provide for
structured public involvement. Usually this involves the participation of a broad range of
groups including scientists, professionals and special interest organizations such as
diaspora communities.

93 Ibid., 158-159.
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Consequently, it has to be pointed out that while it is true that foreigners (either
skilled or unskilled) don’t have voting rights in the country of admission on many
interdependent issues, they do have capabilities to respond to legislation that sometimes
even legitimate voters do not have. Thus emphasis on the uses of migration as a policy
instrument may be extended to two broader questions. Why do certain kinds of states
choose to promote migration? And what can be said of the long-term consequences, for
the regimes and persons involved, of using migration as a policy tool?
Insofar the information revolution is concerned the current literature on soft
power primarily assigns importance to American capabilities. The importance of
computer networks and communication technologies (through internet, and emails) is
primarily seen in the backdrop of shaping American foreign policy. Although the spread
of information will reassign power symmetries in the world, it does not, as yet discuss the
role played by migrant communities in their presence and use of information technology
(IT) industry. The power of migrants as highly skilled diaspora communities in host
societies and their influence on the foreign and domestic policy of their countries of
residence is an interesting subject in the academic jargon on soft power and asymmetrical
interdependence. Although suffering from policy coordination and coalition building at
this stage, their role in the global information age will be critical for foreign policy
formulation in future.

CONCLUSION
Brain drain, a much-debated issue in the study of migration of the highly skilled
people is a continuing phenomenon today. It has been difficult to evaluate from the
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standpoints of either sending or receiving countries its causes and effects as its context
can be quite diverse for different countries.
Brain gain strategies such as remittances, return, and Diaspora networks are hard
to define, difficult to measure, multifaceted, multiform, and resistant to theory building.
However, migrant remittances and savings do represent one of the most direct and
measurable benefits of international migration in migrant-sending areas and tend to be the
best measured and recorded aspect of the migration experience. The return of certain
professionals does have some benefits for the home country with investments, usually in
businesses, health, and education sectors stimulating economic growth and acting as
counter dependent on foreign capital. And diaspora networks are often able to leverage a
network to raise funds, get mentorship, access distribution channels, promote the image
o f their country through their successes, and spawn more enterprise.
Technically, it has been difficult to evaluate the costs and benefits of brain drain
for sending and receiving countries. First, the criteria used by sending and receiving
countries have been different. Second, benefits for the individual have not necessarily
implied benefits for the nation, and vice versa. And third, costs and benefits have
differed over the short and long term. These kinds of issues have made the costs and
benefits of international migration extremely difficult to evaluate. A fundamental
problem is adequate employment opportunities for skilled and professional workers in the
country of origin. Without these, abilities and education are not utilized, whether or not
workers leave the country.
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Current knowledge regarding the interrelations between international migration
and development is incomplete and various schools of thought have yet to define clearly
their current position vis-a-vis brain drain.
The last theme in this chapter discusses migrant or diaspora networks as an
important contribution in bridging the gap between international migrations and
international relations theories. The use of large Diaspora groups settled in the West to
effectively use their position for lobbying, both directly and indirectly and raising issues
of concern for their countries of origin highlights the importance of migration and people
as soft power elements.
In the course of the second half of the twentieth century, and especially in the last
quarter, our understanding of the complexities associated with brain drain has made
considerable success. However, this deepened understanding has resulted more from
empirical research, often divorced from theory, than from conceptual theorizing itself.
Although it is true that the reservoir of theories represents a clear improvement over the
debates that ensued a couple of decades age, it still remains limited and beset with
difficulties that usually accompany social science research.
The central theme, to reiterate, is that if the brightest and the most talented are
leaving their home countries, then, what approaches have been identified in policy circles
to offset the costs associated with the departure of the highly skilled or human capital?
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CHAPTER III
INDO-US RELATIONS: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MIGRATION LINKAGES

“Nations have no permanent friends and no permanent enemies, only permanent national
interests. ” (Lord Palmerston for 19th-century Britain coined the dictum).

INTRODUCTION
The choice of India and the United States as countries in the case study for the
brain drain phenomenon not only seems pertinent but also very interesting given their
diverse backgrounds. Initially, the two countries emerged with vastly different goals and
strategies. The United States emerged as the global leader of the twentieth century in
various affairs, both ideological1 and military, especially after the Second World War in
1945. India’s political and economic history after independence in 1947 was turbulent
and chaotic to say the least, facing internal challenges of post-colonialism, poverty,
backwardness, growth, and diversity. After the Second World War both countries
inherited their share of prejudices and viewed each other with suspicion. India saw the
United States as obsessed with anti-communism and the United States viewed India as
firmly placed in the socialist camp with Nehru2 showing obvious affinities for the Soviet
Union, in particular, for socialism. Despite Washington’s unsympathetic views on
India’s economic policies and in particular the debt crisis in the 1980s, the United States
managed to maintain a relationship of sorts with India, providing economic assistance in
times of need.

1 The U.S. was engaged in its ideological fight against Communism around the world
2 Independent India’s first Prime Minister
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The end of the Cold War and globalization coupled with India’s economic
reforms and liberalization has led to one of the most “strategic partnerships”3, that of
India and the United States. Although they had vastly different goals, doctrines, agendas,
and ideologies, both countries remain firm advocates of democracy and the free market
economy. The United States is currently India’s largest trading partner and India is one of
the largest investment sites for United States based multinational corporations.
An era of increased economic interdependence and greater foreign trade coupled
with the revolution in information technology (IT) and communications has further
spurred on the movement of people across borders and continents. A different kind of
relationship between the two countries has thus emerged with the movement of people
from India to the United States increasing four fold in the 1990s. The strength of the
Indian Diaspora in the United States, close to two million people, boasts of their various
achievements, making them important agents of power in both home and host countries.
It thus becomes important to identify important political and economic events central to
both countries to gain a better perspective on the migration linkage.
It is against this historical backdrop that the current research looks towards India
as the sending and the United States as the receiving country to fully understand the brain
drain phenomenon. This chapter will essentially look at the Indo-US relation from two
perspectives. The first part traces the political and economic relationship between the
two countries (during and after the cold war). The second examines the level and scope
of migration between them.

3 The use o f the term ‘strategic partnership’ has been taken from the Indian embassy website that has
explored the India-US relations in general, economic, defense, energy, science & technology, and in people
to people relations.
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COLD WAR CALCULATION: POLITICAL & ECONOMIC
After India gained her independence in 1947, the division of British India was
complete with the creation of the independent country of Pakistan. Almost immediately,
Cold War settings heavily influenced United States foreign policy in the region towards
them. Independent India, under Prime Minister Nehru (who was the primary architect of
India’s foreign policy in the early years), was determined to keep away from the Cold
War. Thus, Nehru chose a middle path, which subsequently came to be known as nonalignment, and became the leader of the non-aligned movement (NAM).4 India under
Nehru pursued a globally oriented foreign policy while trying to maintain a careful
distance between the power blocs of the East and West. Its stand on disarmament, anti
colonialism, and world peace won for India the respect of the newly independent
countries of Asia and Africa.
However, India’s policy of non-alignment, suffering from two inherent
weaknesses, brought back superpower diplomacy to South Asia. First, India lacked
military and economic power, and second, Nehru ignored the need to evolve a concept of
regional security.5 These weaknesses were inherent in spite of having acquired a high
profile politically. For all these matters, success was dependent on the requirements (of
the great powers) and of the support and goodwill of the newly emerging nations that
India claimed to have influence over.

4 Nonalignment was institutionalized at a conference in Belgrade in 1961, the cofounders being India,
Yugoslavia and Egypt. The concept also grew out o f India’s backwardness, poverty and lack o f military
muscle
5 Explained in Devin T. Hagerty, “India’s Regional Security Doctrine,” Asian Survey 31 number 4 (April
1991): 351-363. India did not have a well defined regional security policy in the 1980s that continued into
the 1990s.
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United States’ interest in the Asian continent spurred with the rise of Communist
China in 1949. And with the Korean War in 1950-51, American policymakers, realizing
the possibility of Communist expansion into Asia, made it a cornerstone of their foreign
policy agenda. Consequently, South Asia too became a priority area for the United States
in the need to contain communism.6 Besides containment, the Cold War also saw a
number of American efforts in trying to resolve the Kashmir issue between India and
Pakistan. The Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations each attempted to
resolve the Kashmir issue. However, “all of these American efforts at resolving the
conflict sprang from the calculation that a strategically divided South Asia would be
vulnerable to Communist power.”7
The United States was initially sympathetic towards India and paid relatively little
attention to Pakistan, but this situation soon reversed. During the 1950’s, United States
foreign policy towards India and Pakistan was shaped by United States’ failure, most
demonstrably over Korea, to enlist India’s support in the fight against communism and
reverse Nehru’s commitment to a policy of non-alignment. This, more than anything
else, alienated the United States from India and brought her closer to Pakistan. Nehru, a
champion of socialism looked upon capitalism as the parent of imperialism and fascism

6 South Asia, one o f the most populous and poverty stricken regions o f the world (after the African
continent), relatively neglected in US foreign policy because the region lacks great strategic significance
when viewed from military oriented, super or major power perspective.
7 Stephen Philip Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001),
276.
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and “America viewed socialism as the road to communism.”8 These ideological
differences contributed towards alliance patterns in the region.9
At the same time, United States’ greatest rival, the Soviets, were firmly on India’s
side and extended vital military and other aid to it. With the Soviet Union moving
towards India under a joint venture of socialism and China moving towards Pakistan with
friendly overtures it was essential for the United States to move in and establish an ally or
satellite country within the region. Thus, United States militarily moved towards
Pakistan making it a favorite in the region.10 It became the main recipient of United
States economic aid per capita, and also its partner in organizations such as the Central
Treaty Organization (CENTO), and the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO),
which entailed substantial military aid as well. The most visible military tilt appeared in
the form of the ‘Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement’ in May 1954 between United
States and Pakistan. On its part, the Soviet Union became extremely supportive of India,
and defended her position on Kashmir by vetoing any resolutions in the UN Security
Council against Pakistan.11
Other non-Cold War issues, such as India’s economic policies, also hardened
American differences with India. A case in point being the application of economic

8 Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire (London, New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996), 177.
9 See Raju G. C. Thomas, “Security Relationships in Southern Asia: Differences in the Indian and
American Perspectives,” Asian Survey 21 number 7 (July 1981): 689-709. The author identifies three main
reasons for for the general lack o f cordiality between India and the United States, 1) clashing personalities
o f nationa leaders, 2) negative images formed on either side, and 3) strategic reasons.
10 For a better analysis see George J. Lerski, “The Pakistan-American Alliance: A Reevaluation
o f the Past Decade,” Asian Survey 8 number 5 (May 1968): 400-415.
11 Documented in Harish Kapur, “The Soviet Union and Indo-Pakistani Relations,” International Studies 8
(July 1966-April 1967): 150-157.
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pressures on India’s agricultural policy by the Johnson administration in 1965. This
resulted in the suspension of long-term PL-480 food assistance to India at a time when
India was experiencing a severe famine. The policy elicited deep anger among Indian
leaders and severely damaged Indo-US relations.
The rift with United States was almost complete in the 1970s with India testing its
nuclear weapons in 1974, and refusing to sign the ‘Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty’
(NPT).12 As a result, the restrictions of the Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers
Group reduced and eventually halted the transfer of nuclear-related technology to India
and other states of proliferation concerns. In addition, the Soviet Union continued its
unlimited supply and access to arms to India, in her involvement in the conflict between
East and West Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971.
In spite of the seemingly unbridgeable policy differences between the United
States and India, the two countries patched up their relations when Jimmy Carter
introduced the carrot in the American diplomatic repertoire when he and the World Bank
offered massive assistance for an Eastern waters regional development program.
The liberal school of thought in the United States remained in favor of supporting
a democratic India,13 with the wide-held belief that India was vital to the preservation of
all non-communist countries in Asia. “It was generally believed that if India should
succumb to Communism, then all Asia would be eventually lost.”14

12 See Robert G Wirsing, “The Arms Race in South Asia: Implications for the United States,” Asian Survey
25 number 3 (March 1985): 265-291.
13 US Secretary o f States, Dulles, had been engaged in building a chain o f military pacts around the World
to ‘contain’ Soviet Expansionism and it had been in this context that Pakistan had been viewed as a
strategically important country.
14 Louis D. Hayes, The Impact o f U.S. Policy on the Kashmir Conflict (Arizona: The University o f Arizona
Press, 1971), 49.
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Table 2. Relationship with India During Cold War: US, USSR, and China.
Country

US

1950s

1960s

U N F R IE N D L Y

(US had a Mutual
Defense pact with
Pakistan in 1954,
CENTO, SEATO

N EU TRA L

1965 Indo-Pakistani War,
Kashmir stood in the way of
U.S. foreign policy
L ate 1 9 6 0 s - F R I E N D L Y

Military aid to Pakistan
stopped

USSR

F R IE N D L Y

Beginning of Five year
Plans, Nehru’s tilt
towards USSR.

CHINA

U N F R IE N D L Y

Continued border
clashes with India

F R IE N D L Y

spy plane in
Peshawar, good relations with
India (enemy’s enemy is my
friend)
U n ite d S ta te s U 2

U N F R IE N D L Y

1962 Indo-Chinese war

1970s

F R IE N D L Y

CENTO, SEATO
virtually dead,
V E R Y U N F R IE N D L Y
T IL L E N D O F C O L D
W AR

India leaning militarily
towards USSR, and
Pakistan in US camp
after Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan

F R IE N D L Y

Unlimited supply of
Soviet arms to India
during and after 1971
war between India and
Pakistan

U N F R IE N D L Y

Friendly relations with
Pakistan
00
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Indo-USRelations in the 1980s
For the United States, the decade of 1980 began with the combined effects o f a
major oil crisis, the collapse of its Iranian ally, and the Soviet occupation o f Afghanistan.
By the early 1980s these events shook up the United States and resulted in a much bigger
stake in South Asia. This decade was considered as a sandwich decade with respect to
Indo-U.S. relations since India was hardly a pawn in the Cold War game and yet not
totally oblivious to it. India seemed less influenced by the cold war since the Soviet
Union itself was deteriorating at all levels15 and was also experiencing its own domestic
problems in the political and economic spheres.
Although in 1980 President Carter approved the temporary waiver of sanctions
that limited the supply of uranium, the decade started with economic and political
disagreements between the two countries. Initially, both Indira Gandhi (the Prime
Minister of India at the time) and after her death in 1984, Rajiv Gandhi, made it
abundantly clear that continued US military aid to Pakistan would be detrimental to IndoUS relations. Rajiv Gandhi after 1984, tried to put behind the turbulence of the previous
years and put the ‘bilateral relationship’ on a more practical footing. Most of this
involved mutual beliefs in principles of democracy, a free market economy, cooperation
in the financial sector and academic links with the West. This linkage was mostly visible
through a steady migration of students and professionals with important educational and
economic consequences for both countries.
The 1980s also witnessed a gradual acceptance by the United States of India’s
growing pre-eminence in the region. This was reflected in India’s (albeit unsuccessful)

15 Mikhael Gorbachev’s twin policies o f Glasnost and Perestroika had proved to be disastrous for the
country and helped in the crumbling o f the Soviet Union
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peacekeeping efforts in Sri Lanka despite India’s earlier involvement with the Tamil
separatists, and during its intervention in a coup attempt in the Maldives. In a letter
addressed to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, President Reagan not only extended his
‘appreciation’ but was also impressed by India’s willingness to restore order without
unnecessary bloodshed.
Economic and trade relationships also improved between the two countries with
cooperation in the fields of defense and technology transfers. President Reagan issued a
directive (1984) instructing government agencies to seek improved relations with India
and accommodate its requests for dual-use technology. The USAID program in India
was also expanded with the aim of science and technology transfers. Scientists from both
countries began working side-by-side to “develop sophisticated satellites for monsoon
forecasting, communications systems, biomedicine, and renewable sources of energy.
The U.S. loan guarantees were also supportive of India’s development of private sector
financing systems and water and sanitation services.”16 In 1986, the US agreed to supply
a number of General Electric F-404 engines and avionics for India’s Light Combat
Aircraft (LCA) then under development. Later, “the US also agreed to sell a Cray XM P14 supercomputer, the first such sale to a country outside the western alliance.”17 This
was symbolic in the visit of the US Secretary of State Caspar Weinburger in 1987, and
then his successor Frank Carlucci in 1988. This was followed by visit to the US by
India’s Defense Minister, K. C. Pant, in July 1989 as the first visit by an Indian Defense
Minister in over twenty-five years.
16 USAID, History o f USAID to India. Available
[Online] :<http://www.usaid.gov/in/lJsaidInIndia/history.htm>[3 March 2004].
17 Mohammed Ayoob, India and Southeast Asia: Indian Perceptions and Policies (London: Routledge,
1990), 80.
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Despite these encouraging overtures throughout the 1980s, the governments of
both India and the United States continued to disagree over India’s need for balance of
payments financing and multilateral aid. These disagreements were visible in global
organizations such as: the International Monetary Fund, (IMF); the World Bank and its
consessional lending affiliate, the International Development Association (IDA); and the
Asian Development Bank (ADB).18 The Reagan administration, in particular, took a
number of actions that adversely affected India’s economic interests. As an illustration,
the United States expressed its disapproval over a $5.6 billion IMF loan to India and also
opposed Indian borrowing from the ADB. India also faced embargoes on missile-related
technology from 1987 onwards.

Some Cold War Lessons
Indo-US relations remained very patchy during the Cold War.19 The initial aim of
the United States had been to enlist India to contain Soviet and Chinese Communism and
“to deny India to the Communist world - the Soviet Union in particular.”20 Thus,
determinants of United States foreign policy towards India were essentially driven by the
need to stem the communist expansion in the region. Nehru’s sentimental attachments to
18 The IMF provides short and medium-term financing to its members to correct payments imbalances. The
World Bank provides near-market loans to finance long-term development in developing countries. Its
affiliate, the IDA, provides interest free credits to those developing countries that lack the credit standing
for World Bank or commercial loans. The Asian Development Bank, founded in 1966, is a smaller
institution that makes near-market term loans in Asia and also provides concessional aid through its Asian
Development Fund (ADF). Both the IDA and the ADF receive the bulk o f their funds from budgetary
contributions o f member countries. These contributions are made in periodic cycles or replenishments.
19 See Vera Micheles Dean, “The United States and India,” Far Eastern Survey 21 number 5 (April 1952):
41-46. The author talks about the different ideologies o f both countries and suggests a starting point for
improving the misunderstandings between them.
20 Nihal S. Singh, “Can the US and India Be Real Friends?” Asian Survey 23 number 9 (September 1983):
1011-1024.
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the British Commonwealth, nonalignment, and socialism in the Soviet Union had already
cast its shadow on the Indo-US relationship. Calculations of foreign policy were made in
terms of Cold-War assumptions, whoever is not with us is against us (the Indian view of
the Eisenhower-Dulles position), or whoever is not against us is at least potentially with
us (the Indian view of the Kennedy position). From the point of view of American
foreign policy, military assistance to Pakistan was necessary to check the communist
aggression there. By making Pakistan a geo-strategic ally in the region, Indo-US
relations were seriously hampered and further pushed India in the Soviet camp. Kashmir
became one of the unintended victims of the Cold War calculations

01

further festering the

sore in the relationship.
India’s foreign policy objectives were remarkably consistent during the Cold War,
despite the adjustments it had to make over the years. Nonalignment served the purpose
that India’s leaders were looking for, a role for India that had not meant being any
country’s follower. Irrespective of the Soviet angle, there had always remained a
measure of goodwill between the two countries. Ideologically, the Indian elite had been
more in tune with American thinking. Besides, the very concept of nonalignment meant
that India should be friends with both the Soviet Union and the United States. In addition
to ideology, India had also been attached to the United States for economic reasons and
the US remained a primary source of economic assistance22 and technology transfers to a
poverty-stricken and backward India. This was also the time when migration between the

21 See Sumit Ganguly and Kanti Bajpai, “India and the Crisis in Kashmir,” Asian Survey 34 number 5
(May, 1994): 401-416.
22 See Nihal S. Singh. Between 1956 and 1975, India received more than $10 billion o f US assistance o f
various types
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two countries was becoming visible especially after the 1965 immigration laws were
relaxed in the United States. This, and other economic linkages proved to be a tying
factor for the two countries in the long run.
Thus, in spite of the highly charged political atmosphere the two countries shared
politically during the Cold War, it seemed plausible and likely that economic, and
information technology (IT) would be the two areas that would define the future of the
Indo-US relations in the long term.

POST COLD WAR AND CHANGING RELATIONS
U.S. foreign policy towards India improved considerably at the end of the Cold
War with the collapse of the Soviet Union accompanied by India’s economic reforms.
However, this gradual process of the warming up of bilateral relations came to an abrupt
halt after India’s nuclear tests in May 1998 (followed by Pakistan), resulting in the
imposition of wide-ranging sanctions. A number of non-governmental and think-tank
reports23 produced in the 1990’s highlight Clinton Administrations’ single-issue approach
to the region. Eventually, they helped in improving American understanding of Indian
political and strategic compulsions asking for more balanced approaches to the region.
Although nuclear issues remain at the center of U.S. policy toward New Delhi,
America increasingly realized India’s economic and strategic potential both within the
region and outside. This proved to be the defining relationship between them for the next
two decades.

23 These studies are sponsored by the Asia Society, the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, and the Council on Foreign Relations
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Indo-US Economic Ties
The Indian economy, considered to be one of the largest consumer markets for the
‘Asian Tiger Economies’, was finally awakened from its sleep with the liberalization
reforms in 1991 undertaken by the Indian Government under the leadership of Prime
Minister P.Y. Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh.24
One outcome of liberalization was the increase in the number of official trips
between India and the United States during the mid 1990s. Indian Prime Minister P.V.
Narasimha Rao’s week-long visit to the United States in May 1994, was followed by a
ten-day visit to India by a U.S. Presidential Business Development Mission led by
Secretary of Commerce, Ron Brown in 1995. These visits were designed to “initiate a
process of intensified identification and opportunity in key sectors”25 and to lay the
foundation for a new Indo-US relationship that would immediately and importantly
benefit both countries. All these events marked a dramatic reversal of uneven and
unclear relations that had existed between the two countries for over four decades.
Although India had liberalized in the 1990s, it did not have enough resources
needed for investment in physical infrastructure, health and education. The United States
government through USAID decided to bring into India new investors to capital markets,
help state governments forecast and analyze fiscal decisions, generate financing for urban
development, and advance agricultural technologies. The partnership between India and
the United States involved them to work efficiently with public funds and leverage
development investments. In the long-term, USAID envisioned India’s civil society

24 Manmohan Singh became the Prime Minister o f the country in 2004
25 Ramesh Thakur, “India and the United States: A Triumph o f Hope over Experience,” Asian Survey 36
number 6 (June 1996): 574.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

91

working hand-in-hand with American “private partners”26 to solve development
problems, without the need for U.S. economic assistance.
The global market economy was among the most prominent issues that formed a
basis for cooperation between them. The debt crisis of the late 1980s and the ills of a
mixed economy proved to be devastating for India. Liberalization and privatization
seemed the logical way out where the Western nations and the major financial institutions
dominated by the United States could provide India with the necessary amounts of aid,
credits, and investment. In fact, India needed the US money, business, and the
technology to maintain its economic momentum. The United States (especially during
the Clinton era) also ended up as India’s most important trading partner in both imports
and exports, and its largest foreign investor. In turn, Washington also identified India as
one of the top ten emerging markets in the world.27
Thus, economic reforms introduced in 1991 radically changed the course of the
Indian economy and led to its gradual integration within the global economy. Benefits of
the reform process were visible in the form of better growth rates, higher investment, and
trade flows. The effects of these reforms on trade and investment relations with the
United States were profound and the government of India identified the United States as
not only the its largest investor country in India, but also its largest trading partner. By
2003, India was identified as 24th largest export destination for the United States. In
terms of exports to the U.S., India ranked as the 18th largest country.

26 USAID, History o f USAID in India. Available
[Online]:<http://www.usaid.gov/in/UsaidInIndia/overview.htm>[3 March, 2004],
27 According to a report issued by the OECD on May 23, 1995, the Asian developing countries would
account for almost a third o f the global demand by 2010. China, India and Indonesia would be the three
big emerging markets whose growth would have a profound impact on the world economy.
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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
United States is one of the largest foreign direct investors in

India.The stock of

actual FDI Inflow increased from previous decades from U.S. $11.3 million in

1991to

US $4132.8 million as of August 2004, recording an increase at a compound rate of 57.5
percent per annum (Table 3). The FDI inflows from the U.S. constitute about 11 percent
of the total actual FDI inflows into India. Although there is a gap between the approved
and the actual inflow (see Table 4 and figure 7), the ratio of cumulative US FDI inflow to
approval has accelerated in the recent years indicating that FDI approved in the past years
have started to materialize. The Indian government has also identified the top sectors of
the economy that have been attracting FDI from USA. These are:
Sector-wise Break-up of US FDI in India
■ Fuels (Power & Oil Refineries): 35.93%
■ Telecommunications (radio paging, cellular mobile & basic telephone
services: 10.56%
■ Electrical Equipment (including Computer Software & Electronics): 9.50%
■ Food Processing Industries (Food products & marine products): 9.43%
■ Service Sector (Financial and Non-Financial): 8.28%28

Portfolio Investment
The U.S. is also the leading investor in India in Portfolio Investments. Out of the
538 Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) currently registered with SEBI, 234 are from

28 All data is compiled from statistics available from the Indian Embassy website. Embassy o f India, IndiaUS Relations. Available [Online]:<http://www.indianembassv.org/Economv/economv.htm>[15 October,
2005],
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Table 3. Share of US FDI in Total - Actual Inflow to India
Total FDI ($ Min)
143.6
258.0
582.9
1048.5
2172.0
3021.0
4579.1
3377.2
4016.1
4498.1
4281.1
4434.5
3109.0
3468.0
38989.1

Years
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
*2004
Total

US FDI ($ Min)
11.3
43.9
147.7
118.9
215.6
271.0
736.6
347.1
431.2
418.4
367.6
282.8
396.3
344.4
4132.8

US Share (%)
7.87
17.02
25.34
11.34
9.93
8.97
16.09
10.28
10.74
9.30
8.59
6.38
12.75
9.93
10.60

Source: Data Compiled from SIA Newsletter, Department o f Industrial Policy & Promotion,
Government o f India. *Up to August 2004.
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Figure 7. Year-wise Cumulative FDI from USA: Approvals and Inflows
to India
Source: www.indianembassv.org
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Table 4. India: Cumulative FDI

76
547
1676
2788
5035
7908
11785
12687
13538
14513
15607
16034
16718

Actual
Inflow of
FDI from
USA
11
55
203
322
537
808
1545
1892
2323
2742
3109
3392
3788

16853

4133

FDI Approved to USA
Year
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
upto August,
2004

Share of Inflow to
Approval
14.87
10.10
12.11
11.54
10.67
10.22
13.11
14.91
17.16
18.89
19.92
21.16
22.66
24.52

Source: Securities and Exchange Board o f India, AvailablerOnline1:<htto://www.sebi.gov.in/>[36
April 2006],

Table 5. Year-Wise Foreign Institutional Investments

Years
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05*
Total

Total FII ($
Min)
1634
1528
2036
2424
1463
-176
2235
2222
1702
525
8630
1068
25291

FII from USA ($ Min)
781
894
856
1019
1005
-9
841
1174
533
174
2863
109
10240

US Share (%)
47.80
58.51
42.04
42.04
68.69
5.11
37.63
52.84
31.32
33.14
33.17
10.21
40.49
* upto June 30, 2004

Source: Securities and Exchange Board o f India, AvailablerOnlinel:<http://www.sebi.gov.in/>[30
April 2006],
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the United States and an additional 169 U.S. based sub-accounts currently registered. As
of June 30, 2004, an investment of nearly $ 10.2 billion out of a total of $25.3 billion by
foreign institutional investments (FIIs) in the Indian capital markets has come from the
United States accounting for about 40.5 percent of the net investments made by the FIIs
since 1993 (see Table 5).
“On its part India has a population of more than one billion, including a large
middle class with spending power, and is therefore a major market in itself.”

U.S.

companies in India are involved in every sector that has been open to private investment,
and a large number of the Leading Fortune 500 companies have invested in India. From
infrastructure to consumer goods, and from information technology to consultancy
services, American companies are now being increasingly represented in India as never
before. During President Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000, a Memoranda of
Understanding (MoU) worth about $3.5 billion was signed by, among others, Motorola,
Hughes Network Systems, Bank of America, IBM, Enron and Ogden Energy.

Indian Investments in the United States
Economic ties have also strengthened with India increasing its direct investment
in the United States. From 1996 up to September 2004, the total approved Indian
investment abroad amounted to US $ 11083.11 million which 60.9% was the actual
outflow. The U.S. share ($ 2080.367 million) constitutes 18.8% of the total approvals.
Since 1996, USA has attracted the highest Indian direct investments (US$ 2080.37

29 Om Malik, “The New Land o f Opportunity,” Business Week, 2 July 2004. The article has estimated that
India’s Middle class is estimated to spend $420 billion in the next three years beginning 2004.
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Table 6. Country Wise Approved Indian Direct Investments
S.No Name of the country

1996 to 2000 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04

Australia

2.61

2.47

1.91

94.97

92.87

2004-05
(April 04Sept, 04)
123.72

2 British Virgin Island

752.08

18.01

6.44

3.27

4.92

6.43

791.15

3

Bermuda

156.90

0.70

75.03

28.95

142.46

6.24

410.28

4

Hongkong

391.41

37.64

16.07

14.80

16.15

53.08

529.16

5

Mauritius

221.64

242.25

154.45

133.35

175.59

21.58

948.86

6

Russia

3.27

3.50 1741.91

0.15

1.43

1.13

1751.39

7

Singapore

88.52

46.79

15.85

22.95

238.56

8

Sudan

750.00

162.03

9

USA

378.53

734.24

428.06

185.27

207.14

147.12

2080.37

10

Vietnam

0.44

0.15

228.20

0.06

0.04

0.05

228.94

1

—

39.41
—

25.03
—

Total

318.56

912.03

VO

Ov
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million) followed by Russia (US$ 1751.4 million), Mauritius (US$ 948.87 million), and
Sudan (US$ 912 million). India’s outgoing investments was largest in the field of
manufacturing (54.8%) followed by non-financial services including software
development (35.4%). Table 6 above provides a country-wise break up of overseas
investments approved in the last seven years for the top ten countries.
Both India and United States have identified some key areas where they can have
increased economic cooperation. These include IT, the Telecom sector, energy and other
knowledge industries such as pharmaceuticals and biotechnology. The U.S. investor
community has been increasingly sharing confidence in the future of the Indian economy.
It is predicted that with the growth of the Indian economy, and the implementation of
second-generation reforms, Indo-US bilateral ties would strengthen further.

Economic Risks and Gains
With increasing trade between India and the United States, several issues continue
to remain in dispute. These include “the American practice of linking human rights
issues with economic policies, the question of child labor, the disappearance of Indian
brands, and the danger of uneven growth within India.”

TO

However, these are balanced,

after a decade of economic reforms in India, with the emergence of India as an economic
super power with global advantages in the field of IT.

-3 1

Azim Premji, owner of Wipro

30 See Stephen Philip Cohen. Cohen accurately describes the economic risks and gains that America has
while trading with India.
31 The Indian IT outsourcing companies have been successful at competing for application infrastructure
projects as well as system and business-process outsourcing with behemoths such as IBM (IBM ;
accumulate; $90), Accenture (ACN ; hold; $24), Computer Sciences (CSC ; buy; $50), and Electronic Data
Systems (EDS ; hold; $21), partly by taking advantage o f a unique global delivery model. Infosys, Wipro,
and Satyam use a low-cost resource base within India on IT outsourcing contracts across the globe. More
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and third richest man in the world has plans of making Wipro one of the Top 10 ITservice companies in the world.

T9

Investors around the world identify countries such as

Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) as most beneficial to their businesses.

TT

On a

positive note, economists at Goldman, Sachs & Co state that if these countries get their
fundamentals right: such as sound fiscal and monetary policies; free trade with the
outside world; and massive investment in education; then collectively their economies
could be larger than the G-6 countries.
With India having graduated out of the aid arena due of its relatively comfortable
balance of payments position and large capital inflows through private channels, the
country no more requires direct support from the US government’s aid budget.
Govemment-to-govemment agreements are significant only inasmuch as they promise to
facilitate or regulate private sector relationships. From India’s point of view, the United
States is obviously an important trade partner. It now accounts for 28 % of India’s trade
and is the main market for the fast growing software and IT-enabled services exports
from India. Thus, it is not because the economic relationship between the two countries
is insignificant or not expanding that it receives less attention than the political
relationship, it is mostly because “a post-liberalisation transformation has introduced an
element of asymmetry into the economic relationship between the two countries.”34

than 70% o f Infosys’ revenue comes from North America, while Wipro gets 53% and Satyam gets 73% o f
sales from the region.
32 Manjeet Kripalani and Bruce Einhom, “India’s Tech King.” Business Week, 13 October 2003.
33 Christopher Farrell and Frederik Balfour, “Four Countries You Must Own.” Business Week, 27
December 2004.
34 C.P. Chandrashekhar, Indo-US Economic Relations: More Give and Less Take? (2005). Available
[Online]:< http://www.macroscan.com/cur/aug05/cur250805Economic Relations.htm> [25 August 2005]
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MIGRATION FLOWS: INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES
In addition to political and economic, migration linkages between India and the
United States increasingly tie them together. India’s visible and tangible presence in the
United States creates a positive image on American policymakers and is likely to have an
enduring impact on the bilateral relationship between them. By the early 1970s the small
but influential Indian minority were estimated at having the highest per capita income of
any ethnic group in the United States. With the end of the Cold War and advent of
globalization the migration of Indians increased four-fold with breakthroughs in
information technology and other professions.
Among the various trends that were observed in India after its independence was
the regular flow of people to developed countries. Many gave up their country of
residence to go and settle abroad for greener pastures. For most of these Indians, the
common official route was to leave the country either for work or for family links. The
lure of foreign jobs was so high that many resorted to illegal means of achieving their
dream of going abroad.
In an emerging global scenario where the immediate future is viewed as the ‘age
of migration’, it is important that attempts be made, especially in a leading labor
exporting country like India, to examine the implications of the contemporary migration
flows so as to evolve a more purposeful migration policy framework aimed at the
maximization and socialization of benefits from migration in the wider context of
economic development. Clearly, the fear of brain drain has been receding in many
countries, especially India. Again answering the question ‘who gains and who loses’
becomes very interesting while looking at India as the sending country.
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INDIA AS THE SENDING COUNTRY
Recent decades yield several pieces of literature on Indians settled abroad.
Various perspectives put forward study some basic facts about Indians settled abroad,
their estimated numbers, their regional distribution across nations, and their regional
derivations and settlements.35 In particular, theorists have reflected on the significance
of Indian immigrant communities in general, and their economic and social impact for
their countries of settlement. Indian migration can be explained using many
perspectives:36 historical, national, colonial, and Marxist. Most studies identify three
distinct phases of Indian migration.
The first wave of emigration, in the historical context, began during the colonial
period. In most cases, they were an economically beleaguered labor force seeking their
livelihood in distant lands. It has a familiar story of people uprooted from their
homeland and taken to far-away places where their historical experiences were as varied
as the destinations. These were movements to far away places such as Guyana, Jamaica
and Fiji, to not so-distant lands such as Malaysia, Mauritius, and Singapore, to
neighboring countries such as Sri Lanka and Burma,37 and other parts of the British
dominion.38

35 The Indian Diaspora spans the globe and stretches across all the oceans and continents. Its population is
estimated to be about 20 million. There are about 10,000 or more overseas Indians in 48 countries. In 11 o f
these, there are more than half a million - persons o f Indian descent - representing a significant proportion
o f the population in those countries.
36 See S.L. Sharma, “Perspectives on Indians Abroad,” in The Indian Diaspora: Dynamics o f Migration, ed.
N. Jayaram, 6-32. New Delhi, London: Sage Publications, 2004.
37 Burma or currently Myanmar has the highest number o f Indians if we are counting Persons o f Indian
Origin (PIOs) and Indian citizens totaling even higher than the United States.
38 Migratory flow during the period o f colonial domination was very much tied to the investment interests
o f the colonial rulers and took place under their aegis. For instance a great part o f the nineteenth century
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The second wave o f migrants, in post-colonial times, occurred with the economic
boom combined with acute labor shortages in the Gulf region and created a huge and
continuing demand since the 1970s for short-term immigrant labor in the countries of the
Gulf and West Asia/ North Africa. Estimated at more than 3 million, with more than half
from the southern state of Kerala, 70% of the Indian population in the region consists of
semi-skilled and unskilled workers, 20-30% as professionals and white-collar workers
(doctors, engineers, architects, chartered accountants and bankers), and a small fraction
composed of domestic help. Remittances to India from the Gulf have been long
recognized as a significant contribution to India’s balance of payments, are mostly made
by Indian workers in the first category. Following Operation Desert Storm the number
of Indians in Iraq has been reduced to a handful. The Indian community in Libya has
also declined, mainly due to an economic slowdown, from almost 40,000 in the mid1980s to about 12,000.39
In recent times, a third wave of emigration is visible with the out-migration of
white-collar professionals and students to the developed parts of the capitalist West,
particularly, to the Unites States, Canada, and Britain. This gives rise to the muchdebated question of brain drain as some of the most important characteristics of this
labor flow include: outflows made up almost entirely of permanent migration and
consisting of a large proportion of migrants or persons with professional expertise,

and the early twentieth century witnessed a regular migration o f Indian workers as indentured labor for
plantations or mines in the British colonies.
39 The High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora in its study o f NRIs in the Gulf region, especially in
countries such as Oman, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait make a list o f grievances and
exploitations o f the Indians working there. It has been recommended to the Indian government by the
representatives o f the overseas Indian laborers that it negotiate with all Gulf countries a ‘Standard Labor
Export Agreement’ prescribing such things as a minimum wage, free housing, medical care, limits on daily
working hours, overtime allowance rates and compensation for on-the-job death or injury etc.
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technical qualifications or other skills. Table 7 illustrates the estimated size of overseas
Indian community as of 2004.
The available evidence on trends in migration from India to the selected
industrialized countries - the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom - during the
period 1951 - 1990 is presented in Table 8. Although we are primarily concerned with
migration to the United States, comparisons with other developed countries provide
better analysis with respect to migration flows and brain drain.
Emigration to North America began in the early 1950s but the numbers remained
modest until the middle of 1960s. This emigration gathered momentum thereafter. The
number of emigrants from India to both United States and Canada steadily increased
during 1970s and 1980s. In contrast, emigration to the United Kingdom was at its peak
during the 1960s but slowed down thereafter in the 1970s and stabilized at significantly
lower level in the 1980s.
Notwithstanding these trends, it is important to recognize some limitations o f the
database. First, the figures do not quite reflect actual emigration flows in each year, at
least in the United States and United Kingdom, because the data includes not only
immigrants expected on arrival in that year but also those granted immigrant status
during that year after their statutory period of residence. Second, the evidence of
migration from India to the United Kingdom is incomplete. And third, there is no
information for immigration to other parts of industrialized world such as Western
Europe or Australia.
Indian immigrants in the United States constitute a selective group, due to the
nature of the 1965 Immigration Act that replaced ‘race’ as a barrier to immigration with
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a preference for Eastern hemisphere countries. A preferential entry status was given to
visa applicants who were either relatives of U.S. citizens or workers with
skills/professional qualifications. Thus, the 1965 Immigration Act caused an influx of
Indian professional workers and students since the act made it easier for the entry of
these persons who were trained after the British or the American educational systems,
with English as the medium of instruction. Although the new immigrants may not be the
majority of those entering the United States now, this group of immigrants increased in
numbers and have become prominent in the last thirty-five years.40 Table 9 gives us data
on immigration into the United States by occupation. They are professionals well
educated in medicine, engineering, and science and are typically what Charles Keely
(1971, 1980)41 calls the “New Immigrants” or the “New Immigration” - terms coined to
make a distinction between those coming in to the U.S. after the 1965 Act.
Migration flows to industrialized countries; the United States in particular, during
the 1990s was considered as the most critical phase of globalization, given its magnitude
and composition. In addition, these have been important for both theoretical and policy
reasons. However as mentioned by many researchers there is hardly any detailed
analysis of the changing nature of this flow.

40 A second type o f migration pattern from India has been the flow o f labor to the oil exporting countries o f
the Middle East following the dramatic oil price increases o f 1973-74 and 1979. An overwhelming
majority o f this labor force has been categorized as either unskilled workers or as semi-skilled with some
skills in manual or clerical occupations. Since the focus o f this dissertation is on skilled labor migration, I
will not focus on this migration flow.
41 Charles Keely, “Effects o f the Immigration Act o f 1965 on Selected Population: Characteristics o f
Immigrants to the United States,” Demography 8 (1971): 157-169; Charles Keely, “Immigration Policy and
the New Immigration, 1965-1976,” in New Immigration: Implications fo r the United States and the
International Community, ed. Roy Simon Bryce-Laporte (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1980).
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Table 7. Estimated Size o f Overseas Indian Community: Country -Wise as of 2004
Country

PIOs

Indian Citizens

Stateless

Total

Myanmar
USA
Malaysia
Saudi Arabia
UK
South Africa
UAE
Canada
Mauritius
Trinidad & Tobago
Guyana
Fiji
Oman
Singapore
Kuwait
Reunion Islands
Netherlands
Australia
Suriname
Bahrain
Kenya
Yemen

2,500,000
0
1,600,000
0
0
0
50,000
700,000
704,640
500,000
395,250
336,579
1,000
217,000
1,000
220,000
200,000
160,000
150,306
0
85,000
100,000

2,000
0
15,000
1,500,000
0
0
900,000
150,000
11,116
600
100
250
311,000
90,000
294,000
55
15,000
30,000
150
130,000
15,000
900

400,000
0
50,000
0
0
0
0
1,000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2,000
0
0
0
2,500
0

2,902,000
1,678,765
1,665,000
1,500,000
1,200,000
1,000,000
950,000
851,000
715,756
500,600
395,350
336,829
312,000
307,000
295,000
220,055
217,000
190,000
150,456
130,000
102,500
100,900

Source: Statistics compiled from the report o f High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora, FICCI
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Table 8. Trends in Immigration from India to Selected Industrialized Countries

Year

United
States

Canada

1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

109
123
104
144
194
185
196
323
351
391
421
545
1,173
634
582
2,458
4,642
4,682
5,963
10,114

120
226
169
208
224
254
186
325
585
505
568
529
737
1,154
2,241
2,233
3,966
3,229
5,395
5,670

United
Kingdom

Year

United
States

n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
2,900
15,500
13,000
17,100
16,700
19,100
23,100
11,000
7,200

1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

14,310
16,926
13,124
12,779
15,773
17,487
18,613
20,753
19,708
22,607
21,522
21,738
25,451
24,964
26,026
26,227
27,803
26,268
31,175
30,667

(Number o f Persons)
Canada
United
Kingdom
5,313
5,049
9,433
12,731
10,106
6,637
5,514
5,112
4,517
8,491
8,263
7,792
7,051
5,513
4,038
6,970
9,747
10,432
8,836
10,662

6,900
7,600
6,240
6,650
10,200
11,020
7,340
9,890
9,270
7,930
6,590
5,410
5,380
5,140
5,500
4,210
4,610
5,020
4,580
5,040

Source: Nayyar, 1999
The above data on immigration are reported by country o f birth for the United States, by Country o f last permanent residence for
Canada, and by country o f nationality for the United Kingdom (b) Information on immigration from India to the United Kingdom is
not available for the period before 1 July 1962 because, until then, Commonwealth citizens were not subject to immigration control.
It is very clear that the United States accounts for the largest number o f Indian emigrants. It shows that Indian immigration in the
United States which constituted less than 1 per cent o f total immigration from all countries during 1950s and 1960s, registered a rapid
increase dining the 1970s, reaching a peak o f 3.8 per cent that tapered o ff in the 1980s till 1991 but went on the upswing in 1992 at
3.8 per cent again and further touching almost 5 per cent in 1996.
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Table 9. India’s Share in Total Immigration to the US: 1951-1996
Immigration

1951-60

1961-70

1971-80

1981-90

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

From India

2,120

31,214

172,080

261,841

45,064

36,755

40,121

34,921

34,748

44,859

973,977 904,292 804,416 720,461

915,900

From All

2,515,000 3,322,000 4,493,000 7,338,000 1,827,167

Countries
India's share

(0.1)

(0.9)

(3.8)

(3.6)

(2.5)

(3.8)

(4.4)

(4.3)

(4.8)

(4.9)

(Percent)
Source: Khadria, 1999
Note: For UK, data are not available prior to July 1962. Hence the figures on immigration to the United Kingdom in the columns for 1961-70
and 1951-90 relate to the periods 1962-70 andl 962-90 respectively

o
a\

107

The author of one study has attempted to collate the latest information pertaining
to Indian immigration flows to the industrialized world with a view to examining the
trends between 1991 and 2004. The information to the three main destinations, the
USA, Canada, and the UK are presented in the tables 10, 11, and 12 respectively.
Data from these tables suggest that the annual inflow of Indian immigrants in the
USA doubled as a percentage of total immigration from 2.5% in 1990 to 5.0% in 2000
and further went up to 6.9% by 2004. India also remains in the list of top ten sending
countries to the United States with acquiring the second position after 2001. In the case
of Canada, the annual inflow of Indian immigrants increased from 14,306 in (6.1% of
the total immigrants) in 1991 to almost double at 28,183 (11.5% of total immigrants) in
2004. Here too, India remains the second highest sending country from 1997. The
percentage of Indian emigration to the UK dropped considerably as a percentage of total
immigration from 10.5% in 1990 to 6.8% in 2001. Irrespective of this decline, India was
the second highest sending country after Pakistan till 1999, after which it acquired the
third position.
Migration from India to industrialized counties, though modest in scale, has
grown steadily since 1950. Nearly 1.25 million Indians have migrated to the principal
destinations. The emigration of Indians to the industrialized countries can be explained
both in terms of supply side factors as well as demands side factors. Several research
studies on migration of professional and technical persons from LDCs to industrial
countries have shown that the wage gap between the two destinations has significant and
positive impact on the volume of migration. The flow was especially impressive during
thel990s, a period that incidentally witnessed tightening of immigration policies in
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Table 10. Indian Immigration to the United States 1991 - 2004
Year

Number

Place in top ten
sending countries

Percentage of Indians to
total immigration

1991

45064

7

3

1992

36755

6

4

1993

40121

6

4

1994

34921

6

4

1995

34748

6

5

1996

44859

3

5

1997

38071

5

5

1998

36482

3

6

1999

30237

4

5

2000

42046

4

5

2001

65916

2

6

2002

66864

2

6

2003

47157

2

7

2004

65472

2

7

Source: vvww.migrationinformation.org and 2004 Yearbook o f Immigration statistics
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Table 11. Indian Immigration to Canada 1991 - 2004
Year

Number

Place in top ten
sending countries

Percentage of Indians to
total immigration

1991

14306

4

6

1992

14301

3

6

1993

21750

2

8

1994

18576

4

8

1995

18262

3

7

1996

23380

3

10

1997

21708

2

10

1998

16965

2

10

1999

18833

2

10

2000

28148

2

12

2001

30804

2

12

2002

31669

2

14

2003

27419

2

12

2004

28183

2

12

Source: mvw.migrationinformation.org
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Table 12. Indian Immigration to the United Kingdom 1991 - 2001 *
Year

Number

Place in top ten
sending countries

Percentage of Indians to
total immigration

1991

5680

2

11

1992

5500

2

11

1993

4890

2

9

1994

4780

2

9

1995

4860

2

9

1996

4620

2

8

1997

4645

2

8

1998

5430

2

8

1999

6295

2

7

2000

8045

3

6

2001

7280

2**

7

Source: www.migrationinformation.org
* Information for UK was available till 2001
**For the year 2001, India was 3rd highest sending country after Pakistan (11,535) and Somalia
(8290).
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many industrialized countries.42 Another striking feature of migration flows from India
to the industrialized nations during the 1990s is the growing importance of newer
destination countries. This period also witnessed significant flow of Indian
professionals, especially IT professionals, to countries such as Australia, Germany,
Japan, and Malaysia. For instance, nearly 40,000 Indians migrated to Australia,
accounting for 4.1% of total immigrants. Many European countries, such as Germany,
prefer the entry of highly skilled Indians to work in fields related to IT. Notwithstanding
all these facts, one problem with respect to emigration statistics is that these are
generally seen as unreliable internationally since people departing from their country of
citizenship are often reluctant to be classified officially as emigrants until they have
obtained at least permanent residence status in their countries of destination. Second,
data coming from source countries are generally misleading and incorrect, as many
movements remain illegal and clandestine. Whatever analysis has been carried out to
date on the composition of these flows is thus based upon immigration statistics of the
countries of destination and other private researches 43

UNITED STATES AS RECEIVING COUNTRY
Data with respect to the Indian immigration into the United States can be traced as
early as 1820 with the first official Indian entry into the United States. Milestones in the
History of Asian Indians in North America can be viewed in Table 13.

42

Ravi Srivastava and S.K. Sasikumar, An Overview o f Migration in India: Its Impact and Key Issues
(New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003).
43 See Deepak Nayyar, Globalization and Migration: Retrospect and Prospect (NOIDA: V.V. Giri National
Labour Institute, 1999).
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Table 13. Milestones in the History o f Asian Indians in North America
Year

Significance

1820

Recorded entry o f one Indian immigrant

1901

First significant immigration o f Sikhs to the West Coast

1907

First major outbreaks of violence against Indian immigrants in
Washington state

1910

East Indians declared eligible for citizenship in United States v.
Balsara

1917

Congress enacts law barring East Indians and other Asians from
becoming citizens

1923

The Supreme Court rules in United States v. Bhagat Singh
Thind that East Indians are not eligible for citizenship because
they are not white according to a 1790 naturalization law that
restricted citizenship only to “free white” people

1926

An Indian lawyer, Sakaram Ganesh Pandit, successfully argues
that East Indians are Aryans (hence white) and is allowed to
retain his American citizenship

1946

Congress enacts law allowing East Indians citizenship and allots
India an annual immigration quota of 100 people

1956

Dilip Singh Saund becomes the first South Asian to be elected
to Congress

1965

New immigration laws enacted to allow Indians - and every
nationality - equal immigration rights and to give preferential
treatment to professionals and relatives of citizens and
permanent residents

1982

Move to reform immigration law is launched in Congress.
Asian Indians lobby against proposals that seek to deny
immigration rights to certain categories of relatives

Source: Arthur, W. Helweg, Strangers in a Not-So-Strange Land: Indian American Immigrants in the
Global Age, (Belmont, London, Ontario: Wadsworth, 2004), Appendix C, p 135.
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Regular flows of Indian students and highly skilled workers could be seen by the
1970s after the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 that gave priority
to the highly trained and educated professionals, at least for the first ten years explicitly.
This was a departure from previous migrations to the United States that had mostly
comprised workers and laborers. The new brand of migration primarily consisted of
urban, educated and English-speaking people.
According to the most recent data provided by the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service INS (2004 Yearbook o f Immigration Statistics), India now
occupies the second position for being the largest source of legal migrants to the U.S.
after Mexico. For Mexico, 2001 was the year with the highest number of entries of legal
migrants, with 204,884 people. For India, 2001, 2002, and 2004 were the highest with
65,916 (6.6% of total immigration), 66,864 (6.6% of total Immigration), and 65,472
(6.9% of total immigration) respectfully. With this, India replaces China as the second
highest country of legal migrants (Table 14).
Annual immigration into United States from India as recorded by the Immigration
and Naturalization Services (INS) reveals some interesting data with important
implications for the United States. According to the 2000 Census, the Indian American
population stands at 1,678,765 comprising about 0.6% of the total US population. Asian
American population taken together constitutes 3.6 % of the United States population,
with 10,242,998. The number of naturalizations for Indian American community jumps
from 11% in 1991 to 18% in 2004(Figures 7 and 8 respectively). The Indian American is
currently the third largest constituency in 2004 stood as the 3rd largest constituency in the
Asian American community, behind the Filipino American, and the Chinese American
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Table 14. Immigration into the U.S. from China, India, and Mexico: A
Comparison

Year
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

2003

tTION TO THE UNITED STATES FROM 1989-2004
Mexicans
Indians
Chinese
World Total
405,172
31,175
32,272
1090924
679,068
30,667
31,815
1536483
946,167
45,064
33,025
1827167
213,802
36,755
38,907
973975
126,561
40,121
65,578
904292
111,398
34,921
53,985
804416
89,932
34,748
35,463
720459
163,572
44,859
41,728
915900
146,865
38,071
41,147
798378
131,575
36,482
36,884
654451
147,573
30,237
32,204
646568
173,919
42,046
45,652
849807
204884
65916
50821
1064318
217318
66864
55974
1063732
114984
47157
37395
705827
173664
65472
45942
946142

Source: http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/vearbook/YrBk03Im.htm
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Figure 9. Comparison o f Asian Immigrants from 1990 to 2004
Source: data compiled from the 2004 Yearbook o f Immigration Statistics
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community respectively (Figure 9). The importance lies in the fact that the overall
growth rate for Indian Americans from 1990-2004 was 105.87%, the largest growth in
the Asian American community.44
This impressive growth can be largely attributed to the significant increase in the
migration flows in the last four years (2001: 65,916; 2002: 66,864; 2003: 50,372; and
2004: 65,472). This total includes the new arrivals to the U.S. who obtain immigrant
visas abroad through the Department of State and people who were already living in the
United States, who became permanent residents by applying for adjustment of status with
the INS. In the year 2001, the total figure was divided as follows: new arrivals: 411,059
(38.6%) and adjustment of status: 653,259 (61.4%).
Legal immigration in recent years, including the fiscal year 2001 - 2002, has also
been affected by a backlog in adjustment of status applications pending. According to
the INS, the increase in the number of legal immigrants between fiscal years 2000-01 and
2001- 02 reflects improved processing of adjustment cases by them - from 442,405 to
653,259 - that continue into the current fiscal year.

Political, Economic, and Migration Linkages
For many decades, policymakers in both India and the United States have focused
their attention strictly on the political and economic relation between them. The
migration of students and professionals from India was mainly seen in terms of costs as
the emigration of computer professionals to the U.S. alone cost India about $ 2 billion
annually. There was little or no connection attached either politically or economically

44 The facts have been compiled from www.census.gov and generated accordingly
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insofar as immigration laws for the people migrating that tended to be an individuals’
problem or the remittances that flowed into the country.
With increasing migration in the last couple of decades, new social, political, and
economic ties have emerged influencing policymakers in both countries. The Indian
American community, close to two million people, represents one of the wealthiest and
educated Diaspora groups in the United States. As high achievers in important fields,
there are approximately 300 Indian-American entrepreneurs with a personal net worth of
at least $5 million, many in the high technology sector. With the transformation of
Indian economic policy since 1991, corporate America has begun to take India seriously
in the wake of these emerging linkages.
The Indian American community has also organized itself along political lines
and contributed generously to both the Democratic and Republican parties in the U.S. in
an effort to lobby issues to interest to their country of origin. The 2000 and 2004
presidential elections in the United States represent one of the most visible and influential
role-played by them (explained in detail in chapter VI). With new linkages, between
political economic, and migration, with visible benefits for the home country, the
literature on brain drain takes a departure from its traditional stance to explore new
avenues for gain.

CONCLUSION
The development of Indo-US relations, can be defined as a relationship that had a
shaky start, a history of disagreements over a wide range of issues, and instances of
cooperation, albeit rare. The bilateral relationship has a history of being influenced by
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U.S. policies towards India’s neighbors and India’s policy of non-alignment and its
relations with the erstwhile Soviet Union. Pakistan and China’s relations with America
have also influenced the bilateral relationship existing between them. Added to this has
been the politics of the Cold War and it becomes easy to understand why relations
between the two democracies were often based on mutual mistrust and misperceptions.
The end of the cold war coupled with the adoption of liberalized economic
policies in India has led to unprecedented economic ties between the two countries.
Although India tested nuclear weapons in May 1998 and had economic sanctions
imposed on it, the relationship between the two countries remained strong. The freeze
did not last very long and improvement in relations was evident in the visit of President
Clinton to India in March 2000, the first presidential visit in over 20 years. Since then
relations between the two countries have swiftly evolved into what has been termed as a
policy of comprehensive engagement coupled with international migration. Since then
Indo-US relations have developed at an unprecedented pace, especially in the politicomilitary sphere. The terrorist attacks in the US in September 2001 and on the Indian
Parliament in December 2001 have further galvanized the growing closeness as both face
similar threats to their security.
At the dawn of a new century, both India and the United States have transformed
their relationship from what it had been in the past. A stable India with a burgeoning
middle class and growing economy is seen as more advantageous to the United States in
the long run given India’s role in South Asian and world affairs. The New York Times
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columnist Tom Friedman has aptly put this point when he remarked that, “while General
Powell may like General Musharraf, General Electric prefers India!45
These linkages remain incomplete without reference to increasing movement of
people between the two countries. As an emerging economic and political force, the
Indian Diaspora promises new linkages between the sending and receiving countries.

45 Thomas Friedman, Long and Short o f India-US Relations (2002). Available
[Online]:<http://fecolumnists.expressindia.com/full column.php?content id=15846>[25 August 2002].
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CHAPTER IV
UNITED STATES: IMMIGRATION LAWS AND FUTURE OF BRAIN DRAIN

“Give us your tired, your poor. . . your scientists and your mathematicians.
INTRODUCTION
Nations increasingly seek to control the various kinds of flows (legal immigrants,
refugees, unauthorized migrants, and non-immigrants) across their borders. In an era of
unrestricted global markets, cross-national studies find a set of relatively consistent
factors that both “push” people out of their homelands and “pull” them into the developed
world. Receiving countries, primarily industrial economies, thus become the site of
migration influx with ‘pull’ factors such as: professional opportunities; better living and
working conditions; opportunities for employment; and in some cases, political freedom.
Many studies see the pull of higher salaries, greater logistical support, political stability,
and opportunities for higher education to the rich industrial countries, as the root cause of
brain drain. In addition, immigration laws and policies associated with the receiving
countries, remains selective and biased bringing in new immigrants with a given level of
human capital, inter alia, in their schooling, occupation, and wages.
By the end o f the 19 century, the United States of America emerged as an
important destination for migrants, as Western Europe had been during the era of
colonialism. Earning descriptive phrases such as “a nation of immigrants” and “melting
pot of the world”, the development of its population has been influenced by both the
quantity, and quality of people who come to America. Since the attraction of highly

1 By Scott Stephens, Immigrants ’ Kids: N ation’s Brainy Superstars, (July 20, 2004). Available [Online] :<
http://www.bridges4kids.org/articles/8-04/PlainDealer7-20-04.html > (3 November, 2005)
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skilled people remains a strategic decision on the part of the U.S., it clearly represents a
case for brain drain, with increasing developments in the core-periphery divide.
Although there are many aspects of immigration laws and policies relating to both
the receiving country as well as the socio-economic integration of the migrants, of
particular importance to this research is the notion of selective immigration and observe
whether it is a much calculated attempt to drain the “more knowledgeable” from the less
developed countries. Thus, the focus of this chapter will be restricted to immigration
laws adopted by the United States to attract and pull in the highly skilled manpower, in
an obvious attempt to get a ‘brain gain’ for itself. However, as human capital produces
positive macroeconomic benefits, this dissertation argues that, brain drain can be
effectively viewed as a positive phenomenon, given that a large portion of this
skill/education was developed in the United States, to be disseminated to the country of
origin. The aim of this chapter is also to shift the focus from a negative image about
immigration towards a more positive evaluation of the current immigration laws.
The United States immigration laws remain varied, and for the most part
controversial. Since policies set the boundaries, to some extent, on the numbers and
kinds of immigrants to the United States, policies shall be examined first, followed by
data on recent migration, by country, occupation, and selection criteria. Since Asians,
more than any other people have predominated the new wave of immigrants admitted to
the United States beginning in 1965 and becoming greater during the 1980s,2 there will
be an attempt to look at how United States immigration policies have changed over time
with respect to Asian professionals and students. Impacts will be discussed primarily
with regard to brain drain and its application as a ‘brain exchange’ strategy for many
2 This has been well documented in the literature review
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sending countries. Finally, I will conclude with speculations as to the future course of
immigration to the United States with respect to brain drain.

THE IMMIGRATION DEBATE
Immigration to the United States is a topic that excites the interest of scholars,
policy-makers, and the general public, bringing forth a rich array o f behavioral, historical,
constitutional, and legal questions. The immigration debate from colonial times has been
dominated primarily with questions such as, ‘who comes, and why? How long do they
stay? What happens to their identity? What happens to their children? Is immigration
too costly? And, are there net economic gains or losses to the native workers?3
In recent times the debate has been more concentrated on economic, social and
cultural dimensions of immigration as the migration of large flows of people across
national boundaries is seen as an important component of demographic change. Most of
the literature written about immigration and host countries focus on the numerical (and
economic) importance of the immigrant population in the labor markets of the host
countries or on the political aspect of foreign policy considerations with the migration
flows.4 Thus, for receiving countries, entry has always been more problematic than exit.5
With the steady stream of migrants pouring into the advanced industrial
democracies after World War II, many states have begun to search for ways to stop or
3 W.I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, The Polish Peasant in Europe and America (Boston: William Badger,
1918-20), provide early examples to these questions
4 For instance, the recent referenda and legislation in the United States (proposition 187 in California, the
Omnibus Crime and Control Act, the anti-terrorist legislation o f 1995, and the 1996 welfare and
immigration bills.
5 Frank D. Bean and David A. Spencer, “Controlling International Migration through Enforcement: the
Case o f the United States,” in International Migration: Prospects and Policies in a Global Market, ed.
Douglas Massey and E.J. Taylor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
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slow this influx. Choosing policies relating to migration leads us to ask: who makes
decisions relating to immigration and in whose interest. Are policies being made in the
interest of the migrants, workers, employers or the state? In addition to these questions
are aspects of nationality and sovereignty, since migration changes both the economics
and the sociological equation in the society.
Many researchers and economists, with respect to the demand for skilled workers
have attributed international trade and the internationalization of the U.S. economy as an
important reason for the increase in the relative demand for skilled workers. Boijas6
explains that: with the globalization of the US economy -rising exports and even more
rapidly rising imports - there is a beneficial impact on the demand for skilled workers,
and an adverse impact on the demand for unskilled workers. The globalization of the US
economy, therefore, can be graphically represented as an outward shift in the relative
labor demand curve in Figure 10 below. The economist, (Boijas, 2000) further explains
that a rightward shift in the supply-demand framework shows that the relative supply and
demand curves for skilled workers were in a race in recent years and that the observed
trend in wage inequality suggests that the demand curve “won” the race.
Furthermore, the demand for skilled workers also increased because of the skillbiased technological change.7 This is explained as, if the technological advances being
introduced constantly into the labor market are good substitutes for unskilled workers and
complement the skills of highly educated workers, it reduces the demand for unskilled
workers.

6 George J. Boijas, Labor Economics, 2nd edition (Boston: McGraw-Hill Companies, 2000), 287.
7 Ibid, 289.
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Explanation: the downward-sloping demand curve implies that employers wish to
hire relatively fewer skilled workers when the relative wage o f skilled workers is
high. The perfectly inelastic supply curve indicates that the relative number o f
skilled workers is fixed. Initially, the labor market is in equilibrium at point A.
Supposing that the relative supply o f skilled workers increased to
the rising
relative wage o f skilled workers can then be explained only i f there was a sizable
outward shift in the relative demand curve (ending up at point C).
Figure 10. Demand for Skilled Labor
Source: George J. Borjas, Labor Economics, 2nd Edition (Boston: McGraw-Hill Companies,
2000), 287
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Debates about immigration have shifted their focus from the general paradigm of
damage from immigration to local workers and the economy, to new arguments about
benefits from immigration levels. The debates have a new approach that prefers to look
at the characteristics of immigrants (country, education, skills), citizenship, economic,
and social change, culture, and national identity. This is most visible in the United States
where the political meaning of immigration to the United States in the last two decades
has been vigorously debated. Generally, the receiving countries’ perspectives were
dominated by the impact of immigration on the employment status of the local
populations. “According to Professor Boijas, immigrants had depressed the average
wage of American-born workers by about 3 percent in the 1990’s.”8
Despite popular beliefs, many theorists and economists have maintained, using a
basic economic model, that there is a net economic gain for the domestic residents for
several reasons. At the most basic level, immigration increases the supply of labor and
help to produce new goods and services. In addition, since they are paid less than the
total value of these new goods and services, the domestic workers as a group gain.9 In
“Rethinking the Gains From Immigration: Theory and Evidence From the U.S.,”
Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano of the University of Bologna and Giovanni Peri of the
University of California, Davis estimate that immigration in the 1990’s increased the

8 Virginia Postrel, Yes, Immigration May Lift Wages, (November 3, 2005). Available [Online]:<
http://www.nvtimes.eom/2005/l l/03/business/03scene.html?emc=etal> (4 November 2005).
9 James P. Smith and Barry Edmonston, The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects
o f Immigration (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997). Chapters 4 & 5 (Immigration Effects
on Jobs and Wages)
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average wage of American-born workers by 2.7 percent.10 Moreover, many researchers
argue that skill-biased technological change explains most of the increase in wage
inequality in the United States.11
David Plotke in his article12 argues that the United States should continue to allow
large-scale immigration at current or even higher levels, as the benefits of immigration
are high. In political terms, he argues for favoring immigrants for three reasons: (a)
immigration leads to free association, (b) immigration reflects on the meaning of
American political institutions and commitments and (c) immigration directly or
indirectly encourages political innovation. The former U.S. Secretary of State, Colin
Powell, stated that:
“Some argue that we should raise the drawbridge and not allow in any more
foreign visitors. They are wrong. Such a move would hand a victory to the
terrorists by having us betray our most cherished principals. For our own nation’s
well being, and because we have so much to give, we must keep our doors open to
the world-. Openness is fundamental to key of our successes a nation,
economically, culturally and politically. Our economy will sputter unless America
remains the magnet for entrepreneurs from across the world. Our culture will
stagnate unless we continue to add new richness to our mosaic. And our great
national mission of spreading freedom will founder if our own society closes its
shutters to people and ideas.”
Former Secretary of State, Colin Powell, Wall Street Journal Commentary, 21 April 2004

10 Giovanni Peri, Rethinking the Gains From Immigration: Theory and Evidence From the U.S, (January
2006). Available [Online] :<http://www. econ.ucdavis.edu/facultv/gperi/Papcrs/perott aggregate 6.pd f >[12
March 2006],
11 John Bound and George Johnson, “Changes in the Structure o f Wages in the 1980s: An Evaluation o f
Alternative Explanations,” American Economic Review 82 (June 1992): 371-392; also see Steven J. Davis
and John Haltiwanger, “Wage Dispersion Between and Within US Manufacturing Plants: 1963-1986,”
Brookings Paper on Economic Activity: Microeconomics (1991): 115-180; Jacob Mincer, “Human Capital,
Technology, and the Wage Structure: What do the Time Series Show?” in Studies in Human Capital, Jacob
Mincer (Hampshire, UK: Aldershot, 1987).
12 David Plotke, “Immigration and Political Incorporation in the Contemporary United States,” in The
Handbook o f International Migration: The American Experience, eds. Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz,
and Josh DeWind (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999) 294-318.
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Many contemporary scholars also agree that immigration has both political as well as
social and economic advantages and that should be compelling enough to make relatively
open immigration policies. This can be seen in many news reports.

“Immigration to the United States began to swell in the 1980s. By the 1990s, it
contributed a larger share of the growth in the nation’s labor force than at any
other time since the end of World War II. Much of it came from Latin America
and Asia. By the late 1990s, Hispanics and Asians were starting businesses at
four times the rate o f the general population.”
—Dallas Morning News, February 11, 2003
And even when the economy as a whole gains, the differences are seen mostly within the
immigrants themselves. “The gainers are usually owners of productive factors that are
complementary with the labor of immigrants - that is, domestic, high-skilled workers.”13
At a political level links between international migration and foreign policy have
not always been direct or explicit, however, since the Second World War, “the admission
of refugees into the United States has been clearly related to foreign policy aims.”14
The American political system, being a liberal, democratic, having a federal constitution,
has not been very efficient in turning immigration policy to military, diplomatic, or
foreign economic objectives. The United States Congress has controlled the immigration
issue and it has been consistently susceptible to interest groups, ethnic lobbies, and other
provincial concerns. The result has been that immigration politics in the United States

13 See James P. Smith and Barry Edmonston, p 5.
14 See Sharon Stanton Russell, “Migration Patterns o f U.S. Foreign Policy Interest” in Threatened Peoples,
Threatened Borders: World Migration and U.S. Policy, eds, Michael S. Teitelbaum and Myron Weiner
(New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), 40.
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had been a scene of structural conflict between the executive and legislative branches of
the government.15
Americans are more likely than any other country in the world to think of
themselves as immigrant people. However, looking beyond the general beliefs of
America as the land of opportunity for the poor and the oppressed of the world,
America’s generous immigration policies for continuing immigration reveals a need for
economic growth by the highly-skilled immigrants. Americans have always felt
uncomfortable justifying immigration in strictly economic terms, however, it cannot have
passed the attention of many that America has taken legislative and executive actions to
control its borders from the illegal migrants mostly low-skilled workers and openly
promote, again through legislative actions, the recruitment of the high-skilled workers or
in other words, promote ‘brain-drain’.

HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Throughout its history, the United States has been continuously dealing with
issues pertaining to its immigration policy. Basic questions such as: how many people
should be allowed to enter into the country? Who should be let in and who should be
excluded? And within those decisions, questions such as what level of importance should
be assigned to nationality or race, family ties, economic contribution, and economic selfsufficiency, have been at the heart of all immigration debates in the United States.
Legislation in the United States immigration history does attempt to shed some light on
the nature of immigration desired in the United States, both historically and
15 See Gary S. Freeman and Katharine Betts, “The Politics o f Interests in Immigration Policymaking in
Australia and the United States,” in Nations o f Immigrants: Australia, United States, and International
Migration, eds. Gary Freeman and James Jupp (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1992).
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contemporarily. Interestingly, “ebbs and flows in the volume and composition of
immigration have not always been dictated by conscious policy decisions and legislation,
but they certainly have been shaped by them.”16
Table 15 provides a brief summary of major federal immigration legislations
introduced in the United States. Each legislative act introduced, observes the various
issues that were dealt with at every level, such as: race; ethnicity; nationality; and
language. In all of the acts, the notion of selective immigration remains primary. Early
immigration legislation was largely a response to racism and was designed to exclude or
block those who appeared as ‘threat’ in the form of cheap immigrant labor. Thus, the
restrictive legislation of the 1920s severely limited immigration to the United States from
most countries, except those of northwest Europe. The increase in immigration levels
(especially that of the highly-skilled) can be attributed to the ‘Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1965’ that fully came into force in 1968. This new legislation gave
priority to highly trained and educated professionals, at least for the first decade that this
law was passed.
Immigration into the United States can be categorized into five distinct periods:17
(a) the colonial era (1607-1790); (b) the old immigration (1790-1890); (c) the new
immigration (1890-1930); (d) the depression (1930-1965); and (e) third world
immigration (1965-current). Immigration policy had not existed in the ‘colonial era’ and
various colonies had taken on their own ethnic and religious character. During the ‘old

16 James P. Smith and Barry Edmonston, p 23.
17 As documented by: T.J. Archdeacon, Becoming American: An Ethnic History (New York: The Free
Press, 1983).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

131
Table 15. Major U.S. Legislation on Immigration
LEGISLATION

PROVISION

Chinese Exclusion Act, 1882

Restricted immigration o f Chinese laborers for 10 years. Prohibited
Chinese naturalization. Provided deportation procedures for illegal
Chinese in the United States.

Immigration Act o f 1891

Provided the first comprehensive immigration laws for the United
States.

Immigration Act o f 1924

Imposed the first numerical limit on immigration. Began a
national-origin quota system, which generally restricted
immigration from countries outside Northern and Western Europe.

Immigration and Nationality Act o f
1952

Continued national-origin quotas. Set a quota for aliens with skills
needed in the United States.

Immigration and Nationality Act
Amendments o f 1965

Replaced the national-origin quotas. Initiated a 7-category visa
system for family unification and skills.
Set a quota for Western Hemisphere immigration for the first time
and set a country limit o f 20,000 immigrants for the Eastern
Hemisphere.

Immigration and Nationality Act
Amendments o f 1976

Extended the 20,000-country limit for the Western Hemisphere.

Refugee Act o f 1980

Established the first systematic procedures for refugee admission.
Removed refugees from the preference system for visa categories.
Began a program for refugee resettlement.

Immigration Reform and Control
Act o f 1986

Started employer sanctions for knowingly hiring illegal aliens.
Created a program for legalizing illegal aliens already residing in
the United States.
Increased border enforcement.

Immigration Act o f 1990

Increased legal immigration ceilings.
Tripled the numerical limits for employment-based immigration.
Created a diversity admissions category.

Illegal Immigration Act o f 1996

Introduced a pilot telephone verification program for employer to
authenticate the legal immigration status o f potential workers.
Expanded restrictions on access o f legal immigrants to welfare
benefits.
Increased border enforcement.

Source: Smith, James P., and Edmonston, Barry. 1997, p 24 and 25. The authors give a good background
to contemporary US immigration.
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immigration period’ most Americans had settled down and the new Congress in 1790
passed a liberal naturalization act making citizenship available to settlers after only two
years of residence. Over the next eight years, this was gradually extended to fourteen
years. In addition, the Alien Sedition & Enemies Acts of 1798 and 1812 permitted the
arrest, imprisonment, and deportation of immigrant males from enemy nations in war
times. Prior to 1875 there had not existed any formal legislation restricting the admission
o f aliens into the country. After independence, many states had restricted the entry of
poor people from outside the United States. The ‘new immigration era’ between 1812
and 1930 saw an unprecedented number of immigrants land on American shores. Most
of these were from Europe, were Jews, young and males. These immigrants mostly
contributed to the industrial machinery. The Congress alone at this point had the power
to control immigration under Article 1 of the constitution.
The massive influx of foreigners in the first decade of the twentieth century, the
newly exercised federal regulatory powers, and strong nativist agitation culminated in the
early 1920s in broad legislation controlling both the numbers and the ethnicity of
immigrants. This can be seen in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, extending to the
Japanese in 1917. Here it was popularly known as the 1907 Gentleman’s Agreement
with Japan, an arrangement made with the Japanese government to restrict immigration
from Japan. Immigration also slackened during World War I as it had raised nationalism
and anti-foreign sentiment to a high pitch. Immigration restrictions had been a core
component of the politics of wartime nationalism and postwar reaction.
In response to the economic situation and widespread public support the Congress
enacted the 1921 Quota Act. In 1921 Congress restricted immigration into the United
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States to 350,000 a year. This was followed up with the Screening Process18 as some
people have called it as the Immigration Act of 1924 when a new regime in immigration
policy, that of numerical restriction, commenced in the 1920s. The Immigration Act of
1924 further restricted immigration to 150,000 a year, less than 15 percent of the average
annual immigration of one million before World War I.19 The Johnson-Reed Immigration
Act of 1924, created the framework for an admissions policy favoring those countries in
Western and Northern Europe who had provided the bulk of the immigrants before 1860,
by means of a complex ‘national origins quota system’. This screening process has
continues till today. At the same time, this also ended the historical policy of open
immigration from Europe. Political and economic developments, both national and
global, influenced this shift. Anti-alien sentiment in the United States had grown since
the mid-1880s, mostly in response to the social problems associated with mass migration
from southern and eastern Europe—urban slums, disease, poverty, class conflict.
Thus, by 1920 the system of mass industrial production had matured to a point
where increased output was derived from technological improvement, and not from
continually increasing inputs of unskilled labor. More broadly, immigration restrictions
had become a part of a new global age. Thus, World War I marked the consolidation of
the international nation-state system, based on Westphalian sovereignty, hardened
borders, state citizenship, and passport controls.

18 Screening process discussed at length in Vernon M. Briggs, Immigration Policy and the American labor
Force (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1984), 46.
19 Act o f May 19, 1921 (41 Stat. 5); Act o f May 26, 1924 (43 Stat, 153); Historical Statistics, 105. Not all
immigration was subject to numerical quota. Immediate family members o f U.S. citizens could immigrate
outside the quota limit, as ‘non-quota immigrants.’ Natives o f the countries o f the Western Hemisphere
were not subject to quotas. At the same time, all Asians were excluded as ‘persons ineligible to
citizenship. ’ The quotas, then, were directed principally at European countries.
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The Period from 1930 to 1965 of ‘Depression and War’ can be generally seen as a
deviant in the normal pattern of immigration. Depression, war, and the global struggle
against communism made the United States a less hospitable and desirable destination. It
was a time of the ‘Melting Pot’ with the McCarran-Walter Act incorporating Asia into
the scheme for the first time, allotting a hundred visas annually to each nation in the
region and setting aside an additional 100 for an area known as the Asia-Pacific triangle.
90

The McCarran-Walter Act establishes the basic laws of U.S. citizenship and
immigration. This act, also known as the ‘Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952’, has
undergone several changes since its adoption. The 1924 and 1952 legislations marked a
historic turning point in American immigration experience.
‘Third world immigration’ from 1965 opened the way for significant new
immigration of persons quite different from those who had come in earlier periods.
Originally, the law admitted only a certain number of immigrants of each nationality.
However, a law passed by Congress in 1965 gave preference to immigrants with skills
needed in the United States and to close relatives of U.S. citizens. Popularly known as
the ‘Immigrant Act of 1965’, this eliminated the immigration quotas, establishing new
criteria for immigrants (see table 16, clause d). The 1965 immigration act removed
‘natural origins’ as the basis of American immigration legislation and was framed as an
amendment to the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act. The 1965 act abolished ‘national origin’
quotas and specified seven preferences for ‘Eastern Hemisphere’ quota immigrants
(Table 17, clause d). These were: (1) unmarried adult sons and daughters of citizens; (2)
spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of permanent residents; (3) professionals,
scientists, and artists of exceptional ability; (4) married adult sons and daughters of U.S.
20 This Act was vetoed by President Truman
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Table 16. Legal Progress Toward Opening of the US Borders to Knowledge Workers in
1965
Immigration and
Nationality Act o f June
27, 1952 (INA) (66
statutes-at-large 163)

Brought into one comprehensive statute the multiple laws which, before its
enactment, governed immigration and naturalization in the United States. In
general, perpetuated the immigration policies from earlier statutes with the
following significant modifications:
a.

Made all races eligible for naturalization, thus eliminating race as a bar
to immigration.

b.

Eliminated discrimination between sexes with respect to immigration.

c.

Revised the national origins quota system o f the Immigration Act o f
1924 by changing the national origins quota formula: set the annual
quota for an area at one-sixth o f one percent o f the number o f
inhabitants in the continental United States in 1920 whose ancestry or
national origin was attributable to that area. All countries were allowed a
minimum quota o f 100, with a ceiling o f 2,000 on most natives o f
countries in the Asia-Pacific triangle, which broadly encompassed the
Asian countries.

d.

Introduced a system o f selected immigration by giving a quota
preference to skilled aliens whose services are urgently needed in the
United States and to relatives o f U.S. citizens and aliens.

e.

Placed a limit on the use o f the governing country’s quota by natives o f
colonies and dependent areas.

f.

Provided an “escape clause” permitting the immigration o f certain
former voluntary members o f proscribed organizations.

g.

Broadened the grounds for exclusion and deportation o f aliens.

h.

Provided procedures for the adjustment o f status o f nonimmigrant aliens
to that o f permanent resident aliens.

i.

Modified and added significantly to the existing classes o f
nonimmigrant admission.

j.

Afforded greater procedural safeguards to aliens subject to deportation.

k. Introduced the alien address report system whereby all aliens in the
United States (including most temporary visitors) were required
annually to report their current address to the INS.
1.

Established a central index o f all aliens in the United States for use by
security and enforcement agencies.

m. Repealed the ban on contract labor (see Act o f March 30, 1868) but
added other qualitative exclusions.

Source: US, INS http://uscis.gOv/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/legishist/5 11 .htm
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Table 17. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of October 3,1965 (79
statutes-at-large 911)
Immigration and Nationality
Act Amendments o f October 3,
1965 (79 Statutes-at-Large 911)

Provisions:
a. Abolished the national origins quota system (see the Immigration Act
o f 1924 and the Immigration and Nationality Act o f 1952), eliminating
national origin, race, or ancestry as a basis for immigration to the United
States.
b. Established allocation o f immigrant visas on a first come, first served
basis, subject to a seven-category preference system for relatives o f U.S.
citizens and permanent resident aliens (for the reunification o f families)
and for persons with special occupational skills, abilities, or training
(needed in the United States).
c. Established two categories o f immigrants not subject to numerical
restrictions:
1. Immediate relatives (spouses, children, parents) o f U.S. citizens, and
2. Special immigrants: certain ministers o f religion; certain former
employees o f the U.S. government abroad; certain persons who lost
citizenship (e.g., by marriage or by service in foreign armed forces); and
certain foreign medical graduates.
d. Maintained the principle o f numerical restriction, expanding limits to
world coverage by limiting Eastern Hemisphere immigration to 170,000
and placing a ceiling on Western Hemisphere immigration (120,000) for
the first time. However, neither the preference categories nor the 20,000
per-country limit were applied to the Western Hemisphere.
e. Introduced a prerequisite for the issuance o f a visa o f an affirmative
finding by the Secretary o f Labor that an alien seeking to enter as a
worker will not replace a worker in the United States nor adversely
affect the wages and working conditions o f similarly employed
individuals in the United States.

Source: US, INS http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/legishist/526.htm
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citizens; (5) siblings of adult citizens; (6) workers, skilled and unskilled, in occupations
for which labor was in short supply in the United States; and (7) refugees from
Communist-dominated countries or those uprooted by natural catastrophe.
Since 1965, two million Asian quota immigrants, two million non-quota
immigrants, and one million refugees outside the seventh preference have arrived in the
United States. The sharp rise of immigration after 1965, led to the shift in source
countries from Europe to Latin America and Asia. In fact, between 1965 and 1990,
Asian immigration to the United States increased tenfold to a quarter of a million
annually, as gates remained open at both ends. Although Asians were admitted in the
family preference category, most Asians remained occupationally diverse having a
greater number of professionals / executives (35%) than laborers (14%).

91

As a result,

this modem phase of immigration comprised typically “urban, educated, and English
speaking”22 as compared to the earlier phase of unskilled workers and laborers. Besides
selective immigration, the 1965 amendments pushed policy in the direction of favoring
family reunification in the selection of immigrants.

SELECTIVE RECRUITMENT: SKILLED WORKERS AND STUDENTS
Skilled Workers: since the end of World War II and advent of Communism,
United States has had a general approach towards immigration that encourages the highly
skilled migrants (both permanent and temporary) with advanced degrees to enter the
country on one hand, and discourages or closely control the entry of unskilled workers,
21 See Robert W Gardner, “Asian Immigration: The View from the United States,” Asia and Pacific
Migration Journal 1number 1 (1992): 64-99.
22 See Binod Khadria.
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on the other. This was mostly seen as a need to develop the country by pulling in the best
and the brightest in the whole world and also to combat Communism. Canada has a
similar policy in place.
‘Immigrants admitted by type and class of admission’ category includes: (1)
IRCA legislation; (2) non-legalization; (3) employment based immigration; and (4)
immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. Of these the third category best represents an
attempt to recruit skilled workers. The employment-based preference further consists of
five categories: (1) priority workers; (2) professionals with advanced degrees or aliens of
exceptional ability; skilled workers, (3) professionals (without advanced degrees), and
needed unskilled workers; (4) special immigrants (e.g. ministers, religious workers, and
employees of the U.S. government abroad); and (5) employment creation immigrants or
investors. Spouses and children are also included in the employment preference limit.23
Here it can be noted that a tremendous increase took place in the employment-based
category, from 85,336 in 1995 to 155,330 in 2004 (Table 18).
In recent years, the top five sending countries from Asia include: the Philippines,
Vietnam, Republic of Korea, People’s Republic of China (PRC), and India. Thereafter,
Asians have formed the second largest source of U.S. legal immigration, after North
America including Mexico (Table 19). This can also be viewed in terms of percentages,
North America: 36% and Asia 28% (Figure 11). Despite this fact, the data when further
investigated reveals that employment based preferences was strongly in bias from people
hailing from Asia with 59% followed by North America at 12% (see Figure 12).

23 All data has been compiled from the Yearbook o f Immigration 2006.
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Table 18. Immigrants Admitted in the US by Type and Selected Class of Admission:
Fiscal Years 1995 - 2004

Year

Total Employment- Priority
Based Workers
Immigrants
Immigrants

Professions
Skilled
Special Employment
with
Workers, Immigrants
Creation
Advanced Professionals,
other
Degrees or
Aliens of
Workers
Exceptional
Ability

1995

720,461

85,336

17,339

10,475

50,245

6,737

540

1996

915,900

117,499

27,501

18,462

62,756

7,844

936

1997

798,378

90,607

21,810

17,059

42,596

7,781

1,361

1998

654,451

77,517

21,408

14,384

34,317

6,584

824

1999

646,568

56,817

14,898

8,581

27,966

5,086

286

2000

849,807

107,024

27,706

20,304

49,736

9,052

226

2001

1064,318

179,195

41,801

42,620

86,058

8,523

193

2002

1063,732

174,968

34,452

44,468

88,555

7,344

149

2003

705,827

82,137

14,544

15,459

46,613

5,456

65

2004

946,142

155,330

31,291

32,534

85,969

5,407

129

Source: All data has been compiled from: U.S. Department o f Homeland Security, 2004 Yearbook o f
Immigration Statistics, (Washington D.C.: Office o f Immigration Statistics, 2006).
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Table 19. Immigrants Admitted by Region and Country of Last Residence, Fiscal Years
1989-2004
Region and
country of birth
Europe
Asia
Africa
Oceania

1991 -2000

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

1,359,737
2,795,672
354,939
55,845

132,480
265,400
44,731
5,136

177,833
337,566
50,209
7,253

177,652
326,871
56,135
6,536

102,843
236,039
45,640
5,102

130,151
314,489
62,510
6,929
407,471
81,893
60,299
69,177
946,142

iriS l
Caribbean
978,787
88,198
96,958 94,240
67,660
Central America
53,435
526,915
66,443
73,063 66,520
South America
539,656
56,074
68,279 73,400
54,155
All countries
9,095,417 849,8071,064,318 1,063,732 705,827
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004 Yearbook o f Immigration Statistics,
(Washington D.C.: Office o f Immigration Statistics, 2006).
*North America includes Canada and Mexico. After 1996, regions of origin of legal
immigrants were North America and Asia. These regions accounted for 36percent and 28
percent, respectively of all legal immigrants in 2004.
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Figure 11. Immigrants Admitted by Region and Country of Last Residence In Percentage
in 2004
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Source: U.S. Department o f Homeland Security, 2004 Yearbook o f Immigration Statistics, (Washington
D.C.: Office o f Immigration Statistics, 2006).
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The need for recruiting skilled workers, especially from Asia can be partly
explained as a competitive strategy with the rapid rise of computer industries in the AsiaPacific region, specially Japan’s development of a computer industry beginning with
mainframes in the seventies. In addition, with the development of PC-based computer
industries in Hong-Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan in the eighties, United States
started facing new challenges in maintaining its leadership in standards, design,
marketing, and business innovation, in the computer industry.24 Thus the recruitment of
highly skilled Asians, particularly in the computer industry became a visible trend in U.S.
Immigration. Since 1992, it has been visible that the employment-based preference
system in the United States did favor the ‘entry of the highly skilled workers’ with a
lesser quota being reserved for the unskilled workers and their families.25
The U.S. immigration program gives preferential immigration status to persons
with a close family relationship with a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident, persons
with needed job skills, or persons who qualify as refugees. Other categories usually
account for few admissions.26
The 2004 OECD report has also confirmed that the recent strains on the labor
market as well as strains on population trends have prompted many OECD countries
(including the United States), to relax their policies regarding the recruitment of foreign,
and especially skilled workers. This trend, according to the report, was more visible in
24 The authors Jason Dedrick and Kenneth L. Kraemer, A sia ’s Computer Challenge: Threat or Opportunity
fo r the United States & the World? (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998).
25 The highest preference still goes to Family-sponsored immigrants including immediate relatives o f U.S.
citizens.
26 An exception can be made in the years 1989-92 when over 2.6 million former illegal aliens gained
permanent resident status through the legalization provisions o f the Immigration and Reform and Control
Act (IR C A )of 1986.
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jobs in the information technology and communications sector, as well as in health and
education. In Europe, economic crisis have also shaped admission policies with most
European countries wanting “highly skilled ‘brain drain’ versus less-skilled and non
worker categories of immigrants.”27 Whereas countries such as Germany and the United
Kingdom have introduced programs aimed at attracting computer scientists and doctors,
respectively (through a point system program), the United States has aimed at recruiting
foreign university professors in addition to the two categories mentioned above. In
addition, the United States also targets the entry of people with intermediate-level
qualifications, such as computer technicians or secondary level teachers.

TEMPORARY ADMISSIONS (HI - B) CATEGORY
Temporary admissions into the United States describe the number and
characteristics of persons on a temporary basis (non-immigrants). These are usually
persons allowed in temporarily under special circumstances, and H l-B workers are those
who find temporary entrance to perform services in ‘specialty occupations’. The criteria
for selection for these specialty workers itself suggests that it has been designed to pull in
or drain the best from the source countries. Criteria such as, ‘must hold a U.S.
baccalaureate or higher degree as required by the specialty occupation from an accredited
college or university’28 in it has fixed the ceiling for workers with a graduate degree. In
addition, the INS determines whether the specialty occupation is a combination of

27 Catherine Withol De Wenden, “Admissions Policies in Europe,” in International Migration: Prospects
and Policies in a Global Market, eds. Douglas Massey and E. J. Taylor (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004), 286.
28 2004 Yearbook o f Immigration Statistics, 94.
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education, training, and/or experience. This has generally included computer systems
analysts and programmers, physicians, professors, engineers, and accountants.
The U.S. nonimmigrant program had been first defined in the Immigration Act of
1819, and the Act of 1855 was the first to require the reporting of “temporary arrivals”
separately. The Act of 1924 defined several classes of admission that were expanded in
subsequent legislations. ‘Tourists’ and ‘business people’ remain the most numerous
nonimmigrant class of admission to the United States. Other categories of admission
such as ‘foreign students’ and ‘temporary workers’ have made up a much smaller share
of the nonimmigrant total. Although the typical nonimmigrant is a tourist who visits the
United States for a few days to several months, there are numerous classes of
nonimmigrant admission, ranging from students to ambassadors. The Immigration and
Naturalization Service has been responsible for the processing and approving of Hl-B
petitions that have been submitted by their domestic employers and their representatives
on behalf of nonimmigrant workers seeking temporary employment within the United
States. These are foreign professionals entering the United States on a temporary basis to
work in their fields of expertise. Under the Hl-B program, the specialty workers have
permission to be employed for as long as three years initially with extensions not
exceeding three years. The maximum stay is six years.
The INS has also amended the Immigration Act of 1990 and the American
Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 (ACWIA), regulating Hl-B
policies as well as guides to Hl-B procedures by increasing the annual ceiling of Hl-B
petitions from 65,000 to 115,000 in fiscal years 1999 and 2000. The enactment of the
American Competitiveness in the Twenty First Century Act (AC21) in October 2000 also
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raised the limit on petitions in fiscal year 2001 from 107,500 to 195,000 and in fiscal year
2002 from 65,000 to 195,000.29 Thus more than 30 million nonimmigrant admissions
have been counted in the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s Nonimmigrant
Information System during the fiscal year 2004. Usually the collection o f an INS Form I
- 94, has been the basis o f nonimmigrant admission counts. This however, does not take
into account people arriving from either Canada or Mexico, who are given separate visas
for business or pleasure (B1 and B2 classes).
Table 20 shows the distribution of beneficiaries by country of birth for 2002,
2003, and 2004. 36% of the H-1B petitions approved in fiscal year 2003 were granted to
individuals bom in India, an increase of 22% over 2002. Beneficiaries from China, the
second leading source of H-1B beneficiaries, increased 6% in 2003. “O f the top 20
suppliers, every country increased its number of H-1B beneficiaries except Canada (600), Pakistan (-261), and Colombia (-195).”30 The share of H-1B workers bom in India
remained much higher for continuing beneficiaries (45 percent) than for initial
beneficiaries (28 percent). In contrast, initial beneficiaries from China outnumbered
continuing beneficiaries. For 2004, HI B beneficiaries from India were 85,536 as the
highest followed by the United Kingdom at 32,134. A special report in 200231 provides
interesting data with respect to top ten countries that were the primary beneficiaries of
temporary admission under HI B (Table 21), followed by the profile Of Hl-B
beneficiaries by top 10 Occupations (Table 22), and in the top ten industries (Table 23).

29 2004 Yearbook o f Immigration Statistics
30 U.S. Department o f Homeland Security, Report on Characteristics o f Specialty Occupation Workers (H-IB):
Fiscal Year 2002 (Washington D.C.: Office o f Immigration Statistics, 2003), 6.
31 This report is complied periodically. The last report exists for 2002.
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Table 20. Top 10 Beneficiaries of HI B for 2002,2003, and 2004
Country of Birth

2002

2003

2004

Total Numbers
of Beneficiaries

197,537

217,340

387,147

India

64,980

79,166

85,536

PRC

18,841

20,063

14,636

Canada

11,760

11,160

24,077

Philippines

9,295

10,454

5,112

UK

7,171

7,599

32,134

Korea

5,941

6,614

9,111

Japan

4,937

5,716

14,322

Taiwan

4,025

4,076

-

Pakistan

3,810

3,549

2,443

Germany

3,291

3,408

14,259

Mexico

3,082

3,407

17,917

France

3,145

3,190

15,447

,

Source: U.S. Department o f Homeland Security, 2004 Yearbook o f Immigration Statistics, (Washington
D.C.: Office o f Immigration Statistics, 2006).
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Table 21. Profile of HI B Beneficiaries by Top Ten Countries of Birth: 2002

Country
INDIA
CHINA
CANADA
PHILIPPINES
UK
KOREA
JAPAN
TAIWAN
PAKISTAN
COLOMBIA
ALL

All Beneficiaries
64,980
18,841
11,760
9,295
7,171
5,941
4,937
4,025
3,810
3,320
197,000

Initial
32
63
67
72
58
65
60
59
51
71
52

Continuing
68
37
33
28
42
35
40
41
49
29
48

Median Median
Age Income
29 60,000
32 48,000
34 70,000
32 38,000
33 68,000
34 42,000
31 38,000
31 42,000
31 50,000
32 38,000
30 53,000

Bachelor's
Degree or
higher
99
100
94
99
92
98
97
99
99
98
98

Master's
degree or Computer-related
higher
Occupation
43
73
85
28
39
24
15
17
36
17
59
14
37
9
71
24
50
39
29
9
48
38

Source: Based on all beneficiaries with known level o f income, education, or occupation
* Initial beneficiaries, Continuing beneficiaries, bachelor's degree, Master's degree and computer-related occupation are all taken in percentage
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Table 22. Profile of HI B Beneficiaries By Top Ten Occupations: 2002

O ccu patio n

Ai l O ccu patio ns

Initial

L ead ing C o u m p o f Birth
(percent!

C o n tinu ing

Computer-related

75,114

34

66

India (63)

Architectural, engineering, and surveying
Administrative specializations
Education
Medicine and Health

25,197
21,103

57
66

43
34

India (23)
India (13)

20,613
12,920
10,610
6,910

68
61
63

32
39

PRC (17)
India (20)
India (11)

Managers and officials
Life sciences
Social Sciences
Mathematics and physical sciences
Miscellaneous professional, technical, and managerial
All occupations

5,547
5,443

68
67
63

4,940
197,537

37
32

PRC (28)

33
37

India (13)
India (16)

64

36

52

48

PRC (26)
India (33)

■P.

00
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Table 23. Profile O f Hl-B Beneficiaries by Top 10 Industries, Fiscal-Year 2002

Industry

Computer-related
College, Universities and professional Colleges
Architectural, engineering
Management, Scientific and Technical consulting
Scientific Reasearch and Development
T elecommunications
Elementary and Secondary Schools
Accounting, Tax preparation, book-keeping, payroll
General Medical and Surgical hospitals
Securities and commodity contracts
All industries

All Industries

50,776
18,401
8,963
7,458
6,695
4,357
3,983
3,507
3,442

Initial

C ontin uin g

L eading Country o f Birth (percent)

33

67

65
60
55

35
40
45

63
41

37
59
24

76
62

2,917

58
54

197,537

52

38
42

India (68)
PRC (26)
India (21)
India (39)
PRC (24)
India (38)
India (18)

46

India (16)
India (24)
India (21)

48

India (34)

H-*
VO
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Based on data from tables 21, 22, and 23, some broad conclusions can be drawn
regarding characteristics of the Hl-B temporary workers, for the year 2002. The typical
Hl-B beneficiary was: bom in India; 30 years old; holding a bachelor’s degree; working
in a computer-related occupation; and receiving an annual income of $53,000. In
addition, twenty-four percent of all beneficiaries were bom in India, had either a
bachelor’s or master’s degree, and were employed in a computer-related occupation.
Interestingly, the corresponding percentages in the fiscal year 2001 were forty one
percent before the September 11 attacks on the United States. Also, the beneficiaries
continuing in H l-B status were one year older and earned $ 15,000 more annually than
the typical initial beneficiaries.
Looking at India specifically, it becomes clear that India features big in the Hl-B
category. They not only represent themselves as the largest beneficiary country at 64,980
with China a distant second at 18,841, but also as the youngest beneficiaries with a
median age of 29. Median income for India stands third with $60,000 with Canada first
at $70,000 and United Kingdom second with $68,000 as their median incomes
respectively. Additionally, seventy-three percent of all beneficiaries bom in India had a
computer-related occupation, thirty-eight percent for all countries and without India, the
percentage of beneficiaries employed in computer-related occupations drops to 14
percent.
In terms of occupation, besides computer-related occupations, India-bom
beneficiaries held the lead in other numerically significant occupations: architecture,
engineering and surveying (23 percent); administrative specializations (13 percent);
medicine and health (20 percent); managers and officials not elsewhere classified (11
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percent); social sciences (13 percent); and miscellaneous professionals, technical, and
managerial (14 percent).
All the above analysis and data indicates that immigration into the United States
from India is not only significant but also that the flock of people coming in are young
with a median age of 29 and education levels that are by far much higher than the local
people. In terms of numbers of specialty workers Hl-B dominate the top ten occupations
and the top ten industries in the United States. This has huge implications when talking
about brain drain as India is definitely losing this part of its population to the United
States.
The characteristics of temporary admissions of aliens should not normally affect
the discussion on brain drain as the duration itself suggests a temporary situation and
return to the home country, not exceeding more than six years. In fact, many sending
countries see this as extremely beneficial, as many of their labor further their skills and
technological know-how in the receiving countries, and then return to apply this in the
home country. However, the discussion swings right back to brain drain as the intention
of non-return becomes prominent. This is usually done through petitions where an H-1B
alien can be the beneficiary of an immigrant visa petition and apply for adjustment of
status, or take other steps toward lawful permanent resident status without affecting H1B. For example, of the 1.1 million people granted permanent status between 2001 and
2002, 384,000 were new arrivals and 679,000 were people already in the United States
who adjusted their status from temporary to permanent. “This is known as “dual intent”
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and has been recognized in the immigration law since passage of the Immigration Act of
1990 ”32

TEMPORARY ADMISSIONS (FI) STUDENT CATEGORY
Besides the need for skilled workers, the flow of scholars from one country to
another - particularly from developing to developed countries, forms the other
component of brain drain. Holding the ‘FI ’ visa status in the United States, the current
number in 2004 is 613,221 down from previous years with 688, 970 (2001), 637,954
(2002), and 617,556 (2003).33 This can be largely attributed to the attacks on September
11, 2001 after which nonimmigrant entry under the FI category went down.
Students present the most difficult part of measuring and defining the brain drain.
First, is the problem of students intending to return vis-a-vis becoming permanent
immigrants. Second, with the departure of many students, population pressures are
relieved at home, making brain drain positive.34 Third, a student’s studies abroad and his
failure to return home does not imply that his native country’s stock of educated people is
reduced by one; rather that the stock of uneducated people is reduced, since the
emigrant’s vacant place is taken by another. And fourth, and most important, brain drain
literature fails to take into account when and where their education have been developed.
Most students coming to the United States earn their master’s, doctorate, and post
doctorate education here. Since “education and training are the most important
32 USCIS, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, (January 2006). Available
rOnlinel :<http ://uscis.gov/graphic s/ho wdoi/li 1b.htm>[ 7 November 2005].
33 All data taken from: 2004 Yearbook o f Immigration Statistics.
34 See Charles Kao, “Brain Drain or Overflow: the Case o f Taiwan,” International Development Review 12,
number 2, (June 1970): 40-41.
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1C

investments in human capital” previous discourses in associating brain drain with
human capital deserves reconsideration.
During the period from 1961 to 1980, more than 500,000 scholars from the
developing countries moved to United States, Great Britain, and Canada. Comparatively,
Eastern European brain drain is a very recent phenomenon. For many decades, brain
drain had been largely unknown to the former Soviet Union and existed as a thin stream
in a relatively weak current of ethnic emigration involving mainly Jews and Germans.
Emigration itself had been either ignored or regarded by the society as a phenomenon
incompatible with the socialist system or even as high treason. The state of brain drain of
students reached a crisis level due to the liberalization of immigration laws in the
developed countries. “It costs U.S.$2.5 - 5 billion in annual potential loss to Russia only.
Between 1981 and 1991, 50,000 high-skill specialists left Bulgaria. While Hungary has
lost 15 percent of its scientists and specialists, Poland lost 10 percent of its total scientific
personnel.”36
The United States is considered as the principal destination (also Canada and
Australia) of the ‘drained’, highly trained people from the third world countries. One of
the primary reasons that the receiving countries show interest in the mobility of PhDs is
that these people are considered as potentially the “most effective change agents.”37
These highly trained people are seen as agents in a developed economy with ample

35 See Gary Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to
Education, 3rd edition. (Chicago and London: The University o f Chicago Press, 1993), 17.
36 Damtew Teferra, Revisiting the Doctrine o f Human Capital Mobility in the Information Age.
37 National Research Council, M obility o f PhDs: Before and After the Doctorate (Washington D.C.:
National Academy o f Sciences, 1971), 1.
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capital to introduce new technology that would reap the benefits of a system with higher
education contributing to it as a supply pool of trainers, teachers and researchers.
The Asian student population in the United States grew by more than 8 % over a
period of 15 years from 1974/75 to 1991/92, which is indicative of the growth of the pool
of potential stay-ons. The nearly 30,000 Asians who settled in Canada during this period
made up 52 % of all highly educated labor from the third world to that country, and the
65,000 in the United States comprised 72 % of flow to that country. Between 1972 and
1985, approximately one fifth of a million Asians with training in the science-based
professions entered the United States from the four major sending countries of India,
South Korea, China, and Philippines. Some estimates determine, the cost to India at $144
million with the loss of 15,000 medical doctors in 1980 to the United States. The Chinese
Communist revolution of 1949 and the incident in Tiananmen Square in 1989 also
resulted in increase immigration measures into the U.S., stimulating brain drain from
China. Other source countries include Hong Kong, Formosa, Japan, and Korea.
The issue of brains and level of education attained is usually associated with the
number of PhD degrees that a country is able to produce. The usual assumption with
PhD’s is that they represent the very best brains in the country. Thus implicit in most
studies on the international flow of people with high levels of training is the belief that
having a doctorate represents a highly important segment of the brains of the countries
involved. Some writers have been careful to note the difference between those who have
had advanced training before coming to the United States and those who attain their
education in the United States. Bayer,38 for example has used the terms “trained brain

38 Alan E. Bayer, “The Effect o f International Interchange on High-Level Manpower on the United States,”
Social Forces 46 number 4 (June, 1968).
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drain (or gain)” and “untrained brain drain (or gain)” to maintain this distinction.
However it should be remembered that irrespective of the titles, PhDs represent only a
minor fraction of the people at the highest level of ability. The vast majority of people
with brains are, many times, not PhDs, as they prefer to terminate their education earlier.
At the same time, it is assumed that the education phase is distinct from the rest of life
and especially from professional time. Thus, the presence of students in a foreign
country is counted as part of brain drain, ignoring when and where their skills and
education were further developed.

Immigration and the Case fo r Brain Gain
The term “brain drain” was first popularized in the 1950s with reference to the
immigration to the United States of first-rank scientists from countries such as the United
Kingdom, Canada, and the former Soviet Union; it is now used in a more general sense to
designate the international transfer of human capital (people with higher education) from
developing to developed countries. Since the mid-1970s, there was a great deal of passion
around this issue when everybody took for granted that the emigration of highly skilled
people was detrimental to the country of origin. A number of prestigious academic
economists were part of this consensus, notably Jagdish Bhagwati and his followers, who
delivered more or less the following message: “ 1) the brain drain is basically a negative
externality imposed on those left behind; 2) it amounts to a zero-sum game, with the rich
countries getting richer and the poor countries getting poorer; and, 3) at a policy level, the
international community should implement a mechanism whereby international transfers
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could compensate the sending countries; for example, through a “tax on brains” to be
redistributed internationally.”39
For a long period of time, immigration and immigration laws have been viewed
negatively by sending countries, since it represents a much-calculated attempt to drain the
LDCs of their trained, and educated manpower. Since the development of human
resources is seen as vital in the development process, investments in education are
primarily seen as a simple solution to the problem of promoting economic growth and
consequently the migration of this manpower as a cause for concern.
However, economic benefits through study and work abroad, have given way to a
more pragmatic view of the immigration and its laws. The education required to train the
highly educated is not bound by particular locations in practice therefore the development
of human capital is linked to advanced economies with built-in social and research
centers. These usually flow from three kinds of advantages: “(1) industrialized
economies have an intensified division of labor conducive to specialized research and
development; (2) the establishment of an excellent research environment with the most
modem equipment, permitting more concentrated research; and (3) massive state support
for research and development.”40
Studying in advanced economies provides the most direct form of global
articulation of higher education. Having many historical precedents, it represents a costeffective way for the LDCs to acquire and disseminate knowledge either through return

39 Hillel Rapoport, Who is Afraid o f the Brain Drain? Human Capital Flight and Growth in Developing
Countries (Stanford: Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, 2002), 1.
40 Paul M. Ong, Lucie Cheng, and Leslie Evans, “Migration o f Highly Educated Asians and Global
Dynamics,” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 1 number 3-4 (1992): 551.
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or networks. History41 shows that backward nations can catch up with leading nations
through the development of institutions of higher education. Today, developing countries
pursue a similar path and take advantage of their technological backwardness by
bypassing the enormous cost and risk in initially producing the technology. Thus, highly
educated manpower may provide the much needed skills used by nations at home in the
development process.
The following statement by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) is typical of the current international attitude:
It is necessary that study abroad should be used as an integral part of the strategy
of the advanced countries in extending help to the newly developing countries for
the growth of their human resources.4
The positive evaluation of immigration is confirmed by the so-called growth
theories that evaluate very positively the additional availability ‘imported manpower’. It
argues that an inflow of human capital produces positive externalities that spill over to
other sectors and regions. Thus brain drain induces positive feedback effects such as
remittances, return, and transfer of technology through networks and undermines the
strongly negative view of immigration and brain drain. Described as an “optimal brain
drain theory”, it promotes the simple idea that one should also look at how a given stock
of human capital is built up.

41 The development o f centers o f higher learning in the engineering fields helped Germany and Sweden to
industrialize rapidly in the 19th C and catch up with Great Britain. Japan, before and after World War II
period followed a similar path, emerging from backwardness to advanced status based on a sound
knowledge base.
42 OECD. Policy Conference on Economic Growth and Investment in Education, V: International Flows o f
Students (Paris: Directorate o f Scientific Affairs, 1962), 5.
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THE FUTURE OF IMMIGRATION LAWS AND BRAIN DRAIN
Receiving societies, both historically and contemporarily welcome global citizens
who contribute most to their economy. For a long time, there has been a general
awareness of the various benefits to the US population by capturing the mobile, skilled
foreign professionals. The reasoning behind this statement lies in the assumption that
individuals increase or at least do not decrease the per capita income of the receiving
societies. Empirical evidence proves that immigration, being selective through a set of
laws and regulations, prefers legal migrants with a definitive skill set.
It is difficult to predict the future of immigration of the highly skilled manpower
to the United States. At best, current data and facts suggest that there is little likelihood of
it going down in future. The United States has been extremely pragmatic and has rolled
out red carpets to immigrants with specific skills, especially after the immigration law in
1965. The fact that Asian immigration has increased almost tenfold between 1965 and
1990, suggests that legislative policies within the United States will support this trend.
Unquestionably, the events of September 11th have reshaped the debate over
immigration in general. However, since there is no way of predicting the one-time
factors such as terrorist attacks, wars, revolutions and natural disasters, this has little or
no impact on migration patterns, on the whole. Immigration through family
reunifications and the employment based categories, constituting the family component
of U.S. immigration remains dominant, assuring a high degree of stability in immigration
to the United States.
Immigration tradition in the United States has generally welcomed global citizens
who can be considered as human capital, as they bring benefits to the US economy.
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“Foreign students contribute over $7 billion to the US economy. Almost half of all the
PhD recipients in the United States in any year are now foreigners.”43 The absorption of
human capital in host societies is thus seen as gain with transfer of knowledge acquiring
primary importance.

CONCLUSION
The migration of the highly skilled individuals from the rest of the world to the
United States, often termed as ‘brain drain’ has put policymakers on all sides in great
dilemma. On the one hand the United States has remained morally and politically
committed to assist the development of the poorer regions of the world and on the other,
the United States has considered it to be in its national interest to restrict general
immigration and make it selective through a set of laws and regulations that have
historically favored individuals with high level of training, education and skills.
In recent years countries throughout the world have awakened to this brain drain
phenomenon to the United States and have generated policy discussion and debates at all
levels. The United States congress, the United Nations, the Pan American Health
Organization, and the organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
have all discussed the magnitude of this issue through studies and conferences. Asian
immigration to the United States has been most dramatic after 1965 Immigration and
Naturalization Act with top sending countries comprising China, India and the
Philippines. The recruitment of skilled labor, both permanent and temporary (Hl-B) and

43 Thomas Straubhaar, International Mobility o f the Highly Skilled: Brain Gain, Brain Drain or Brain
Exchange (Hamburg: Hamburg Institute o f International Economics, 2000), 8-9.
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highly educated manpower point towards the admittance of people with special skills and
educational attainments in key occupations and industries.
However, while analyzing the brain drain phenomena there arises a conceptual
problem that needs to be addressed. Most developing and highly populated countries,
such as India, have in fact welcomed the general emigration of their citizens, as it relieves
pressures on both population and resources. The problem has arisen as to where does one
draw a line between immigrants whose departure has been welcomed by their native
countries and those who have actively contributed to an undesirable drain.
Students, more than any other category of immigrants have been cited as cutoff
point in defining brain drainers. However, students too present a special problem of
measurement and definition. To begin with, many graduate students, postdoctoral
fellows, and established professionals come to the United States with immigrants’ visas
although they plan to return home after their period of training. On the other hand, many
arrive with permanent immigration as their ultimate goal. Furthermore, from the point of
view of the sending country, at the time that the student left abroad for higher studies has
to be considered as ‘unskilled’ and also as relieving the country of population pressures.
Both these points point to neither ‘brain’ nor ‘drain’ of the home country. Thus the
answer to this broad question depends to a large extent on the definition of loss and gain
in a holistic sense for the home country. It also demands viewing the immigration laws
in the receiving countries (although representing brain drain) in a more positive light.
In recent years, possible connections between Indian Diaspora and their country
of origin have received increasing attention. Many scholars have talked about the
possibility of developing the human-led-growth of ‘human capital’ in the country of
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origin through increased return migrations or remote mobilization o f resources, the
Diaspora option. Popularly termed as second-generation effects of brain drain, the
subsequent chapters look at the place of Indian immigrants in the United States economy
and labor market in terms of employment, occupation, income, and educational
attainment and their connections to their home countries.
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CHAPTER V
INDIAN DIASPORA AND BRAIN GAIN: REMITTANCES, RETURN AND
NETWORK APPROACHES

“No Gold did theyfind
Underneath any stone they
Touched and turned
Yet
Every stone they touched
Into solid gold they turned. ”
-Vishwamitra Ganga Aashutosh, Mauritian Poet.
INTRODUCTION
The migration of skilled human capital from developing countries such as India to
developed countries such as the United States, has incurred increasing interest among
both receiving and sending countries with respect to the benefits that can come out of this
migration of people. The early 1970s was rife with discussions of brain drain and how
this could potentially be checked and converted into benefits for the home country.1
While the research on the structural aspects2 of the Indian Diaspora continues with vigor,
in recent decades, efforts to reverse some of the costs associated with brain drain has
captured the imagination of many scholars. Three questions in particular have begun to
engage the attention of both the social scientists and the policy makers alike: (a) what has
the Indian state done for the Indian communities in various parts of the world; (b) what

1 Discussed in detail in chapter II during literature review
2 Structural dimensions such as gender in Indian Diaspora, caste in Indian Diaspora, regional identities in
Indian Diaspora, including Punjabi Diaspora or Gujarati Diaspora, etc., and the issue o f racial
discrimination.
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has the Indian Diaspora done for or against the Indian state; and (c) what should the
Indian state do to cultivate and harness the Indian Diaspora as a resource for Indian
development. For the first question, the Government of India, following the express
directions of the Prime Minister, had recently established a ‘High Level Committee’
under the chairmanship o f Dr. L.M Singhvi, Member of Parliament (MP), with the
mandate to make an in-depth study of the problems and difficulties, the hopes and
expectations of the overseas Indian communities. The second question will be examined
in this chapter through brain gain strategies and chapter VII answers some critical
questions with respect to the role sending countries can play in harnessing the potential of
their Diaspora communities.
This chapter examines the available empirical evidence about ‘brain gain’ to India
as a result of ‘brain drain’ of knowledge workers to the United States and examines the
first hypothesis in this dissertation: Diasporic communities can become agents o f
development fo r their home countries by direct benefits that will outweigh the costs.
The chapter is structured as follows. It begins with an evaluation of some of the
costs that are incurred in the sending country, with the out-migration of its students and
professionals’. Then, it explores some of the benefits that come out of this drain. These
benefits are usually measured as remittances, investments with return, and network
approaches. This is done through: (a) analyzing the effect of remittances on India’s
economy, in a balance of payment framework; (b) by quantifying the magnitude of the
return of human capital and their investments in various sectors of the Indian economy;
and (c) by attempting to highlight the importance of networks in the transfer and
3 Given the great diversity and global spread o f the Indian Diaspora, This has proven a mammoth task. The
Committee, with the active cooperation o f NRIs and PIOs, has submitted the Report to the Prime Minister
on 08th January 2002.
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dissemination of knowledge, in fields such as health and education. The chapter ends
with important implications for the relationship between migration and economic
development. In an emerging global scenario where the immediate future is viewed as
the ‘age o f migration’, it is imperative that attempts are made, especially in a leading
labor exporting country like India, to examine the implications of the contemporary
migration flows so as to evolve a more purposeful migration policy framework aimed at
the maximization and socialization of benefits from migration in the wider context of
economic development.
Primarily, this chapter addresses some serious questions with respect to the
migration of highly skilled labor, especially in the information technology (IT) sector.
Since Indians form a substantial portion of foreign-born workers in the United States, and
a significant share return to their countries of origin, this study justifies some of these
findings for India. It also attempts to put into perspective the role-played by the sending
country in cultivating the Diaspora through policies and awards. Finally, it begs a
redefinition of the terms benefit and loss, and a reconsideration of the oft-repeated
phenomenon of brain drain.
Before evaluating some of the benefits, let us briefly examine the costs that India
incurs with the migration of its students and professionals.

BRAIN DRAIN AND COST
Brain drain has been associated with ‘underdevelopment’ in sociological term and
‘cost’ in the economic term since educational levels, to a large extent, determine why
some countries are rich while others are poor. With the highly educated people leaving
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the country it is generally assumed that the nation incurs substantial losses in the money
it put in the training of the individual. And with an increasing number of scientists,
engineers, physicians, and other professionals from developing countries leaving to work
in Canada, the United States, and Western Europe, ‘brain drain’ becomes a contentious
issue in the North-South debate. Not only is the pool of skilled workers in the receiving
country better educated and therefore contributing more to the host economy than the
native worker but is also endorsing the fact that, by investing in education in a developing
country may not lead to faster economic growth. Thus any discussion linking brain drain
to underdevelopment needs to first ask how extensive is this brain drain and second, how
can this lost human capital be utilized to augment development in the sending country.
The first question examining ‘extent’ usually depends on the magnitude of the flow and
on the international focus it receives.
Emigration from India is traditionally seen as a cost that it incurs when it loses
some of its most valuable people. The thousands of dollars spent on educating a doctor
or an engineer disappears when they take their skills abroad. A ‘United Nations
Development Program’ (UNDP) report estimates that India loses $2 billion a year in
resources, because of the emigration of computer professionals to the U.S. alone. “The
Human Development Report in 2001 also mentions that about 100,000 Indians are
expected to emigrate each year, and that the average total cost to India of educating each
one of them is anywhere between $15,000 and $20,000.”4
Although unequal standings make it difficult for LDCs like India to invest in
higher education, either locally or for overseas studies, the Indian government does spend
4 HDI, Brain drain costs developing countries billions, (July 2001). Available
[Online]:<www.cnn.eom>f23 June 2005].
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vast amounts of money in some of its premier educational institutions. The Indian
Institutions of Technology (IITs) established in the 1950’s and 1960’s with foreign
assistance not only represent educational institutions with highly educated students, but
also valuable in terms of their possible contribution to the Indian economy.5 The first IIT
in Kharagpur (in the eastern part of India) was established with help from UNESCO
because o f its proximity to India’s industrial belt.6 IIT Kanpur (in the Western part of
India) was set up with US help, IIT Delhi (North) and Chennai (South) were established
in the 1960’s with British and German aid respectively. Despite the conspicuous ‘foreign
hand’ in the establishment of the IITs, the idea behind this was mainly to serve national
indigenous needs. The departure of these ‘brains’ to the developed world represents huge
losses to the nation as a whole.
Empirical evidence does suggest that not all IIT graduates go abroad. O f all
graduates, only one-third migrates abroad and about two-thirds remain in India to serve
the country. Also, those who stay back work for good multinationals like Hindustan
Lever7, other multinational banks, or get absorbed by IT industries with companies such
as Infosys, that supplies cheap off-shore labor to foreign companies. The problem
however, is that the top quarter of all IIT graduates in fields such as computer science and
electrical engineering leave India, leading many scholars to believe that although it

5 Chidanand Rajghatta, The Horse that flew: How India’s Silicon Gurus Spread Their Wings (New Delhi:
Harper Collins, 2001). Rajghatta’s book offers interesting information on the role IIT plays for all three:
IITians, India and the World. The chapter is also aptly titled as “The Tech High Five: IITians take on the
World.”
6 Kharagpur is geographically close to cities such as Jamshedpur (India’s Iron and Coal industry), Sindri
(fertilizers), Dhanbad (Iron Ore industries), and Bokaro (SAIL: Steel Authority o f India Limited.)
7 Hindustan Lever Limited, 51.6% subsidiary o f Unilever Pic, is the largest FMCG company in the country,
with a turnover o f Rsl 18bn. The company’s business sprawls from personal and household care products to
foods, beverages and specialty chemicals.
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constitutes only one-third, it is also the costliest. Besides, when Nehru had first
envisioned the dream of a powerful and developed India, enriching the global economy
had not been his original intent behind setting up the IITs. When he inaugurated the IIT
Q

in Kharagpur , his dream was very different: to establish first-rate engineering schools
that would aid India’s development. Nehru had wanted Indians to cultivate a scientific
temper, and the IITs were seen as a means that would produce that end. Essentially he
had wanted his skilled engineers to, “build what he called the temples of modem India —
its dams and power stations, its petrochemical industries and heavy engineering plants.”9
Critics in India, blame the Indian government for having hyped the IIT and
diverting generous resources to it at the cost of primary education. In fact, many scholars
and politicians have raised questions about the ‘subsidized fees at the IITs’. The fees at
the institute had remained highly subsidized up to 1991 when the annual tuition had been
fairly low, at 250 mpees per annum ($10 at the 1991 exchange rate, and $5 at today’s).
Although the tuition at the IIT has now risen to 22,000 rupees ($440) a year, it does not
compare with the tuition at elite American engineering schools, that are 40-50 times
higher. The question remains that if India subsidizes such high-quality education, and if
nearly half the graduates leave India, never to return, is India getting a good return in its
investment in people?
Another cost is the so-called option of ‘return’. Despite the patriotic rhetoric of
patriotism and as claimed by an IITian himself, “most IITians do not come back to India.
They talk about it but as they get married and have children and get settled in their

8 the first IIT in India was established in the Kharagpur In the State o f West Bengal.
9 Salil Tripathi, “India’s High Tech Bounty.” Wall Street Journal, 16 April 2003.
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careers, their return becomes highly unlikely.”10 Over the last 50 years, some 25,000 IIT
alumni have made their home in the United States, not in India. Perhaps the saving grace
comes from the fact that these IITians have burnished India’s reputation as a country that
produces highly skilled manpower. Not only do these alumni become CEOs of the
world’s leading corporations, but also enhance India’s image as a leading investment site.
One of the most frequently asserted explanations for the high rate of out
migration of professionals is the imbalance between education and employment. It is
important to recognize that over-expansion of higher education is partially responsible for
the decision to emigrate. Thus, even though the demand for higher education may be
high, if the economy is not able to absorb the number of graduates, especially in highly
populated countries like India, then out-migration is seen as a logical consequence. As
Usha Nayar argues,
“The number of graduates in science and technology produced by Indian
universities is fewer than the number of graduates that American universities turn
out every year. But the American economy needs even more highly skilled
persons, whereas the Indian economy cannot absorb even the small number of
graduates from Indian universities.”11

The other factor that contributes to emigration of professionals from India is the
lack of development in certain branches of knowledge. In recent times, the Indian
government has invested in ‘Higher Education Institutions (HEIs)’, not only because the
service sector is important but also because it is an important source of qualified
manpower for the job markets, in a knowledge-based economy. Statistically speaking,

10 Kamal Sinha, Brain Drain and IIT. Available [Online] :<http://w ww.kamalsinha.com/iit/braindrain.html>[19 March 2006].
11 Usha Nayar, Brain Drain: The Phenomenon and its Causes (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1985), 1-13.
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“India has a huge and diverse system of higher education and large R & D Lab system
(particularly in the Govt. Sector) with 310 university level institutions, 15,000 colleges,
and 400 national laboratories.”12 This has helped in the growth of scientific and
technological culture and creation of a vast pool of science & technology manpower.
However, in spite of these positive developments, the impact of these institutions in the
creation of new enterprises has been rather limited. The University Grants Commission
(UGC) in India acknowledges that India has a long way to go to promote
entrepreneurship through their institutions of higher learning.
Other factors that contribute towards out-migration are better working conditions,
financial incentives, and other material benefits in the Western countries. Better facilities
for research, better equipment, and infrastructure encourage not only migration but also
permanent settlement in foreign countries. Many complaints are made about working
conditions in India, particularly in the government sector. Most of the dissatisfaction
arises with excessive bureaucratic hurdles that scientists and technicians have to go
through. Others have attributed the non-return with the lower levels of income as
compared to what they would have earned in the United States.
The question then arises as what do we define as the word ‘cost’ and how can we
explain this if the United States trained IIT graduates invest billions of dollars as
remittances in India. Cost, in this sense is incurred by the United States that invests large
amounts of money in training these foreign nationals in their universities or jobs. Again,

12 University Grants Commission, Promotion o f Knowledge Based Enterprises through Institutions o f
Higher Learning - A Concept Note. Available
[Online]:<http:/7www.ugc.ac.in/new initiatives/kbe.html>r 10 November 2005],
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the biggest problem that remains are how should one measure costs and benefits since it
is not easy to quantify the benefits but it is very easy to quantify the costs.
While many policy makers in India have been in a panic about the ‘brain drain’ the departure of skilled professionals for more lucrative jobs and opportunities abroad recent studies have triggered many debates on whether ‘brain drain’ can be converted
into a ‘brain gain’ for India. Almost all of the brain drain literature, coming from a
nationalist perspective, talks about economic losses to the sending countries. As an
alternative, ‘brain gain’ approaches look at how migration of professionals can eventually
benefit the sending country. These have been identified as (1) remittances and savings;
(2) return migrations; and (3) Diaspora networks. Networks in the field of IT have
created transnational circuit of professionals that serve as linkages between IT hubs in
India (Bangalore) and the Unites States (Silicon Valley). In addition, the Indian Diaspora
has been actively involved in philanthropic activities, through charities and grants.
Networking with various state governments and in different sectors will also be
identified.

REMITTANCES
Remittances to India have been growing rapidly since 1991, making it one of the
largest recipients of remittances by quadrupling between 1991 and 2003 and totaled about
US$18 billion by 2003.13 In terms of percentage of GDP, remittances equaled about 3
percent in 2003. Although money returns to the sending country in various forms, it is
13

The two main sources o f data on private transfers to India are the Reserve Bank o f India’s databases—
Handbook o f Indian Economy and RBI Bulletins, in addition to the IMF’s Balance o f Payments Statistics
(BOPS). The RBI’s data on private transfers are available for the period 1990-2003, and the IMF’s data are
available for 1975-2002
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Diaspora remittances14 that have been the center of attention in recent times. Since
migrant remittances and savings represent one of the most direct and measurable benefits
of international migration in migrant-sending areas, they represent both direct, and
indirect contributions to incomes in remittance-receiving households.
In the mid-1970s, there was a rapid increase of remittances from the Indian
Diaspora from both the Middle East as well as from the industrialized countries (North
America, Western Europe, Britain, and Australia). Continuing well into the 1980s,
“remittances equaled 25 percent of export earnings and were enough to finance one-sixth,
i.e., 16-17 percent of India’s import bill.”15 Remittances from North America (dollar area
comprising the U.S., Canada, Central American and a few Latin American countries)
were the second source of remittances after the Middle East (oil-exporting Persian Gulf
countries) with rising shares over time. Table 24 compares the size of remittances with
select macroeconomic aggregates from regions of origin and balance of payment
components from 1971 to 1996. Although these were small measures, they were by no
means insignificant and were large enough to play a crucial role in India’s balance of
payments.
In recent years, NRI16 remittances to India have played an extremely important
role in India’s economic development at the micro-economic level. NRI deposits have
helped India in averting its balance of payment crisis, carrying developmental work, and
servicing international debt. For example, NRIs in the Gulf countries, as a group, bailed
14

Remittances (also known as current transfers) include worker’s remittances and other private transfers
on current account.
15 See Binod Khadria, 141.
16 See Appendix A for an explanation o f terminologies such as NRIs and PIOs.
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out India during the economic crisis in 1990-91 by providing 75 percent of the amount
collected. Even today, NRIs in the Gulf region contribute the most with almost $10
billion dollars annually.
The increase in remittances has been somewhat sharper to India than to many
other countries (Figure 13). In 2002, India accounted for about 10 % of total remittances
to developing countries, and about 25 % of total remittances to Asian countries. India, a
country that did not even feature in the top ten remittance recipient countries in 1990
became the world’s largest recipient of remittance inflows in 2003-2004, rising to over
US$17 billion in 2003 (Table 25), up from almost US$14 billion in 2002, and over US$
11 billion in 2001. In 2004, a “strong growth in remittances and services contributed to a
current account surplus of 1.7 % of GDP”17 irrespective of higher oil prices.
On a comparative note, India and China, two countries with the largest global
migrations, report substantial differences in remittance figures. While remittances into
China were about one-eighth those to India between 1992 and 2001, foreign direct
investment (FDI) from overseas Chinese communities was ten to twenty times more than
FDI from the Indian Diaspora. According to World Bank statistics, Indian workers’
remittances have soared considerably over the years to touch $23 billion in 2004 (1.7% of
GDP). Interestingly, at the exchange rate that prevailed in 2003, the inward remittances
amounted to about Rupees 84,000 crore, which was more than double the amount that
government collected as income tax during the financial year.18

17 International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Concludes 2004 Article IV Consultation with India,
Country Report No. 05/86 (Washington D.C.: IMF), 2.
18 The actual remittances may be much higher as flows through informal channels, such as hawala, are not
captured in the official statistics but are believed to be quite large, the report points out.
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Table 24. Remittances to India by Regions of Origin, 1971-1996
(In Rupees Millions)1
Year

North
America

Western
Europe

1970-71
1 9 7 5 -7 6
1980-81
1 9 8 5 -8 6
1990-91
1 9 9 5 -9 6

284
1105
2100
4803
8645
86385

114
502
1684
2578
4633
28561

Britain
and
Australia
223
620
2548
3224
4844
33617

Other
Middle
Total
East Developing Remittances
Countries
37
147
805
694
1316
4237
12194
2771
21297
13884
2665
27155
14499
3639
36260
117961
21086
287610

Source: Binod Khadria, The Migration o f Knowledge Workers: Second-Generation Effects o f India’s Brain
Drain (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), 143.

Table 25. Remittances by Country: 2003
(In US $ billion)
Countries receiving the most remittances, 2003
(US$ billion)
India

17.4

Mexico

14.6

Philippines

7.9

China

4.6

Pakistan

4.0

Morocco

3.6

Bangladesh

3.2

Source: World Bank

1 Source RBI report on Currency and Finance, cited in Nayyar 1994
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Figure 4. Remittances to Selected Countries
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An IMF working paper by Poonam Gupta19, suggests a strong correlation between
the increase in the number of migrants to countries such as the United States, Australia,
and Canada, in particular the number of Indian migrants to the United States that doubled
during the 1990s, and the buoyancy of remittances that has been instrumental in
substantially reducing the current account deficit in the past few years. She attributes the
migration during this period as consisting of more skilled people and professionals,
accompanied by sharp increases in the average earning of the migrants as the primary
cause of increased remittances. Other factors that may have contributed to increased
remittances include: (a) informal channels of money transfers proving less attractive by
the exchange rate devaluations of the early 1990s; (b) opening up of the capital account;
(c) reduction in duty on the import of gold; and (d) the illegal import of gold becoming
less remunerative. All of these reasons result in remittances being channeled more
through the official routes. Figure 14 provides data on the different components of the
remittances in the RBI and IMF databases (In millions of U.S. dollars) for the years 1990
to 2000.
In the literature on international migration, several issues related to remittances
have been studied, such as estimating the impact of migration on domestic economy (in
terms of lost human capital or tax revenue); analyzing the incentives behind remittances
(for support of family, or investment purposes); and assessing the effects of the
remittances on the native country (effects on the balance of payments and growth). The
literature broadly distinguishes between an altruistic motive to remit earnings to the
migrant’s native country (mostly for consumption by the family), and remittances sent to

19 Poonam Gupta, Macroeconomic Determinants o f Remittances: Evidence from India (Washington D.C.:
IMF, 2005).
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either invest in the native country or to repay previously borrowed funds. Since the 1991
crisis, NRI deposit inflows have continued to be substantial, although their relative
importance in the external accounts has declined. The past decade has witnessed rapid
growth in information technology exports and inward foreign investment making India’s
foreign reserve position increasingly comfortable. Despite the significance of NRI
deposits for India’s balance of payments, there has been relatively little research to date
on their determinants or stability. Thus, it is fairly difficult to conclude whether the
decision to remit has been altruistic in motive. What can be observed is that with an
increase in the number of migrants from India to the United States and the migration of
high skilled worker’s, over time, private transfers to India on current account have been
very robust in the past decade. Among the variables that are found to be significantly
associated with the movements in remittances include indicators of economic activity in
the source countries. “Remittances are higher when economic conditions abroad are
benign, and remittances are also found to be somewhat counter-cyclical, that is, higher
during the periods of negative agriculture growth.”20

INVESTMENTS AND BANK DEPOSITS
NRI deposits were first introduced in February 1970 by the Indian government.
(Table 26 provides a list of regulations that governed the NRI deposits from 1970-2003).
The initial scheme was a rupee denominated account, the ‘Nonresident (External)’ Rupee
Account (NRE), with repatriable principal and interest. In November 1975, a foreign
currency denominated deposit facility, the ‘Foreign Currency Nonresident Account’
(FCNRA) was added. This deposit was also repatriable and was made attractive to the
20 Ibid, 17.
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banks through the RBI assuming the exchange rate risk. Nevertheless, the two schemes
got off to a slow start (Figure 15). By March 1980, NRE deposits had risen to only
US$850 million, while the FCNRA scheme had attracted less than US$200 million. In
the 1980s, inflows into NRI deposits accelerated, with the FCNRA schemes enjoying
particularly rapid growth. These inflows coincided with the widening of the current
account deficit, and the need for increased borrowings on commercial terms. About half
of the non-concessional debt inflows during the decade were external commercial
borrowing (ECB) with the other half coming from NRI deposits.
By March 1990, the stock of NRI deposits had grown to US$12.4 billion, of
which 70 percent was foreign-currency denominated (Figure 16). The preferences of
depositors for foreign currency deposits reflected the favorable interest rates on such
deposits, together with the lack of exchange rate risk. Consequently, FCNRA accounts
became an attractive source of funding for the banks because the RBI assumed the
exchange rate risk, and because NRI deposits tended to have a less onerous ‘Cash
Reserve Ratio’ (CRR) and ‘Statutory Liquidity Requirement’ (SLR) than deposits raised
domestically.

"J1

“These schemes, however, proved to be vulnerable during the 1991

balance o f payments crisis, when outflows of deposits compounded the pressure on the
external accounts.”22 As a result, steps were taken to enhance the stability of the deposits
by switching the composition toward rupee denominated accounts and by reducing the
repatriable component (RBI, 2000). The exchange risk on foreign currency deposits was
shifted back to the banks.
21 All data compiled from: Reserve Bank o f India, RBI: Indian Economy, Banking, and Finance. Available
[Online] :< http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/Statistics.aspx>[5 October 2005].
22

Acharya Shankar, India’s Macroeconomic Management in the Nineties (New Delhi: ICRIER, 2001).
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Table 26. Regulations Governing NRI Deposits
February 1970: Rupee-denominated account—the Nonresident (External) Rupee Account (NR(E)RA)— was
introduced. This provided for repatriation of both principal and interest.
November 1975: Foreign currency denominated deposit facility—the FCNRA—was added. These deposits
were also repatriable and were made attractive to the banks through the RBI assuming the exchange rate risk.
November 1990: A nonrepatriable scheme, the FC(B&0)D. was introduced which was open to both foreigners
and NRIs. The scheme was terminated in July 1993.
June 1991: A new foreign currency scheme, die FCON was introduced. Its distinguishing feature was that the
principal was not repatriable.
June 1992: A nonrepatriable rupee-denominated scheme, the NR(NR)D. introduced. Banks allowed to fix
interest rates on these deposits.
May 1995. A new repatriable foreign currency scheme, the FCNRB. was introduced, which differed from the
FCNRA in that the banks were made to bear the exchange rate risks themselves
May 1994: The maximum interest rate on rupee deposits reduced to 10 percent (the same as on domestic
deposits).
August 1994: FCNRA scheme was closed to new deposits with effect from August 1994. By 1997. all
remaining balances had been repaid
October 1994: The maximum interest rate on rupee deposits was further reduced to 8 percent (2 percentage
points below the ceiling on domestic deposits).
October 1995: The maximum interest rate on rupee deposits increased to 12 percent.
April 1996: Interest rates on term deposits with maturity of two years or higher freed.
April 1997: Interest rates on term deposits with maturity' o f one year or higher freed: interest rates on FCNR(B)
permitted to be determined by the banks subject to ceiluigs.
September 1997: Interest rates on deposits o f all maturity' freed.
October 1997: FCNR (B) deposits to be offered at LIBOR o f the relevant currency and maturity.
April 1998: FCNR (B) deposits of maturity' o f one year or higher to be offered at 50 basis points above LIBOR
and lesser maturity deposits to be offered at 25 basis points below LIBOR.
October 1999: Minimum maturity o f foreign currency deposits raised from six months to one year.
April 2002: FCNRfB) deposits with 1-3 years maturity to be offered at LIBOR swap rates for respective
maturities••'corresponding maturities minus 25 basis points.
April 2002: No fresh deposits to be accepted under NRNR scheme, overdue NRNR deposits not to be renewed,
may be credited to the NRE accounts. If the NRNR deposits holder does not hold NRE account, he may be
allowed to repatriate the maturity' proceeds of the NRNR deposits outside India.
July 2003, September 2003, October 2003: Ceiling on interest rates on NRE deposits fixed at 250 bps. 100
bps. and 25 bps above the LIBOR respectively.

Source: Reserve Bank o f India, Handbook o f Indian Economy and RBI Bulletins,
Available[Online]:< http://www.rupe-india.org/36/profits.html>|~30 April 2006].
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In the wake of the economic crisis in 1990, the authorities also made a number of
changes to the deposit schemes. In June 1992, a new rupee-denominated scheme, the
‘Nonresident Non-repatriable’ (NRNR) account was introduced, which allowed the
repatriation of interest income only. Deposits under this scheme were exempted from
SLR and CRR requirements. In May 1993, a new repatriable foreign-currency scheme,
the FCNRB, was introduced, which differed from the FCNRA in that the banks were
made to bear the exchange rate risk themselves.
Additionally, India’s progress in the decade of the nineties and the growing
momentum of the expatriate’s involvement in their country of origin, especially in the
years 2000 - 2003 has yielded NRI foreign direct investment (FDI) of an amount close to
$ 1 billion and deposits to over $25 billion.23 The Reserve bank of India (RBI) offers
statistics in terms of US foreign investments approved by the government o f India. It
also gives information about year-wise NRI investments (both technical and financial),
and finally the total investments in millions of rupees that include investments from all
countries and U.S. (Table 27). Table 28 also provides data on the inflow/outflow under
various NRI schemes from 1990 to 2004.
Members of the Indian Diaspora have expressed sentimental and nationalistic
feelings while investing in their home countries, but these have been calculated decisions
with the realization that business is for profit and nobody invests if there is no potential.
A closer look at the reasons for investing in India reveals that many of the decisions to
invest were taken for reasons that go beyond nationalism and patriotism.

23 See McKinsey & Company, 6.
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Table 27. NRI Investments (Both Technical and Financial)
S.No

Time

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

JAN 1991 - DEC 1991
JAN 1992 - DEC 1992
JAN 1993 - DEC 1993
JAN 1994 - DEC 1994
JAN 1995 - DEC 1995
JAN 1996 - DEC 1996
JAN 1997 - DEC 1997
JAN 1998-DEC 1998
JAN 1999 - DEC 1999
JAN 2000-DEC 2000
JAN 2001 - DEC 2001
JAN 2002 - JUNE 2002

No. of Collaborations
Tech
Financial
125
52
177
155
145
153
169
179
209
260
154
283
144
315
140
243
120
358
84
413
587
63
33
302

Total
177
332
298
348
469
437
459
383
478
497
650
335

Foreign Investment by US Collaborations Million Rs Total All countries
(in Million of rupees)
NRI
Million Rs
1748.92
197
197
4,969.94
11382.6
52 4,391.69
33.623.73
34729.78
126 10,325.12
78.292.86
34880.93
168 4,911.49
1,36.961.19
70,447.83
141.00 7.097.07
3.17,726.53
1,00.558.69
175 21,937.43
3.39,561.24
1,35,698.26
121 18.171.80
5,30,731.89
35,618.81
105.00 7,503.40
3,00,131.71
35.751.68
144.00 4,548.08
2.79,117.27
41,938.37
16.186.39
191.00
3.57,535.53
49.197.41
112.00 6,097.40
2,62,649.22
17.337.22
49.00 3,117.98
74,446.78

Source: Data compiled from: India Investment Center, Statistics: Country-Wise Foreign Investments Approved. Available [Online] :<
http://iic.nic.in/iic2 cO 1.htm>f30 April 2006].
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Table 28. Inflows (+) / Outflows (-) under Various NRI Deposit Schemes
(US $ million)

Year
1
1990-91
1991-92
1992-93
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04

FCNR(A)
2
1465
-311
825
-1317
-2249
-2796
-1949
-2270

FCNR(B)
3

-

1075
1979
2669
1773
971
-632
337
904

NR(E)RA
4
384
324
255
111
1049
-208
1244
1197
799
885
860

594
526
762

1626
6195
4695

NR(NR)RD
5
-

637
1131
742
1279
2246
1256
793
318
553
508
-3745
-1816

FC(B&0)D
6
287
564
446
-507
-533

FC(0)N
7
-

-

12
-2
4
-9
-1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Total
8
2136
577
2163
1171
986
948
3305
1153
960
1540
2317
2728
2976
3641

@ All figures are inclusive o f accrued interest and valuation factor.
FCNR(A)

Foreign currency non-resident (accounts).

NR(E)RA

Non-resident (external) Rupee accounts.

NR(NR)RD Non-resident (non
repatriable) Rupee deposits
FC(0)N: Foreign currency
(ordinary) non-repatriable deposits

FC(B&0)D Foreign currency (bank and other) deposits.
FCNR(B)

Foreign currency non-resident (banks).

Source: Reserve Bank o f India (RBI)
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This leads us to some basic questions like, ‘why invest in India?’ and ‘how much
has been invested in India by the Diaspora?’
Why invest in India - some basic facts about India in the new millennium sheds
light on why would anybody, Diaspora or non-Diaspora, want to invest in India. The
following data, both economic and political, make India a good investment site. Among
the economic reasons:
■ India is one of the largest economies in the world having a long history of market
economy infrastructure
■ Its strategic location makes it accessible to the vast domestic and South Asian
markets (with SAFTA coming into effect)
■ It has a large and rapidly growing consumer market up to 300 million people,
constituting the market for branded consumer goods - estimated to be growing at
8% per annum
■ Demand for several consumer products has grown at over 12% per annum
■ Foreign investment has been made welcome by the Indian government since
liberalization in the early 1990s
■ Skilled manpower and professional managers have been available at competitive
cost
■ A growing IT industry, both domestically and internationally
Among the political benefits, the Indian government has additionally listed out
benefits for investors. These include:
■ A policy environment that provides freedom of entry, investment, location, choice
of technology, production, import and export
■ A well-balanced package of fiscal incentives
■ A sophisticated legal and accounting system
■ Convertible Rupee on Current Account at market-determined

rate

■ Free and full repatriation of capital, technical fee, royalty and dividends
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■ Free use of Foreign brand names
■ No income tax on profits derived from export of goods
■ Complete exemption from Customs Duty on industrial inputs and Corporate Tax
Holiday for five years for 100 per cent
■ Export Oriented units and units in Export Processing Zones
■ Corporate Tax applicable to the foreign companies of a country, with which
agreement for avoidance of Double Taxation exists, can be one that is lower
between the rates prevailing in any one of the two countries and the treaty rate
■ A long history of stable parliamentary democracy.24
The Indian Diaspora has been most active in making investments in capital
formation through building the infrastructure, through business operations, and through
venture funding. In China, about 65 to 80 percent of its foreign direct investment (FDI)
comes from its overseas Chinese community.

This has been instrumental for

development in China, especially at the regional level. The Indian Diaspora, in contrast,
lags far behind and needs to build clear priorities around which to build partnerships to
compete with other Diaspora roles.
Infrastructure is identified as crucial for enabling any kind of project/venture
that is undertaken. Thus, a large extent of buying bonds, channeling funds, and
participating in the debate on infrastructure involves members of the Indian diaspora. For
example, the Indus Holdings, founded by the Hinduja family of London, leverages taxbreaks in Mauritius, and channels money from overseas Indian investors into banking,
communications, power, airports, and urban transit systems. The Andhra Pradesh
government continues to stay committed to the US $17 million Pulichintala reservoir
24 Source: FICCI, Pravasi Bhartiya Divas. Available [Online]:<http:/7indiadav.org/index.htm>r 12 October
2005],
25 McKinsey & Company, A3.
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project, in some part due to the support shown by NRI Telugus in offering to purchase
bonds, and in lobbying the World Bank, and the Central Government in India. “Power,
railways, civil aviation, ports, telecom, roads and urban development, as a whole, require
the finances for infrastructure that could become available at costs that are internationally
competitive with the servicing of the debt. Here the twin roles of FDI and NRI deposits
become important.”
Repatriable deposits by the NRIs are other channels of financial investment in
the Indian economy that has led to gains from brain drain of human capital. Unlike
remittance inflows that are unrequited transfers in the current account, bank deposits are
entered into the capital account on the balance of payments.

RETURN MIGRATION
Jagadish Shukla, a professor of climate dynamics at George Mason University in
Virginia, said during the First Pravasi Bhartiya Divas meet in New Delhi in January
2003, that he was returning to start a school in his village in eastern Uttar Pradesh. “In
my village, nothing has changed,” he said, noting that it took longer to get the village
from New Delhi than it did to get to New Delhi from the District of Columbia. The
Escorts Heart Institute in New Delhi, India, founded by Dr Naresh Trehan, performs
minimally invasive, robotically controlled cardiac surgery, the latest frontier in heart
surgery. Trehan came to the U.S. in 1969 and by mid-80s was highly paid heart surgeon.
He returned to India and with private funding, opened the institute, among largest of its
26 N. K. Singh, Infrastructure: The Emerging Opportunities (Highways, Ports and Airports), 2nd PBD
Proceedings, (New Delhi: FICCI), 148. Mr. N. K. Singh is a Member o f the Planning Commission in the
Government o f India.
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kind anywhere. Escorts draws Indians and others from abroad to New Delhi, by bringing
the most advanced technologies and techniques here. The institute is only second in
Asia, after Japan, to perform robotic surgery. The center devotes 10 percent of its income
to free care for the poor and subsidizes care for government employees, members of the
military and retirees. Staff members in its mobile echocardiogram van see 100,000
villagers a year.27
Such examples, as the ones enumerated above, are few and far between.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, members of the Indian diaspora were talking of being
involved in India’s growth and having a strong voice contributing their ideas to India’s
development, at least in principle. In reality, however, an increasingly large number of
Indian immigrants do not want to return. According to data from INS, more than onethird, have been naturalizing themselves into American citizens and thereby breaking any
option of permanent return to India. The high number of ‘trainees’, ‘workers’, and
‘students’, the genuinely high-quality semi-finished human capital as Majumdar28 calls
them, have not returned to India on completion of their initial assignments.
In recent times, many US-based Indian engineers and technology entrepreneurs
have been returning to India to have their own start-ups in India and also indulge in nonpecuniary indulgences such as philanthropy. This type and number of returning Indians
had specially changed after the crunch in technology spending in the United States after
the year 2000. This return has now become common as an increasing number of Indians
are swapping careers with high six figure dollar salaries in the U.S. for opportunities in
India. While earlier there was a trickle of Indians returning from abroad, today the facts
27 Amy Waldman, “Indian Heart Surgeon Took Talents Home,” The New York Times, 18 May 2003.
28 Tapas Majumdar, “Old World is the New World,” The Telegraph, Calcutta, 8 August 1994.
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speak for themselves. According to one estimate, there are 35,000 returned NRIs in
Bangalore alone, with many more scattered across India. According to a study conducted
by India’s NASSCOM (National Association of Software and Service Companies) in
2003, which categorized U.S. returnees, 15 percent were U.S. citizens and about that
many more as Green card holders. These numbers indicate that a significant percentage
of those returning are doing so by choice rather than compulsion. As mentioned by Mr.
Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the prime minister of India in 2004,
“There was a time, not long ago, when many people in India bemoaned of the
phenomenon of ‘brain drain’. Today a large number of highly qualified and
successful Indian professionals are returning to India because they see that India
itself has become a land of opportunity and achievement. Foreign companies and
businesses now look at India as an important emerging market and are keen to
invest here. At the same time, there has also been a reverse phenomenon. The
year 2003 has seen many Indian corporates emerging as global players with
impressive investments overseas and acquisitions of companies abroad.”
- Inaugural Session, January 9, 2004, Second PBD
Many have tried to explain why senior professionals are returning. Among some of the
most common reasons for return, many Indians felt flattered that they are returning ‘to
give something back’ to the country and that ‘India called to them’, but the majority of
the entrepreneurs returned to India as they saw it as a - a high quality and low cost29 country with a huge comparative advantage in its English speaking, technology oriented
service sector. In July 2003, in Santa Clara, in the heart of Silicon Valley, industry
bigwigs like Intel, Microsoft and National Semiconductor Company were among a list of
28 employers taking part in ‘Career Factory 2003’, hosted by ‘Siliconindia’ magazine.
Approximately 2,000 tech workers of Indian origin were checking out the job

29 A World Bank study, by Jack Absteen, that classifies performance o f countries, places India in the classic
and coveted fourth quadrant o f high quality and low cost. The other quadrants being, high cost-low quality;
low cost-low quality (China and Philippines); high quality-high cost (Singapore and Ireland).
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opportunities in India. In a study conducted at the University of California at Berkeley,
it was discovered that over half of the Indian-born IT professionals in Silicon Valley
would consider going back to establish a company. A shortage of high-tech jobs in the
United States and increased downsizing could be motivators too. However, the most
important reason for returning seems to be generated by ‘pull factors’ at origin (category
5 in Table 2, Chapter II) that include a good investment climate in business, health, and
education sectors at home. Among other common reasons for return include: the tug of
family and the almost atavistic pull of roots; pushed by diminishing job opportunities in
Silicon Valley; and/or tightening American visa regulations. Notwithstanding the many
adverse conditions that exist in India such as: excessive bureaucratic procedures; a
mismatch between Indian education and employment; dismal working conditions; and
lower salaries than what would earn abroad, many migrants do return.
Return migration remains an elusive subject, owing to the lack of official data.
Countries that regulate and record exits do not record returns from abroad, except via
disembarkation cards, which are usually voluntary and hastily filled out by the returning
migrants. Surveys usually prove to be the main source of information on the subject.
Studies done on the subject, through various individual examples and case records at best
come up with general reasons for return; employment reintegration; social adjustments;
use of remittances; and effects of return migration policies.
On a positive note, the return of certain professional groups does have some
benefits for the home country. Investments, usually in businesses, health, and education
sectors stimulate economic growth and act as a means to counter dependency on foreign
capital. At the same time, as illustrated by a United Nations report in 1997, “return
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migrations can only have a positive impact on development when the country of origin
provides a proper social and economic environment for the productive use of the skills
and savings of return migrants.”30 As a case in point, Newly Industrialized Countries
(NICs) such as India, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan benefit tremendously by
having successful return policies along with advanced scientific, technological, and
industrial sectors where manpower may effectively be employed.
In addition to sending country governments, many international organizations
have also come up with programs to better facilitate the return of the skilled migrants.
Regarded as carriers of capital, technology and entrepreneurship, skilled migrants are
seen as contributing to the development of their native communities. United Nations
Development Program’s Transfer of knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN)
helps many qualified expatriates to return to work in their countries on specific projects
on a volunteer basis. These programs, however, have been most successful when they
have been supported by their active Diaspora organizations.

DIASPORA NETWORKS AND BRAIN CIRCULATION
The rapid growth of the foreign-born workforce has evoked intense debates over
U.S. immigration policy, replacing discussions on ‘brain drain’ with ‘brain circulation’
where the assumption that the movement of skill and talent must benefit one country at
the expense of another is giving way to newer ideas of circulation, where high-skilled
immigration increasingly benefits both sides. The professional and social networks that
link new immigrant entrepreneurs with each other have become global institutions that

30 See United Nations Secretariat, Population Division, International Migration and Development: The
Concise Report (New York: United Nations Reproduction Section, 1997).
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connect new immigrants with their counterparts at home. These new transnational
communities provide the shared information, contacts, and trust that allow local
producers to participate in an increasingly global economy. This is the concept of ‘brain
circulation’ that has become synonymous with ‘brain gain’. The increasing
sophistication of information and communication technologies and the liberalization of
global markets has accelerated this process. It is now quick, simple, and inexpensive to
communicate internationally and to transfer information between distant locations.
Information systems that facilitate the formalization of knowledge are dramatically
expanding the volume as well as the variety of possible forms of information exchange.

Silicon Valley: a Case in Point
Silicon Valley serves as a good example to discuss ‘brain circulation’ as its
workforce is the world’s most ethnically diverse body including a high number of Asian
immigrants from China, India, and Taiwan among others. Many of these groups have
become important cross-generational forums. “Older engineers and entrepreneurs in both
the Chinese and the Indian communities now help finance and mentor younger co-ethnic
entrepreneurs. Within these networks, ‘angel’ investors often invest individually or
jointly in promising new ventures.”

T1

Silicon Valley’s Taiwanese engineers, for example,

have built a vibrant two-way bridge connecting them with Taiwan’s technology
community. Their Indian counterparts have become key middlemen linking U.S.
businesses to low-cost software expertise in India. These cross-Pacific networks give
skilled immigrants a big edge over mainstream competitors who often lack the language
31 AnnaLee Saxenian, “Brain Circulation: How High-Skill Immigration Makes Everyone Better Off,” The
Brookings Institute 20 number 1 (Winter 2002): 28-31.
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skills, cultural know-how, and contacts to build business relationships in Asia. The long
distance networks are accelerating the globalization of labor markets and enhancing
opportunities for entrepreneurship, investment, and trade both in the United States and in
newly emerging regions in Asia. Some interesting case studies are enumerated below.

Case Study # 1 32
Howard Yang was among the first ‘returnees’ to China in 1994. Yang was from
Beijing but had spent more than a dozen years in the U.S., first obtaining a
doctorate in electrical engineering from Oregon State University and then
working for Silicon Valley companies like National Semiconductor, Chips &
Technologies, and start-up Pericom Semiconductor.
Yang and his co-founders tapped their professional networks in the U.S. and
Taiwan as well as China to start the company. NeWave Semiconductor Corp.
began operations in 1997 with venture financing of $5.4 m. from Silicon Valley
and Taiwanese investors, Hua Hong Microelectronics (a state-owned enterprise in
Shanghai), and several individual investors. The firm’s headquarters is in Silicon
Valley but most of the company's employment, including R&D and design as well
as marketing, sales and administration, are in Shanghai.
Case Study # 2
Silicon Valley remains the center of new product definition and of design and
development of leading-edge technologies, provided by Taiwanese engineers,
which ensure continuous flows of information between the two regions. The
reciprocal and decentralized nature of these relationships is distinctive. The ties
between Japan and the United States during the 1980s were typically arm's length, and technology transfers between large firms were managed from the
top down. The Silicon Valley-Hsinchu relationship, by contrast, consists of
formal and informal collaborations among individual investors and
entrepreneurs, small and medium-sized firms, and divisions of larger companies
on both sides of the Pacific. In this complex mix, the rich social and
professional ties among Taiwanese engineers and their U.S. counterparts are as
important as the more formal corporate alliances and partnerships.
Case Study # 3
Silicon Valley-based firms are poised to exploit both India’s software talent and
Taiwan’s manufacturing capabilities. Mahesh Veerina started Ramp Networks
(initially Trancell Systems) in 1993 with several Indian friends, relatives, and
32

AnnaLee Saxenian, Brain Circulation and Chinese Chipmakers: The Silicon Valley-Hsinchu-Shanghai
Triangle (Berkeley: University o f California at Berkeley, 2002), 1.
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colleagues. Their aim was to develop low-cost devices to speed Internet access
for small businesses. By 1994, short on money, they decided to hire
programmers in India for one-quarter of the Silicon Valley rate. One founder
spent two years setting up and managing their software development center in
the southern city of Hyderabad. By 1999 Ramp had 65 employees in Santa
Clara and 25 in India.
Case Study # 4
After a decade with Intel, the dominant manufacturer of microprocessors, and a
failed technology start-up funded by Indian “angel investors”, Mr. Iyengar has
set up a back office unit in Bangalore for his new US employer.33 Naren
Bakshi, Founder, Versata in Jaipur (capital of the state Rajasthan in Western
India) after working closely with seven IT entrepreneurs in the Silicon Valley
from ‘The Indus Entrepreneurs (TiE)’ has created a new organization called
Rajasthan IT Entrepreneurs Group (RITEG). This group attracts innovative
entrepreneurs from a large number of fields including non-IT and has conducted
many mentorship programs in schools and colleges, organized many IT events,
has hosted a venture capital conference, has created special interest groups for
IT and Tourism, and has organized a TiEcon with a focus on Tourism.
Overseas Indians have also taken advantage of their positions in the companies
they work for or their own start-ups business operations. As a result of their direct and
indirect lobbying, American technology firms have been encouraged to invest directly in
India, especially in the Information Technology (IT) industry. Members of India’s
Diaspora, who are employed amongst the top consultancies and multinational firms, can
facilitate access to the top management, by supporting trade and FDI initiatives, and
helping to increase the share of products outsourced by large multinational corporations.
Indian professionals, traders and businessmen also provide useful insights for market
penetration strategies and use their networks for the entry of new products and services
from India. The list of Fortune 500 United States investors in India is listed in Table 29.

33 Khozem Merchant, “India’s New B2B means Back to Bangalore,” Financial Times, 19 May 2004.
34 TiE: The Indus Entrepreneurs, A Global Not-For Profit Network o f Professionals D edicated to the
Advancement o f Entrepreneurship, (2004). Available
rOnline]:<http://www.tie.org/newsletter/02/articles2,htm>|'24 January 2006].
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Table 29. United States Fortune-500 Investors In India
Abbott Laboratories

Ingersoll-Rand Company

AlliedSignal Incorporated

American Express Company

American Home Products
Corporation

AMP Incorporated

Apple Computer, Incorporated

Asarco, Incorporated

Associates First Capital

AT&T

Avery Dennison Corporation

Bank o f America Corporation

The Bank o f New York

The Black & Decker Corporation

Brunswick Corporation

Bankers Trust New York
Corporate
Caterpillar, Incorporated

Chevron Corporation

Citicorp

CMS Energy

The Coca-Cola Company

Colgate-Palmolive Company

COMPAQ Computer Corporation

ConAgra, Incorporated

Cooper Industries, Incorporated

Coming Incorporated

CPC International Incorporated

Dana Corporation

Digital Equipment

Cummins Engine Company,
Incorporated
The Dow Chemical Company

Eastman Kodak Company

Emerson Electric Company

E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Company
Enron Corporation

The Estee Lauder Co.,
Incorporated

Exxon/Esso

Farmland Industries, Incorporated

Federal Express

Fluor

Ford Motor Company

General Electric Company

General Motors Corporation

The Gillette Company

The Goodyear Tyre & Rubber
Company

W.R. Grace & Company

Harris Corporation

Hasbro Incorporated

Hewlett-Packard Company

Honeywell, Incorporated

Intel Corporation

International Business Machines
Corp.
Kellogg Company

Johnson Controls Incorporated
McDonald’s Corporation

The McGraw-Hill Co.,
Incorporated

Merck & Company, Incorporated

Merrill Lynch & Company, Inc.

Microsoft Corporation

Minnesota Mining &
Manufacturers

Mobil Corporation

Monsanto Company

J.P. Morgan & Company

Morgan Stanley Group

Motorola Incorporated

NYNEX Corporation

Oracle Corporation

Johnson & Johnson

The Chase Manhattan
Corporation
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Continued
Parker Hannifin Corporation

PepsiCo Incorporated

Pfizer Incorporated

Phelps Dodge Corporation

Phillip Morris Companies Inc.

Phillips Petroleum Company

PPG Industries, Incorporated

The Procter & Gamble Company

Qualcomm

Raytheon Company

Rockwell International
Corporation

Rohm & Haas Company

Sara Lee Corporation

Shering-Plough Corporation

Silicon Graphics

Sprint Corporation

Sun Microsystems

Tenneco Incorporated

Textron Incorporated

TRW Incorporated

Union Carbide Corporation

United Parcel Service o f America

United Technologies Corporation

UNISYS Corporation

US WEST, Incorporated

USX Corporation

The Walt Disney Company

Warner-Lambert Company

Source: Embassy o f India, Washington D.C., Indo-US Economic Relations.
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Knowledge Networks
An OECD working paper35 identifies the application of new information
technologies as causing a reduction in the international migration of the highly skilled.
Since knowledge is transferable geographically in a number of ways not requiring
physical presence, Diaspora networks become more viable than ever. Modem satellite
and fiber-optic communications, faxes and emails make it easier to establish network
links with the Diaspora, highly skilled groups whose main contribution is knowledge. In
the service sector, India has long-term benefits as we are in the knowledge era where
knowledge is translated as both power and wealth.
Various knowledge-based industries, with the help of Diaspora initiative, are now
networking for global leadership. Excerpts from different speeches in the roundtable
discussion held on 9-11 January, 2004, Vigyan Bhawan, New Delhi stress the growing
importance of Diaspora networks in a knowledge era.
Excerpt 1: Mr R Ramaraj Managing Director and CEO, Sify Limited, India
Today India is recognised as a business destination, as the destination for
outsourcing. Fortunately, we find that it is not just in the IT or the knowledgebased industries but overall that India has been fortunate, including in industries
like auto-components, that we are starting to make a serious dent in the
outsourcing market. The pharmaceutical industry is starting to outsource, and that
opportunity is expected to be about $48 billion.
Excerpt 2: Mr Kiran Kamik, President, NASSCOM, India
I address myself particularly to the diaspora living in other countries. That is a
critical role of being able to work in partnership, a partnership that may involve
moving technology back and forth, a partnership that may involve acting as a socalled front-end in a country which is a market, acting as a link, helping to bring
in maybe funding, bring in technology, bring in customers. There are great

35 For a better discussion see: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International
Mobility o f the Highly Skilled, OECD Proceedings, (Danvers, MA: OECD, 2002).
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possibilities of partnership where the human talent in India can be capitalized on,
to dig up this two-way partnership and take it forward in a really big way.
Excerpt 3: Dr Krishna M Ella, Chairman and Managing Director, Bharat Biotech
International Limited, India
India is a scientific pool. Next to the US, India is highest in terms of number of
people in biological sciences. We have wonderful clinical database in the country.
Our strong IT skill is really going to help biotech and, certainly the younger
generation, like us, is keen to be in the knowledge-based industry. Once 2005 is
in place, a lot of outsourcing is going to happen, particularly contract research,
contract development and contract manufacturing, and people looking at joint
ventures with MNCs in the US where Indians form a large number.
Excerpt 4: Mr J Rajagopal, Director, Life Sciences, Tata Consultancy Services, India
In recent years, large companies such as my own are moving into new verticals
such as life sciences and healthcare and, therefore, are ready to take up new
challenges. India is one of the leading nations with a qualified pool of scientists
and engineers. Many Indian scientists are in key positions of research and
management in several of the leading pharmaceutical and biotechnology
companies in US and elsewhere. Many of the leading institutions in India are part
of the global best.
The only successful strategy will be based on partnership between academia,
industry and the government, and between Indian domestic and non-resident
Indians (NRIs).
Excerpt 5: Dr Zareen Karani Araoz, President, Managing Across Cultures, USA
I deal with companies at both ends and I think there are three issues I would
quickly like to deal with. One, all Indians need to understand the reasons and the
benefits of outsourcing for the host country so that we do not get the backlash of
countries withdrawing in that area. The second issue is creating a culture of
innovation in India, utilizing the Diaspora. But the major area I want to raise
people’s awareness is adequately addressing the cultural and communication
issues that can be bridged with the help of the Indian Diaspora.
Excerpt 6: Dr Saroj Basak, Vice-President, Product and Business Development,
Celprogen Inc, USA
Biotechnology can be categorist into discovery, development and marketing.
Interaction between people (which is the networking and which the Diaspora can
help people do) will develop the niche between themselves so that it can help
technology, the industry as well as the people of the world over, not only India.
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Excerpt 7: Dr Gandhi, Department of Biotechnology, India
We have been interacting with NRIs and we have some programs of human
resource development where we are providing biotechnology associate-ship
overseas for short term and long-term to 25 scientists. We are supporting over 60
universities, institutions for post-graduate, post-doctoral and post-MD and MS
programs. We are supporting more than 15 training programs for mid-carrier
scientists and industrial R&D people. Another program which is being frequently
used by NRIs is our visiting scientists from abroad, where a host laboratory can
invite scientists from outside to work with the laboratories.
The Department also created over 60 national facilities that include repositories
for microbial and other microorganisms and collections. We have advanced
biotech facilities like micro-erase facilities, NMRs, DNA sequencing facilities.
We also set up one super-computing facility at IIT, New Delhi.

Based on some of these views and opinions, it becomes clear that the task of
communicating and taking advantage of the whole economy, the Indian government
needs to work through NRIs to establish contact with the great institutions of other
countries and that will create the real win-win opportunity and will reflect Indian
companies as being true global players, particularly in IT where, by and large, India has
not taken full advantage of its capacity to develop intellectual property, to sell products.
Although the concept of the Diaspora as a ‘brain bank’ from which knowledge can be
borrowed is not new, the concept takes on new and promising dimensions with the
growth of ‘knowledge networks’ in India for the last ten years. Expatriate Indian
professionals promote the exchange of skills and knowledge, especially in countries
where they are residing in large numbers such as the United States. Diaspora networks
can thus be important channels for knowledge transfers through what the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) calls “virtual return migration” as opposed to physical
travel.
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Primary Education
In the field of education, several overseas Indians, through network links have led
efforts to establish world-class management institutes in India. Since the migration of
students had contributed primarily to the drain, NRI input in the education sector
represents some attempt to turn this back to a gain. The American Indian Foundation, a
non-profit organization in the United States has as part of its educational strategies, has
taken up challenges for the betterment of the education sector in India. These have
primarily two-fold in nature, (a) increase access to education and (b) to improve quality
of education and retention of students in schools.36
Besides providing primary education, NRIs have also taken initiative in
establishing world-class institutions such as the Indian School of Business in
•5 *7

Hyderabad

and the Indian Institute of Public Health. “Besides these, Alums of the

Indian Institute of Technology in the United States have donated over $50 million
towards primary education.”38

Health
The Indian Diaspora has also played an important role in promoting primary
health care in India as well. Of late, the help sought from resourceful members of the

36 AIF: American Indian Foundation, The Education Strategy, (2005). Available
rOnlinel:<http://www.aifoundation.org/site/Grants/Education Proiects/index.html>|T8 October 2005],
37 Global Institute is a joint initiative o f three global leaders in policy-related research: The Brookings
Institution, The World Bank, and Center for Economic Policy Research in London. As a first step towards
building the Global Institute, a set o f institutions in the transition countries will join together in a core
network. The Indian School o f Business (ISB) and the National Council o f Applied Economic Research
(NCAER) are two institutions in India who have joined this network.
38 McKinsey & Company, 12.
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Indian Diaspora has been found in every quarter in India. Governments, NGOs,
corporations and several communities and groups in India have sought the Diaspora’s
helping hand. Primary health care has been a complex issue for India. The health o f a
population has not just been confined to hospital and medical facilities. A much wider
domain of socio-economic, political and environmental aspect has to be taken into
account to promote the health of the population.
Several members of the Diaspora have been quite optimistic about their
contribution to India’s development in the health sector. The only hurdles have been the
level of transparency and infrastructure bottlenecks. “Several Telugu associations in
USA and elsewhere have been prepared to give any amount, but they are apprehensive of
proper utilization of funds.”39 Dr. Ashok Dayal Chand, Institute of Health Management,
Maharastra, has also expressed his disappointment over the government collaboration,
which has made many health programs unsustainable due to bureaucratic procedure. The
emphasis has been on accountability and trust building. Suggesting NGOs and
organizations who are involved in resource generation, he said that the ‘projects should
be packaged so that they (NRIs) should find it interesting’. He cautioned that there should
be proper management and there is a need of corporate collaboration in mediating Indian
Diaspora and health programs to make health care programs successful.
India’s first hospital consultancy body - the ‘Indian Hospitals Corporation’ - and
the commissioning of two more tertiary care centers in India, soon followed Apollo
Hospital, established in Chennai in 1983, by a US-based cardiologist, Dr. Reddy. Not
only did he set a precedent for corporate healthcare in the country but also the

39 Sadananda Sahoo, Seeking Diaspora Input fo r a Healthy India (Hyderabad: Center for the Study o f
Indian Diaspora (CSID), University o f Hyderabad, 2004).
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Government of India recognized his enterprising efforts leading to financial institutions
amending their funding legislation to include hospitals.40
In addition there are many example of a few people in corporate sectors in
primary health care such as L.V. Prasad Eye Institute, established by an NRI, to provide
services for the poor free of cost and the Hinduja hospital in Mumbai. Mr. Manoj
Kumar, CEO of Naandi Foundation emphasized the importance of Indian Diaspora in
primary health care. His focus has been mainly on ‘enhancing the quality and access of
primary health care in rural areas’ and ‘access to safe drinking water’. For this initiative,
he has sought the help of Indian Diaspora in these areas. Dr. R. Gopal Kumar, Assistant
Director, Research and NGO Services, CAF India, has also emphasized the willingness
of NRIs for various programs in India.41 At an individual level, thousands of Indian
doctors have returned for the long-and short terms to provide medical services to India.
They have worked in hospitals, medical camps, and teaching institutions to deliver
healthcare.

Project/need-based support
The Diaspora has also contributed its support time and again for project-based
efforts targeting specific issues. These include volunteer help and relief services in
disaster relief operations. After the Gujarat earthquake, NRI groups in the United Arab

40 On an upswing since then, today the Apollo Hospitals Group has over 22 centers in major metropolises
in India with a combined turnover o f over US $ 100 million. Apollo Hospitals, Chairman’s Profile.
Available [Online]:<http://www.apollohospdelhi.com/apollo-group/chairmans-profile.html>[12 January
2004],
41 CAF America, Servicing the International Philanthropic Community, (1993). Available [Online] :<
http://www.cafonlme.org/cafamerica/default.cfmN 13 July 2005]. CAF America can help US citizens add
value to their gifts to charities based anywhere in the world. The services they provide have been designed
to bridge the gap between tax-effective giving and the needs o f international charities.
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Emirates adopted small towns and villages. The ‘America India Foundation in the United
States’ raised about $4.7 million for the quake victims, and thousands of overseas Indians
volunteered to work in Gujarat in the aftermath.42 In response to the tragic events of
September 11th, AIF also temporarily served as a grant-making vehicle for members of
the Indo-American community interested in providing financial assistance to the victims
of the attacks. Members of the community channeled over $1,000,000 through AIF to
organizations including the Citizen’s Scholarship Fund, the Chicago Remembers Fund,
and the Twin Towers Fund amongst others.
The American India Foundation (AIF) also raised $2 million for the Tsunami
Relief Fund and victims in India. To this end, AIF awarded grants to the South Indian
Federation of Fishermen Societies (SIFFS), working to rebuild coastal fishing industries
by setting up local repair stations for crafts and engines; the Tamil Nadu Women’s
Collective (TNWC) and the Integrated Women’s Development Institute (IWDI), both
working to improve long-term political, social, and economic empowerment for tsunamiaffected women and children through programs like self-help groups and microcredit
loans.
Interestingly, the Indian governments’ attempts to woo the NRIs into ‘nationbuilding’ have been focused on the economy-end rather than the education-end or health,
as some would expect. A variety of incentives and preferential treatments have been
offered to attract overseas investments (there is even talk of providing dual citizenship to
expatriates living abroad). In sharp contrast, no serious efforts at the national or regional
level have been made, except for some charitable efforts by a few NGOs and select

42 The Gujarati community is one o f the most affluent among Indians in the United States. They mostly run
the Gas-station, hotel and motel businesses in the United States.
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individuals on their own initiatives, that would get the NRIs physically or financially
involved in drawing out major parts of human resource potential - either in the education
or the health sector.

CONCLUSION
Emigration from India is traditionally seen as a drain since they lose some of their
most valuable people. One of the most frequently asserted explanations for the high rate
of out-migration of professionals is the imbalance between education and employment. It
is important to recognize that over-expansion of higher education is partially responsible
for the decision to emigrate. Thus, even though the demand for higher education may be
high, if the economy is not able to absorb the number of graduates, especially in highly
populated countries like India, then out-migration is seen as a logical consequence.
Since the 1960s, skilled migration from India was viewed as a loss of scarce
human capital and public resources, leading to proposals such as a tax on the brain drain.
However, in recent years, coinage of terms such as ‘brain gain’ and ‘brain circulation’
reflect a shift in thinking. Skilled outflows are being seen as a potential positive force for
the source country of migration. In India, the changing perception about skilled
migration has been driven by the role of NRIs in sectors like IT, education, and health.
There is growing awareness about the Indian diaspora’s contribution towards investment
flows, skill, knowledge, technology transfer, trade and business opportunities, and India’s
brand equity.
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CHAPTER VI
INDIAN DIASPORA IN THE UNITED STATES: SOFT POWER AND BRAIN GAIN

“Power is passing from the ‘capital-rich ’ to the ‘information-rich ”
Joseph S. Nye1

INTRODUCTION
So far, the discussion on brain gain for the sending country, India, through
migrant or Diaspora networks, is explained in terms of migration and economic
development or gains. Very similar to the concern raised by economists, is the question
of migration and political change. With increasing migration of highly skilled people,
both sending and receiving countries realize the importance of Diaspora communities in
their bilateral dealings, serving varied roles as stakes or instruments in state-to-state
interaction. Large Diaspora groups settled in the United States use their position to
lobby, both directly and indirectly, issues of concern for their countries of origin.
Usually this includes both economic and political concerns. Consequently, migration, in
such situations, loses its traditional image as a sector of Tow politics’ and may alter or
even advance to other priorities in international relations. Migration thus changes the
nature of power between two countries and becomes multidimensional, changing from
actor to actor in specific issue areas.
Within this context, it is argued whether the migration of the highly skilled
people from India can be effectively utilized as soft power for their country of origin,
redefining notions of asymmetrical interdependence between them. Insofar as current
theories are concerned, in all of the discussion on brain drain, brain gain, and future
1 Joseph S. Nye, 75.
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trends of migration flows (either capital or people), the core of the interest in the
migration of the highly skilled remains ‘economic ’. Moving beyond dependency theory
that posits the importance of brain drain taking place from the South to the North in
economic terms, current theories do not explain in detail the ‘political implications’ of
contemporary South to North migrations. This is a serious gap in the literature that links
international migration and international relations.
Indians in United States have emerged as the single largest as well as fastest
growing component of the Indian Diaspora worldwide. Their achievements and status
make them distinct from other communities in the United States. Today, the Indian
American community2 constitutes the third-largest Asian American population in the US,
after the Chinese and Filipino Americans respectively. Boasting large numbers of
professionals - doctors, dentists, scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs, and computer and
software specialists - the community has become increasingly affluent and powerful in
tli

the last decade of the 20 century.
This chapter traces the emergence of the Indian Diaspora in the United States as
having the power of attractive ideas, through their position of wealth and education, to set
the political agenda beneficial to their home country. It evaluates, through evidence and
arguments whether: skilled migrants with high levels o f education and income are more
likely to influence (economic and political) investments fo r their country o f origin. And
whether they can be utilized as soft power to redefine asymmetrical relationships between
country o f origin and destination. This is the second hypothesis in this dissertation.

2

The population o f the Indian American community is nearly equal to the entire population o f the State o f
Nebraska. Nebraska has 3 Congressional Representatives. There are only two Indian American state
legislators out o f 7,424 total state legislators (according to the National Conference o f State Legislatures) in
the United States.
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The chapter is structured as follows. First, critical trends with important
implications for the leverage the Indo-American community can exercise in their country
o f settlement - the United States, will be observed. Second, the visibility and power of
Indo-Americans, as high achievers in important fields such as information technology
(IT) and other industries will be explored. The third section witnesses the role of the
Indo-American community in exercising political influence through their lobbying
efforts, both directly and indirectly. Lastly, through these migration linkages, there will
be an attempt to tie in concepts soft power, and interdependence as elements of brain gain
for the sending country.

STATISTICAL PROFILE OF ASIAN INDIANS IN THE UNITED STATES
After India’s independence in 1947, the number o f Indian students migrating to
the United States increased dramatically bringing in their wake, high levels of academic
attainment and valuable scientific and engineering skills to their new country. The last
decade has witnessed some trends with the migration of Indians to the United States.
First is a sharp increase in their numbers after the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization
Act. Second is their growth in all states of America from 1990 to 2000. Third, in terms
of education, Asian Indians have the highest percentage with a bachelor’s degree. Fourth
is their high representation among the more remunerative professions in the US as
compared to other Asian communities. And last, the wealth of Asians and Indians in
particular, has the median annual income that was higher than the median of all families
in the US.
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Population in Numbers
Annual immigration into United States from India, as recorded by the
Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) reveals some interesting data with respect
to number of Indians in the United States.3
1920
1960
1970
1990
1997
2000

5,000 (estimate)
5,000 (estimate)
350,000
815,477
1.215 million
1.7 million

As recently as 1980, there were only 387,000 Indian Americans in the United
States, but by 1997, this figure had more than tripled to 1,215,000.4 According to the
Census Report of 2000, the Indian American population in the United States has
dramatically increased by almost 106 percent from 1990 to 2000, comprising 1.7 million
o f the U.S. population, rising by more than twofold from 815,447 in 1990.

1980- 1990
1990- 1997
1990-2000

Growth
8.5%
55%
-

Growth Rate
103%
106%

India records the highest increase among the Asian American community, and is
considered to be the fastest growing in the United States. Ten years ago the Indian
Americans had ranked fourth in the group, behind Japanese Americans, today it is the
third largest Asian American group behind both Chinese and Filipino Americans.

3 All data has been compiled from: U.S. Department o f Homeland Security, 2004 Yearbook o f Immigration
Statistics (Washington D.C.: Office o f Immigration Statistics, 2006).
4 Ibid, 42.
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According to an analysis given by the ‘Indian American Center for Political
Awareness’ (IACPA),5 a key factor that has accounted for the rising numbers in the
Indian American community is the influx of H-1B visa holders and their families
(spouses and children) who have helped stimulate economic growth at unprecedented
rates in the last several years.6 According to figures from the Department of Homeland
Security, the number of H-1B visas issued to those from India has grown visibly from
2,697 in 1990 to 15,228 in 1995 to 55,047 in 2000, and 85,536 in 2004.
This impressive growth in recent years can also be largely attributed to the
significant increase in the migration flows in the last four years. This includes the new
arrivals to the U.S. who obtain immigrant visas abroad through the Department of State
and people who were already living in the United States, who became permanent
residents by applying for adjustment of status with the INS.
Although the Indo-American community represents only 0.6% of the US
population,7 it is important to note the rate at which it is increasing as this could
potentially become very significant for demography within the US. For now, it is this
number in combination with other characteristics, such as distribution, education,
profession, and income that makes this community worth observing.

5 IAPCA: The Indian American Center for Political Awareness, Participation by the Indian American
Community in American Democracy. Available [Online]:<http://www.iacfba.org/N 4 August 2004].
6 The H1B visa (or simply called HI Visa) is a non-immigrant employment based visa for workers coming
to the USA to perform a “specialty occupation.” Workers from Mexico and Canada can get a special TN
status under the NAFTA treaty. The H1B status allows foreign workers to work in the USA for a maximum
o f six years. It is granted for three years and can only be renewed once for an additional three years. The
Information Technology industry uses this type o f visa frequently to fill vacant positions. Many H1B
applicants are engineers or computer programmers. Quotas are set every year for the H1B visa by the
government.
7 In one interesting comparison, IACPA’s analysis notes that the Indian American population is equivalent
to that o f the state o f Nebraska which indicates that if all o f the Indian community lived in one state, then
Indian Americans would have three members o f Congress.
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Table 30. Indian American population by State of Residence
STATE

TOTAL POPULATION INDIAN AMERICANS AS %AGE OF TOTAL

ASIAN AMERICANS

I-A AS %AGE OF ASIAN

%AGE GROWTH FROM 199o|

4447100

6900

0.16

31346

22.01

A L A SK A

626932

723

0.12

25116

2.88

53.18

A R IZ O N A

5130632

14741

0.29

92236

15.98

160.3

A LA B A M A

58.69

2,673,400

3,104

0.1

20,220

15.4

C A LIFO R N IA

33,871,648

314,819

0.93

3,697,513

8.51

96.8

COLORADO

4,301,261

11,720

0.27

95,213

12.31

205.53

C O N N E C T IC U T

3,405,565

23,662

0.69

82,313

28.75

101.29

D ELAW ARE

783,600

5,280

0.67

16,259

32.47

141.87

D IST R IC T OF C O LU M B IA

572,059

2,845

0.5

15,189

18.73

77.7

FL O R ID A

15,982,378

70,740

0.44

266,256

26.57

124.88

G E O R G IA

8,186,453

46,132

0.56

173,170

26.64

231.27

H A W A II

1,211,537

1,441

0.12

503,868

0.29

41.97

ID A H O

1,293,953

1,289

0.1

11,889

10.84

172.52

ILLIN O IS

12,419,293

124,723

1

423,603

29.44

94.27

IN D IA N A

6,080,485

14,685

0.24

59,126

24.84

106.98

IO W A

2,926,324

5,641

0.19

36,635

15.4

86.73

K A N SA S

2,688,418

8,153

0.3

46,806

17.42

106.09

K ENTUCKY

4,041,769

6,771

0.17

29,744

22.76

131.72

LO U ISIA N A

4,468,976

8,280

0.19

54,758

15.12

62.9

M A IN E

1,274,923

1,021

0.08

9,111

11.21

68.2

M ARYLAND

5,296,486

49,909

0.94

210,929

23.66

76.17

M ASSA CH U SETTS

6,349,097

43,801

0.69

238,124

18.39

122.13

M IC H IG A N

9,938,444

54,631

0.55

176,510

31.12

129.11

M IN E SS O T A

4,919,479

16,887

0.34

141,968

11.89

105.09

M ISSISSIPPI

2,844,658

3,827

0.13

18,626

20.55

104.43

M ISSO U R I

5,595,211

12,169

0.22

61,595

19.76

99.13

M ONTANA

902,195

379

0.04

4,691

0.02

52.82

A RKANSAS

133.56
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Continued
NEBRA SK A

1,711,263

3,273

0.19

21,931

14.92

168.72

NEVADA

1,998,257

5,535

0.28

90,266

6.13

203.29

N E W H A M P S H IR E

1,235,786

3,873

0.31

15,931

0.23

128.23

NEW' JE R SE Y

8,414,350

169,180

2.01

480,276

35

112.97

N EW M E X IC O

1,819,046

3,104

0.17

19,255

16.12

94.85

NEW 1' YORK.

18,976,457

251,724

1.33

1,044,976

24.09

78.55

N O R T H C A R O L IN A

8,049,313

26,197

0.33

113,689

23.04

166.04

642,200

822

0.13

3,606

0.05

70.54

O H IO

11,353,140

38,752

0.34

132,633

29.21

85.88

OKLAHOM A

3,450,654

8,502

0.25

46,767

18.18

87.02

R H O D E ISLA N D

1,048,319

2,942

0.28

23,665

12.43

48.96

S O U TH C A R O L IN A

4,012,012

8,356

0.21

36,014

23.2

114.26

754,844

611

0.08

4,378

13.96

112.89

5,689,283

12,835

0.23

56,662

22.65

117.14

20,851,820

129,365

0.62

562,319

23.01

131.98

2,233,169

3,065

0.14

37,108

8.26

96.85

608,827

858

0.14

5,217

16.45

62.19

V IR G IN IA

7,078,515

48,815

0.69

261,025

18.7

138.19

W A SH IN G T O N

5,894,121

23,992

0.41

322,335

7.44

192.41

W E S T V IR G IN IA

1,808,344

2,856

0.16

9,434

30.27

44.17

W ISC O N SIN

5,363,675

12,665

0.24

88,763

14.27

83.18

N O RTH DAKOTA

SO U TH D A K O T A
T E N N E SS E E
TEXAS
U TA H
VERM ONT

Source: All data is compiled from, IAPCA: The Indian American Center for Political Awareness. Participation by the
Indian American Community in American Democracy. Available rOnline1:<http://www.iacfoa.org/>T4 August 2004].
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Distribution in the United States
As seen in Table 30, the population of Indian American community has grown in
all states of the America from 1990 to 2000. In 2000 the state of Illinois had the highest
geographical concentration, but in 2004, Texas replaced it at the fourth highest state. As
per 2004 records, the top ten states of residence are:
1. California
2. New York
3. New Jersey
4. Texas
5. Illinois
6. Florida
7. Michigan
8. Massachusetts
9. Virginia.
lO.Ohio

100,182
64,926
58,999
40,583
31,632
31,173
21,533
21,475
18,177
15,662

The highest concentrations of Indians can be found in the cities of:
1. New York, NY
2. Chicago, IL
3. Los Angeles, CA
4. San Francisco, CA
5. Washington, DC
These concentrations in the metropolitan areas of the United States have brought
for Indians fabulous personal and professional successes. Broadly falling into three
groups of professionals, businessmen, and students & researchers (in the high-technology
fields), their interaction with American communities has rendered close and positive
relations between them. Many have found employment in these areas, and in the case of
Silicon Valley have provided employment to the local people.8

8 AnnaLee Saxenian, Silicon Valley’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs (San Diego: University o f California,

2000 ).
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Education and Occupation
The educational achievement and economic status of the Indian American
community is perhaps the most important feature that they possess. The large and highprofile presence o f Indo-Americans in the information technology (IT) and health sectors,
the number of CEO’s of Indian origin in multinationals, and their presence in the world
of international finance and management consultancy has created a new image for them
enabling them to strengthen their position both vis-a-vis their county of residence, the
United States, as well as their country of origin, India. According to the U.S. Census
Bureau:
■ More than 87% of Indians in America have completed high school;
■ At least 62% have some college education;
■ As much as 58% of Indian Americans over the age of 25 hold a bachelor’s degree or
higher (compared to 21.5 percent of whites);
■ High levels of education have also enabled Indian Americans to become a productive
segment of the U. S. population, with 72.3% participating in the work force;
■ Of these work force participants, 43.6% are employed in managerial and professional
specialties;
•

Technical, sales, and administrative support occupations constitute another 33.2% of the
work force;

■ The remaining 23.3% of the population works in other areas, such as operators,
fabricators, laborers and precision production;
■ More than 5,000 Indian Americans today serve as faculty members in institutions of
higher education in the U. S.;
■ About 300,000 Indian Americans work in technology firms in California’s Silicon
Valley. They account for more than 15% of high-tech startups in that region.
In 2000, roughly 80 % of two groups: (1) all Asians; and (2) all people in the
United States 25 years and older, had at least a high school education. Within that, a
higher proportion of Asians (44 %) than of the total population (24 %) had earned at least
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a bachelor’s degree. Among Asians, Indians had the highest percentage with a bachelor’s
degree (about 64 %). In contrast, about 60 % of Hmong, and about half of Cambodians
and Laotians, had less than a high school education. Japanese had the highest proportion
(91%) with at least a high school education (see Figure 17). Asians (about 45%) were
also seen as more likely than the total population (about 34%) in the United States to be
in management, professional, and related occupations. However, the proportions
employed in these jobs varied from 13 % for Laotians to 60% for Asian Indians. Less
than 20% of Cambodians, Hmong, and Laotians were employed in management,
professional, and related occupations, and more than 35% were employed in production,
transportation, and material moving jobs. 26 % of all Thai, compared with less than 15%
of Asian Indians, Chinese, Japanese, and Pakistanis, were employed in service jobs
(Figurel8).

Income
By the early 1970s, the small but influential Indian minority (not even recognized
by their own governments), were estimated at having the highest per capita income of
any ethnic group in the United States. As early as 1980, the median family income of an
Indian in the US, according to the census of that year, was $25,644 per annum - at a time
when the median income of white American citizens was $20,800. In 2002, the median
income had jumped up to $60,000 for an Indian as compared to others.9 According to
Figure 19, the median income of Asian families was over $9,000 higher than the median
for all families ($59,300 compared with $50,000). Asian Indian and Japanese families’

9 U.S. Census Bureau, We the People: Asians in the United States 2000, U.S. Census Bureau Report
(Washington D.C.: Census Bureau), 7-15.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

214
(P e r c e n t d is tr ib u tio n o f p o p u la tio n 2 5 a n d o k le r. D a ta b a s e d o n s a m p l e . F o r i n f o r m a tio n o n c o n f id e n tia lity p r o te c tio n ,
s a m p lin g e n o i . n o n s a m p lin g e rro r, a n d d e f in itio n s , s e e

Less than
high school graduate

mixxmus.omA'r<k1'c0 >?i}OO/dc>C''iU.i)df>
High school
graduate

Some college or
Bachelor's degree
associate's degree o r more

2 5 and older
T o ta l p o p u l a t i o n
A s ia n

C h in e s e
F il i p i n o
A s ia n In d ia n
V ie tn a m e s e
K o rean
Jap an ese
C a m b o d ia n
H m ong
L a o tia n
P a k is ta n i
T hai
O th e r A s ia n

Figure 17. Educational Attainment for Different Asian Groups: 2000
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 special tabulation
i P e t c e n t d i s W i h u t io n o f e m p l o y e d c i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n 1 6 a n d o k l e t . D a t a b a s e d o n s a m p l e . For i n f o i m a t i o n o n c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y
p r o te c tio n , s a m p lin g e t t o t . iw n s a m n lim i e u o r , a n d d e f in itio n s , s e e t v t m c c n s u s

Management*
professional*
and related

Service

Sales and
office

^QV/pHxia'w2OQ0/ikK/$(4.i'dfx
Fanning,
fishing,
and
forestry

Construction,
extraction,
and
maintenance

0.7

c

A s ia n

0.3

I 3'6

C hinese

0.1

i 26

F il i p i n o

0.5

J 41

A s ia n In d ia n

0.2

12 1

V ietnam ese

0.6

H

K o rean

0.2

| j 3.9

Jap a n ese

0.4

C a m b o d ia n

0.5

H m ong

0.4

I 4'5

L a o tia n

0.5

I s

P a k is ta n i

0.1

J 3 .6

0.2

S 3.6

0.3

1 4 .,

A ll w o r k e r s

5.0

4 '3

H 5.5

•s

,

pM

O t h e r A s ia n

I

Production,
transportation,
and material
moving

i- ( f v .

Tl

Figure 18. Occupation for Different Asian Groups: 2000
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 special tabulation

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

”

j

215

'Families classified by tace of householder Data based on sample.
Foi information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, non sampling enoi.
and definitions. see w w w .cem u s.g w /p ro tl/m iJO O O A Io c/sfA .p d f)

All families

S50.046

Asian

SSy.324

Chinese

$60,05.8

Filipino
Asian Indian

S70.708

Vietnamese
Korean
Japanese

S70.84 9

Cambodian
Hmong
Laotian
Pakistani
Thai
Other Asian

Figure 19. Median Family Income for Different Asian Groups: 1999
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 special tabulation

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

216
median incomes were more than $10,000 higher than that of all Asian families.
Cambodian, Hmong, Korean, Laotian, Pakistani, Thai, and Vietnamese median family
incomes were substantially lower than the median for all Asian families. The median
incomes of Hmong and Cambodian families were the lowest of all Asian groups ($32,400
and $35,600, respectively).10
Based on some of these statistical profiles, the US census bureau, in its report
titled, “We the People: Asians in the United States 2000”, labeled the Asian Indians as a
‘model minority’ based on the various statistical findings in the report.11 These trends
suggest important implications for the role of the Indian diaspora in both sending and
receiving countries.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) AND OTHER INDUSTRIES
The early Indian hand in founding what is today some of the largest and most
successful IT firms are common knowledge. The technological renaissance in America is
full of names that can be traced back to the Indian origin. The years 1995 and 1997, in
particular, saw a growing momentum of Indian entrepreneurship in the United States.
Many Indian professionals in their thirties, forties and fifties were heard of throwing up
their secure jobs in companies such as Cisco, Microsoft, Intel, Apple, or IBM to start
their own companies. For example, Desh Deshpande quit Motorola and founded a start
up called Cascade Communications and soon others like Hewlett-Packard’s Kumar
Malavalli and Xerox PARC’s Pradeep Sindhu followed him from the corporate ladder

10 U.S. Census Bureau, 16.
11 Ela Dutt, Census Report: Asian Indians Lead Asian Minority on Socio-Economic Indicators, (January
2005). Available [Online]:< http://www.iacfpa.Org/p news/nit/iacpa-archieve/2004/12/31/censusbureaul31122004.html >[23 September 2005].
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onto the entrepreneurial route. Another visible trend had been that of Indians funding
other Indians. Although success stories in the IT industry is full of Indian names and
icons, some very successful immigrant stories will be enumerated below.
Sabeer Bhatia, “hot male (hotmail): a simple idea + nerves of steel = $400
million,”12 has in his own words, described his success as a defining immigrant story.
Sometimes undervalued as a chance achievement (since it was all about somebody or the
other would have come up with it sooner or later), is clearly the poster boy for Indians in
the high-tech boom. Although the story of Vinod Khosla, famous venture capitalist (VC)
and co-founder of Sun Microsystems, is bigger in range and depth, nobody really cared
about Indians in the US until the ‘Sabeer story’ came out. The very idea of a twenty-six
year old battling against the world’s biggest monopoly, Microsoft, and getting $400
million for his efforts captured the imagination of a generation. Ironically, Sabeer’s
triumph spread on the very vehicle he had fine-tuned - the e-mail.
Sabeer’s age (twenty-six when he started hotmail), the short time in which he
popularized it, and the speed with which he clinched a deal with the world’s most
aggressive company, Microsoft, made him an icon in the field of IT. Hundreds of
Indians, taking his lead started securing jobs in IT. Overnight, Sabeer Bhatia became the
epicenter of the Internet revolution. One would like to ask the simple question, why a
revolution? The answer to that question is also very simple. It all goes back to the idea
behind hotmail. The brilliance of hotmail lays its very simplicity. An e-mail service that

12 This is the title o f the third chapter in the book by Chidanand Rajghatta, The Horse that flew: How
India’s Silicon Gurus Spread Their Wings (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2001).
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would not go through paid Internet Service Provider.13 Although there have been many
names just before or after Sabeer Bhatia, none of the ventures of the time managed to
attain the height and popularity of Hotmail. With the e-mania ebbing and flowing in the
United States, Sabeer also transferred some of his work to India. In September 2000, he
backed his father Baldev Bhatia and lawyer cousin Naval Bhatia to unveil ‘waqalat.com’,
an India law portal. Eventually many of Sabeer’s investments, even in Silicon Valley,
came to acquire Indian connections.
An equally important icon, Vinod Khosla,14 co-founder and first chief executive
of Sun Microsystems15 is regarded by many as the greatest VC of all time. Vinod
Khosla’s evolution into a Silicon Valley icon and entrepreneurial legend came at a time
when Indians in the United States were more accustomed to becoming general managers
or vice presidents of a division after decades of service. As mentioned by a Business
Week article,16 Khosla, an electrical engineering graduate from IIT Delhi, was among the
first to understand that Internet technology and fiber optics could make communications
fast, cheap, and easy to install and that it would unleash a tsunami of productivity growth.
He also made key contributions to the early growth of two other IT flagships; database
13 A good example here would be America Online (AOL) for which one had to pay $29.95 a month.
Mostly people could access this from their home computers. Hotmail, in contrast, was a freebie that one
could access on any computer that was linked to the ‘world wide web’. It soon earned a reputation o f being
a standardized service, almost like using an ATM or a parking lot.
14 Vinod Khosla is a partner in the venture capital firm Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers. He was a co
founder o f Daisy Systems and founding Chief Executive Officer o f Sun Microsystems where he pioneered
open systems and commercial RISC processors. Khosla serves on the boards o f Asera. Corio Inc.. Corvis
Corporation. BigVine.com. Juniper Networks. Redback and QWEST Communications, plus several other
private companies.
15 Sun Microsystems is often described as the world’s only fully integrated computing company dealing wit
the chip, the operating system, and the hardware. In other words, it is like Intel, Microsoft, and HewlettPackard all rolled into one.
16 “Vinod Khosla,” Business Week, 15 May 2000.
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giant Oracle, and Novell, the world’s networking leader. Occasionally cited as the
darling of the American business media, in early 2000, ‘Wall Street Journal’ called him
the hottest hand in Silicon Valley. By October that year, ‘Fortune’ was wondering if he
was the greatest VC of all time. In February 2001, ‘Forbes’ put him on cover in a story
featuring the 50 most powerful dealmakers. The same month ‘Red Herring’ also featured
him on its cover, labeling him as the number one VC on the planet.
Vinod Dham, considered as father of the Pentium, left his high-profile career in
Intel after having successfully completed the Pentium project in 1995 at age forty-five.
Today the Pentium and K-6 are among the most widely used chips in personal
computing. Dham soon joined Nexgen after leaving Intel, which was a startup that was
acquired by AMD later. After helping AMD seriously challenge Intel with its vastly
popular K-6, Dham left AMD and joined ‘Silicon Spice’, a startup, and became its
chairman, president, and CEO. Interestingly, Dham’s co-worker on the Pentium project,
another Indian named Avter Saini, heads Intel’s operations in India.
Kanwal Rekhi, Novell’s vice president and Chief Technology Officer,
spearheaded its rise as the leader of IT networking. Rekhi’s publicity stems from his
becoming the President of ‘The Indus Entrepreneurs (TIE)’,17 an organization that has
become the envy of every other immigrant group of entrepreneurs in the US. His biggest
contribution has been that after he took over as President of TIE, he helped fuel Indian
enterprise on an unprecedented scale. In fact, Sabeer Bhatia, Vinod Khosla, and Vinod
Dham may have been the Indian superstars in Silicon Valley, but the man who gave

17 TIE chapters stretch from San Jose in California, US to Trinidad and Tobago. Members o f the Indian
diaspora from Fiji to Guyana clamor for a TIE chapter.
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shape and substance to the collective Indian enterprise and melded it into a force is
Kanwal Rekhi.
‘TIE’ has become instrumental in the success of many start-up companies,18
generating billions of dollars in wealth, and restoring respect and recognition to the
Indian mind. Enlarged as a pan-Indian identity, TIE involves not just the Indian diaspora,
but also other sub-continentals like Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. Often dismissed as
mahatma-come-lately with an eye on the headlines, Rekhi holds a strong conviction that
there is a feeling among Indians in America to give back to India, whether as a social
investment or as charity.
Others, less public and prominent faces of Indian successes in the Silicon Valley,
although not quite household names, have also laid the foundations of the computer
revolution in the 1990s in America. These include:
■ The world’s largest supply-chain management firm ‘i2 Technologies’ (founded by Sanjiv
Sidhu);
■ Chip innovator ‘Cirrus Logic’ (Suhas Patil);
■ ‘B2B pioneer Aspect Development’ (Romesh Wadhwani);
■ Electronic design automation firm ‘Duet Technologies’ (Prabhu Goel, Centura Software
(Umang Gupta); and
■ ‘ACT Networks’ (Suresh Nihalani) - that went on to become the world’s largest
independent provider of integrated frame relay access solutions.

Through the 1990s and since the turn of the century, the Indian presence in US
software industry continues to strengthen unabated. By 1996 nearly half of the 55,000
temporary visas issued by the US government to high-tech workers had gone to Indians:
in other words, Indian engineers in the US accounted for nearly as much as the rest of the
18 Its roster o f success includes start-ups such as Exodus Communications, Cybermedia, Junglee, and
RightWorks.
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world put together. By the end of the decade, they accounted for no less than 20 percent
of Microsoft’s US employees,19 according to its chairman Bill Gates, and 25 percent of
Cisco’s, according to its chief executive, John Chambers.

00

In addition to the software industry, the Indian high-tech role also extends to new
generation pharmaceutical firms such as Aviron, Theratech, and Xechem, chemical
companies like Raychem, as well as the auto industry. Mohammad Zaidi, for instance,
developed the first aluminum spaceffame for automobiles - used in Audi A8 and the
Ferrari Modena, while Dr. Haren Gandhi of Ford Motor has won over 40 patents.21
The corporate world also boasts its fair share of Indians, some of whom are
named below in Table 31. Currently, many Indians are running Fortune 500 companies
in the United States. Some shining examples include Rono Dutta, who is the President of
United Airlines; Rakesh Gangwal, president and CEO of U.S. Airways or, as consultants
and securities analysts; and Calcutta-born Raj at Gupta, managing director of consulting
giant McKinsey & Co.
Venture-capital fund company, Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, one of Silicon
Valley’s biggest VC firms, says “forty percent of its portfolio consists of companies
founded or managed by people of Indian origin.”22 According to Suhas Patil, founder
and chairman of semiconductor manufacturer Cirrus Logic (1999 revenues: $564
million), who is now running an incubator company called Tufan, Inc. for Internet start19 “Microsoft’s Gates says 20 percent o f Engineers Indian,” Inquirer, 1 November 2002.
20 “Cisco to invest another $50 Million in India,” Indian Express, 18 January 2001.
21Ford’s Haren Gandhi Awarded National Medal O f Technology For Catalyst Research, Ford Motor
Company researcher Dr. Haren Gandhi has won the 2002 National Medal o f Technology for research,
development and commercialization o f automotive exhaust catalyst technology.
22 Anthony Spaeth, “The Golden Diaspora: Indian immigrants to the U.S. are one o f the newest elements o f
the American melting pot—and the most spectacular success story,” India Today, 19 June 2000.
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Table 31. The Techie Tide - Vaulting the Corporate Ladders
Com pany

N am e

T itle

Adobe

Shantanu Narayen

Vice President, Corporate Engineering

Alcatel Telecom

Krish Prabhu

Chief Operating Officer

Air Touch

A run Sarin

Chief Operating Officer

Alcoa

Mohammad A. Zaidi

Chief technical Officer

AT&T Wireless

Mohan Gyani

Chief Executive Officer

Aviron

Raysam S. Prasad

Vice President, Technical Affairs

Bradley Pharmaceuticals

Dileep Bhaghwat

Chief Scientific Officer

Cable & Wireless

Gian Dilawari

Vice President

Cabletron

Piyush Patel

Chief Executive Officer

Cisco

Jayashree Ullal

Vice President

Computer Associates

Sanjay Kumar

President

Cray Research

V en B . Rao

Director, New Technology Research Lab

Delphi Information

Robin Raina

President

Deneb Robotics

Rakesh Mahajan

Chief Executive

e.digital

Atul Anandpura

Vice President R&D

Ficon Technologies

Vivek Bansal

Chief Executive

GovCon.com

Raj Khera

President

Hanover Direct

Rakesh kaul

President

HP

Pradeep Jotwani

President and General Manager

Hughes Electronics

S. Radhakrishnan

Chief Information Officer

Microcircuits International

Arvinder Chadha

Vice President

Lawson Software

Pramod mathur

Vice President, Collaborative Commerce

Lucent Technologies

Basant Chawla

Director

Matthew Studio Equipment

Anil Sharma

President

Microsoft

Sanjay Parthasarathy

Vice President (Strategy and Business
Development)
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Continued
Com pany

N am e

T it l e

Microsoft

Amar Nehru

Vice President (Corporate Development group)

Microsoft

S. Somesagar

Vice President (Windows Engineering group)

Neoforma.com

Bhagwan Goel

Vice President

Newbridge Networks

Satjiv Chahil

Vice President, Global Marketing

Nhancement Software
Technologies

Ram V. Mani

President and Chief Technology Officer

Nortel

Krishna G. Kushwaha

Director, R&D (Access Networks)

Shri Dodani

Director, Transmission Systems

Jnah Dash

Vice President, Advanced technology

Rahul Bardhan

Senior Practice Director, Advanced technology

Picture Tel

Vinay Kumar

General Manager

Planar Systems

Balaji Krishnamurti

Chief Executive

Qualcomm

Anil Kripalani

Senior Vice President

Ramp Networks

Raghu Bathina

Vice President, Broadband Unit

Raychem

Sanjay Kasturia

Director

Santa Cruz Operation

Alok Gupta

President

SDRC

Rajneesh Chopra

Director

SoftPlus

Mohan Uttarwar

President

SSE Telecom

S. Ram Chandran

Director Engineering

STMicroelectronics

Ravi Sundaresan

Senior ManagerAdvanced Technology
Development

Symetricom

Murli Thirumale

Vice President

Thera Tech

Dinesh Patel

President

Viacom

Jayaram Balachander

Vice President Software Engineering

Oracle

Source: This table has been taken from Ashutosh Sheshabalaya’s, The Rising Elephant: The Growing Clash
with India over White-Collar Jobs and its Meaning fo r America and the World (Monroe, Maine: Common
Courage Press, 2005), 138-139.
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ups, “Indians have one of the highest per capita incomes of any immigrant group in the
U.S.” He further adds that it has been a credit to this country (America) that someone
from a distant land could become a successful in business, bringing their own stamp of
entrepreneurial effort.

Other Professionals o f the Indian Diaspora
In addition to the IT industry, many Indians in the United States have been very
successful in the media, liberal arts, and the academia. Jagdish Bhagwati, Fareed
Zakaria, V.S. Naipaul, Shashi Tharoor, Late Kalpana Chawla, Deepak Jain, Meera Nair,
Manoj Night Shyamalan are just some members of the Indian diaspora in fields other
than information technology that have equally made their mark in different professional
and entertainment fields. Noted for their excellence and creativity in various areas, their
contributions in the Unites Stated have brought Indians to the forefront of many journals
and magazine covers.
Professor Jagdish Bhagwati, currently a Professor at Columbia University and
Senior Fellow in International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, has
published more than three hundred articles and fifty volumes for which he has received
several prizes and honorary degrees and writes frequently for internationally renowned
newspapers and journals such as the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Financial
Times, New Republic and The Times. He is counted amongst the most creative
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international trade theorists of his generation. His most recent book, ‘In Defense of
Globalization’ has attracted worldwide acclaim.
In addition, Professor Bhagwati has been Economic Policy Advisor to the
Director General GATT (1991-93) and has also served as a ‘Special Advisor’ to the
United Nations on globalization and as an ‘External Advisor’ to the WTO. Bhagwati has
made immense contribution to the ‘brain drain’ debate when he had come up with two
volumes, as one collection, commentaries upon and back-up investigations on the braindrain tax proposal.24 These two volumes have stood for many years as milestones in
economic study of migration and human capital. In addition he is recognized for his
immense contribution to economic thought and for enhancing the understanding of India
through his academic work.
Fareed Zakaria, the editor of Newsweek International, columnist of Newsweek,
Newsweek International, and The Washington Post, and author of many books has been
described as “one of the most influential foreign policy advisor of his generation,” and
Esquire magazine named him “one of the 21 most important people of the 21st
Century.”26 A classic case of ‘brain drain’, Zakaria was bom in India and acquired his
Bachelors’ from Yale University (in History), and Ph.D. from Harvard (in International

23 Professor Jagdish Bhagwati has been recognized and awarded at the 2005 awards given out at the
‘Pravasi Bhartiya Divas’ function that is held every year beginning in 2003. ‘Pravasi Bhartiya’ is the
Indian name for Indians living abroad.
24 See Jagdish Bhagwati and Martin Partington, and Jagdish Bhagwati.
25 He is the author o f The Future o f Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (April 2003), a
new book on global political trends, and From Wealth to Power, a provocative examination o f America’s
role on the world stage, which has been translated into several languages. He is also co-editor o f The
American Encounter: The United States and the Making o f the Modern World.
26 Fareed Zakaria, Biography. Available [Online] :<http://www.fareedzakaria.com/about. html>f4 April
2005],
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Relations), His fame and visibility grew, as he soon became the managing editor of
Foreign Affairs27 in 1992. Currently Zakaria offers political analysis on many television
shows in the United States such as ABC’s ‘This Week’. Already at the pinnacle of
success Fareed Zakaria at forty-one years of age, has been the recipient of numerous
awards in the United States and abroad, including the Overseas Press Club Award, the
National Press Club’s Edwin Hood Award, the Deadline Club Award for Best Columnist,
and a lifetime achievement award from the South Asian Journalists Association.
Shashi Tharoor, yet another success story of the Indian diaspora began his career
with the United Nations in 1978 on the staff of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) in Geneva. He was later made the Head of the UNHCR office in
Singapore (1981-1984) during the peak of the Vietnamese “boat people” crisis.
Currently he is Under-Secretary-General for Communications and Public Information
and has led the Department of Public Information (DPI) since January 2001. In addition,
he has been the author of eight books and numerous articles. He is also the recipient of
several journalism and literary awards, including a Commonwealth Writers’ Prize. Being
an Non-Resident Indian (NRI) himself, Tharoor has written extensively on NRIs whom
he describes as, “prodigal sons of a motherland they have left but not forgotten.”28
Conscious of the enormous potential and constructive contribution that NRIs can make to
the motherland, Tharoor brings visibility to both the predicament and benefits that the
Indian Diaspora represents.

27 Foreign Affairs is a leading journal o f international politics and economics.
28 Shashi Tharoor, India: From Midnight to the Millennium (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1998),
158.
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Bom in Kamal, India and died on February 1, 2003 over the southern United
States when Space Shuttle Columbia burned up sixteen minutes prior to its scheduled
landing, Kalpana Chawla represents a monumental loss to: NASA; the United States; and
India. After getting her Bachelors’ degree in aeronautical engineering from Punjab
Engineering College, India in 1982 she got her master of science degree in aerospace
engineering from University of Texas in 1984. She also obtained a Doctorate of
philosophy in aerospace engineering from University of Colorado in 1988. Kalpana
having worked on various projects for NASA became the first woman of Indian origin
to be in space.
The year 2004 has undoubtedly been considered a fabulous year for the Indiaborn in Hollywood, opening up a new aspect of the term soft power. Manoj Night
Shyamalan’s ‘The Village’ had made $230 million as an initial count. Mira Nair’s
‘Vanity Fair’, though not making enough box-office profits, was appreciated in all global
circles for its multicultural subtext. Gurinder Chadha’s $18 million ‘Bride and Prejudice’
also created ripples at the box-office. Previously the director had been acclaimed for her
last movie ‘Bend it Like Beckham’ in both the United States and the United Kingdom.
Interestingly, India’s engagement with the West in the entertainment sector had begun
even before the Chinese. Ismail Merchant’s The Householder had reached Los Angeles
in the late 1950s.
Powerful and influential in their own arena, these men and women have been able
to translate their dreams into reality and alter the behavior of other powerful people.
Considered as underdogs for quite some time, Indians have been finding themselves

29 A biographical information on Kalpana Chawla: Available
rOnlinel:<http://www.isc.nasa.gov/Bios/htmlbios/chawla.html>r4 April 2005].
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increasingly influential and powerful, changing fortunes overnight. It can be said that
Hollywood, the nerve centre of the global entertainment industry, has acknowledged the
role played by people of Indian origin. Some accomplishments are listed below in Table
32.30
The Indian immigrant community that was not sure of how it would be welcomed
or treated in the United States some fifty years ago sings a different tune today.31 Today
it comprises the “richest immigrant class in the United States, with nearly 200,000
millionaires.”32 According to a report by the US Census: “Asian Indians own nearly
40% of the hospitality properties and also own and run chains of mom-and-pop stores and
newspapers stands around the country; 38% of doctors in the United States are of Indian
origin; 34% of Microsoft employees are Indians; and 30% of the staff at NASA, trace
their roots to India.”33
By the mid-1980s, Indian professionals had begun to consolidate in different parts
of the country, especially in the state of California. In fact by 1990, immigrants
accounted for one-third o f the scientific and engineering workforce in Silicon Valley with
Indians and Chinese accounting for two-thirds of the region’s foreign-born engineers. By
1998, many Indian and Chinese engineers have become senior executives at one-quarter
of Silicon Valley’s new technology businesses.

30 Shilpa Rohatgi, “The Power 25,” India Today, 11 October 2004.
31 As late as 1935, signs on the doors o f certain California establishments declared, “No Jobs for Japs and
Hindus.”
32 Some facts that make India a compelling story for global fund managers. Arun Kantharia, The Indian
Paradox by CLSA Emerging Markets, (June 2003). Available
[Online] :<http:/Avww.indiadav.oru/articles/articles2.asp#9>[ 17 August 2004].
33 U.S. Census Bureau, 18.
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Table 32. Indian Diaspora Achievements in Popular Media and Movies
S. No

Name

Occupation

Claim to fame

1

Manoj. N. Shyamalan

Filmmaker

The collective box office gross of his last
four movies in the US alone is over $700
The Sixth Sense, grossed $661.2 and
garnered six academy award nominations

2

Gurinder Chadha

Filmmaker

Bend it Like Beckhan, grossed $50 million

3

Mira Nair

Filmmaker

Salaam Bombay (academy award
nominee), Mississippi Masala and
Monsoon Wedding (diaspora movies),
Vanity Fair

4

Shekhar kapur

Filmmaker

Bandit Queen, Elizabeth

5

Ashok Amritraj

Film
producer

Top echelons of Hollywood

6

Ismail Merchant

Producer,
Director

Spokesperson for Indian entertainment
since 1960s, The Householder, The
Creation of Woman

7

Sanjay Gupta

Surgeon,
medicine
man for CNN

Part of the team that covered 9/11 tragedy

8

Kal Penn

Actor

Harold and Kumar go to White-castle

Source: India Today
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Table 33. South Asian Candidates in 2004
United States Senate
1. Chirinjeev Kathuria (R) lost the Republican nomination for the US Senate seat in Illinois.
He received 0.8% of the vote."
United States House of Representatives
1. Rohit Khanna (D) lost the Democratic nomination in the 10th Congressional District
California. He received 19.6% of the vote.
2. Peter Mathews (D) lost the Democratic nomination in the 37th Congressional District
California. He received 16.1% of the vote.
3. Bobby Jindal (R) ran for the Republican nomination in the 1st Congressional district of
Louisiana being vacated by Rep. David Vitter (R) and also ran for Senate.
(http://www.bobbviindal.comA
4. Ayesha Nariman (D) running for the Democratic nomination in the 26th Congressional
district of New York, (http://www.narimanforcongress.com/)
5. Tim Phillips (R) lost the Republican nomination in the 1st Congressional District Oregon.
He received 24% of the vote.
6. Arjinderpal Singh lost the Democratic nomination in the 2nd Congressional District
California. He received 28.4% of the vote.
7. Inam ur-Rehman (R) running for the Republican nomination in the 2nd Congressional
district of Hawaii.
8. Sylvester Fernandez (R) ran for Congress in the 6th Congressional district of New Jersey
against Congressman Frank Pallone (D).
9. A. D. Amar (R) ran for the 7th Congressional district of New Jersey.
State Level
1. Ash Bhatt (D) lost in the 20th State Assembly district of California. He received 3.3% of
the vote.
2. Chonchol Gupta (R) lost the Republican nomination in the 70th State Assembly district
of California. She received 1.0% of the vote.
3. Swati Dandekar (D) running for re-election in the 36th State House district of Iowa.
(http://www.swatidandekar.comA
4. Sreenivasa Dandamudi (D) running for the Democratic nomination in the 64th State
House district of Missouri. (http://www.sreenu2004.comA
5. Nikki Randhawa Haley (R) running for the Republican nomination in the 87th State
House district of South Carolina.
Mayoral
1. Eduardo Bhatia (PDP) running for election as the Mayor of San Juan, Puerto Rico.
2. Suchita Saigal lost in the race for Mayor of Fresno, California. She received 20.9% of the
vote.
3. Jayendra Shah lost Los Angeles County Supervisor - 4th District. He received 9.5% of
the vote.
4. Sanjiv Kapoor (G) lost County Council, County of Fresno, CA. He received 13.5% of the
vote.

Source: Indian American Center for Political Awareness (IACPA)
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POLITICAL CONNECTIONS THROUGH CAUCUS AND LOBBYING
The Indian American community, mostly represented in fields such as
academics, medicine, law, engineering, financial consultancies, and information
technology, earning a median income of $60,09334 have increasingly taken up a more
direct role in political activities. This group of people who are multi-ethnic, multi
religious, and multi-lingual have translated this wealth and status acquired in their
adopted countries into financial and political clout only in recent years. They have
traditionally exercised the most political influence through their campaign contributions,
and have been actively involved in fundraising efforts for political candidates on the
federal, state, and local levels. On many occasions, they have mobilized their opinion on
important issues and played a crucial role in generating a favorable climate of opinion in
the Congress by defeating anti-Indian legislations there, and lobbying effectively on other
issues of concern to the Indian community. They have demonstrated willingness to
contribute financially to Indian causes such as relief for natural disasters and other
charitable causes back home.
In the last two decades, the Indian Diaspora worldwide has seen the
transformation of its members from humble migrants in a foreign country to holding high
posts in politics, universities, and industries as elected leaders, politicians, eminent
professors, and other professionals. One of the best examples is Bharrat Jagdeo (bom
1964) who is the socialist president of Guyana. Mr. Bharrat Jagdeo, who is of Indian
origin, shares great linkages between the country of origin and his country of

34 Ibid, 12.
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settlement.35 In the United States recently, the nomination of Bobby Jindal, an IndoAmerican, for the post of Governor in the state of Louisiana, USA during elections in
November 2003 was a big landmark for the Indian community. Though he was not
elected, Jindal became the youngest Governor nominee in the nation.
The ‘Indian American Center for Political Awareness’ (IACPA) records the list
of South Asian candidates for the 2004 elections in the United States. This is presented
above in Table 33 above. This type of political achievement and recognition has
coincided, especially in the last decade, with the emergence of India as a strong
economic, social, and nuclear power. After a decade of economic reforms, India has
emerged as a modem society, with a key role to play in the information technology (IT)
industry, has helped to change the image of the Indian Diaspora globally. It is no longer
considered as an economically disadvantaged, silent minority in many of the lands of its
permanent settlement. It has even started playing a role in molding public opinion in
them.
Many believe that the Diaspora can contribute to the Indian economy in ways
that the Indian government cannot. Overseas Indians can and have played multiple roles
in contributing towards India’s development. Most members echo their warm memories

35 See speech: Bharrat Jagdeo, Second PBD Event Held in Delhi, (2004). Available
[Onlinel:<http://sultanpur.nic.in/PresJagdeo.htm>ri5 February 2004],
36 Bobby ‘Piyush’ Jindal, a Republican candidate for the post o f Governor in the state o f Louisiana,
handsomely defeated his nearest rival Kathleen Blanco, a Democratic and Louisiana Lieutenant Governor,
in the primary runoffs. At 32 years o f age he has been a Rhodes scholar, a consultant for McKinsey, the
head o f Louisiana's Department o f Health and Hospitals, the executive director o f the Breaux-Thomas
Commission on Medicare Reform, president o f the University o f Louisiana system, and an assistant
secretary o f the federal Department o f Health and Human Services.
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and willingness to participate in India’s future. Parag Khanna37, a ‘second generation’
Indian specializing in U.S. - India relations, ranging from the political mobilization of
Indian Americans to Indian foreign policy, believes that using the Diaspora would be a
useful contribution for development in India, in fact he compares the contribution to that
of foreign companies in India.
Besides contribution towards the home country, members of the Indian Diaspora
play important roles in mobilizing political support for issues of vital concern to Indians
in their new adopted countries. The United States of America, Canada, and the United
Kingdom are examples of that pro-active role. Because of their increasing economic
strength, they have become well situated to play a pivotal role in energizing and
augmenting bilateral trade, investments, transfer of technology, and tourism with their
countries of settlement.
The ‘Indian-American Forum for Political Education’ (LAFPE)38 has made many
achievements, such as establishing an effective bipartisan liaison with the Democratic
and Republican National Committees and opening communication channels between
Indian Americans and the White House executive agencies, including the U.S. State
Department. The objective of such an organization is to provide a platform whereby
members of the Indian community can reach out politically to their United States

37 Parag Khanna, manager o f the World Economic Forum’s Global Governance Initiative at Brookings
Institution, Washington, D.C. Khanna, who is on secondment as Senior Research Analyst to the Brookings
Institution, a Washington based think tank, was bom in Kanpur (India) and brought up in the United States
and Europe and has authored several articles in reputed American publications including The New York
Times, Policy Review, Georgetown Journal o f International Affairs, and The New Statesman (Britain)
38 Their basic mission has been to empower Indian Americans politically by raising civic consciousness and
increasing participation in community affairs and the mainstream political process.
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counterparts. As enumerated by the IAFPE, the objectives of the Indian Diaspora in the
United States can be broadly enumerated as:39
a. Enhancing political awareness, involvement and civic responsibility among
Indian Americans.
b. Promoting voter registration and encouraging Indian Americans to exercise their
rights to vote and to run for public office.

c. Identifying issues of concern to Indian Americans and pursuing solutions within
the political system.
d. Facilitating and promoting ongoing Indo-U.S. relations

In these objectives, of particular interest to this research has been the last point of
facilitation and promotion o f Indo-US relations. Many other Indo-American political
organizations are also actively reaching out to their Washington representatives, at the
micro level. The ‘American Association of Physicians of Indian Origin’ (AAPI), the
‘Indian American Friendship Council’, the ‘Asian American Hotel Owners Association’,
and similar groups host legislative conferences in Washington each year, where
prominent U.S. lawmakers are invited to address. Many of the TiE functions are well
attended by members o f the Senate and Congress throughout the United States. Normally
a lot of information is shared through these informal meetings and get-togethers.
This linkage is better explained with the help of Figure 20, that links all these points
to give a clear picture of how the strength of this Diaspora can be converted to India’s
advantage and negate brain drain with some gain to the sending country. These are gains
are both economic and political.

39 IAFPE: Indian American Forum for Political Education, Joint Forum, (2004). Available
[Online] :<http://www.iafpe.org/php/showFomms.php71inkid--lN 23 September 2004],

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

{Financially powerful)
(High levels of education)
1

Investment in India
1. Remittances
1. Return
2. Diaspora Networks

Issues of Concern to
Indo-US Community

Direct and Indirect Lobbying

US CONGRESS

(National, state and local levels)
Development
Defeating anti-Indian legislations
Indian caucus, 118 in House of Representatives

BILATERAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS
BETWEEN IN D IA AN D US

Figure 20. Indian Diaspora and Political and Economic Gain

ro

236
Direct and Indirect Lobbying: The Election Years
The Indo-American community is relatively evenly distributed throughout the
country and few congressional districts are without at least a handful of Indian American
families. The largest concentrations, however, reside in the major industrial- urban states
of New York, New Jersey, California, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Ohio, Illinois, Texas,
Florida, and Massachusetts as seen from table 6.1. On the whole, the community avoids
identification with either of the major political parties and gives generously to both the
Republicans and the Democrats.
For the 1992 elections, Indian Americans raised $4 million on behalf of political
candidates; six years later, this figure had almost doubled to $7 million.40 Undoubtedly,
the total for the 2000 and 2004 elections was higher still.
The 2004 presidential elections “marked the coming-of-age for the two million
Indo-Americans, not only in terms of their fundraising acumen for both Republican and
Democratic parties, but more with regard to their participation at the grassroots level.”41
In addition to the money power of the community, they also played their role in swinging
the verdict in favor of Bush, especially in Florida, where the affluent community of
doctors backed Bush to the hilt (Table 34). Notwithstanding these facts, Indians had also
been equally active in supporting Kerry during the Presidential campaign through large
monetary donations. It became obvious for any observer that the ‘first-generation Indian
immigrants’ were clamoring for political clout for their interests in the United States, and
that of their home country India. The Indian community was especially committed

40 Miles A. Pomper, Indian-Americans: Numbers, Affluence Are Translating into Political Power,
(Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 2000), 580.
41 Ramesh Vinayak and Shefalee Vasudev, “The Right Karma,” India Today, 15 November 2004.
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Table 34. Top Six Fundraisers for Bush: Election Campaign 2004
Raghavendra
Vijayanagar
$ 200,000

Heart Surgeon

Founder of the Indian American Republican Council;
is hopeful that Indian-Americans will geta big-ticket
role in Bush’s second term

Raj Vattikuti
$ 188,883

Covansys founder

Supports Bush as he believes the Republican Party is
‘more oriented to business’ and because he has done
the most in furthering Indo-US ties

Zach Zachariah
$91,951

Cardiologist

A front-ranking fundraiser for the Bush campaign;
believes that the Indian-American community can
influence lawmakers to strength Indo-US ties

Sampat Shivangi
$51,000

Physician

A senior office bearer of the Indian American
Republican Council, at the forefront of the IndoAmerican lobby groups, is pro-Bush also for his
support of India

Akshay Desai
$ 45,550

Physician

Chairman of the Council for Education Policy,
research and improvement for the state of Florida and
was appointed to this position by Governor Jeb Bush.

Sudhakar Shenoy
$ 44,500

Entrepreneur A frequent speaker in the IIT and business process re
engineering areas, serves, on many regional/statewide
boards and commissions.

Source: India Today
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towards the Bush administration as Bush was seen as best suited (for the job) given his
commitment to push though a federal legislation curbing medical malpractices suits.
The four years from 1982 to 1986 was very significant in the political life of
people of Indian origin in America. During this period, many political organizations
helped to bring together Indian American leaders to a common platform and assisted
them in identifying Indo-American community issues for the review and understanding
of the White House, the U.S. Congress, state-level governments, the Democratic National
Committee, and Republican National Committee. Their major initiatives and
achievements can be summarized below:
1. Preservation of Immigrants’ Rights
2. White House Recognition of Indian-Americans
3. Successful Congressional Contacts
4. Formation of the Asian American Voters Coalition (AAVC)
5. Impact Making Voter Registration Drive
6. Speaking for Healthcare Professionals
7. Building a National Network of all Indian American Associations
8. Strengthening Indo-US Relations
a. Working with Indian Government Officials
b. Working With American Government Officials
9. Leadership in Asian American Civil Rights Issues
10. Bipartisan Liaison with Political Parties
The promotion of Indo-US relations were deemed most crucial to the success of
the IAFPE and other such political organizations. This includes working with
government officials on both the Indian and the American side. Additionally, issues such
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as the property rights of Indian Americans in India, their travel-related problems, concern
for their families’ interests in India, educational programs, and business-related matters
have dominated the agenda. Philanthropic acts are also included prodding the United
States in stepping up its aid to India on specific events. One such occasion was the
terrible Bhopal tragedy that occurred in December 1984 due to the gas leak from Union
Carbide’s plant controlled by an American company in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh State,
India.42 Recently, their efforts have rendered economic aid to natural disasters such as the
tsunami (south India) and the earthquakes in Gujarat and Kashmir. On matters more
close to them, these organizations have also been able to bring several hardship cases
relating to non-immigrant and immigrant visa applications of Indian American family
members to the attention of the State Department and U.S. Embassy and Consulate
offices in India. In many instances, favorable decisions have been made.
In recent times this power has been translated as large communities holding key
economic and political positions. For instance, the massive Chinese and Indian expatriate
communities in the United States - 2.4 million and 1.7 million respectively - play a
critical role in promoting the political and economic interests of their home countries.
Both have powerful lobbies in Washington. “The Indian community, which is now
America’s richest ethnic minority, has become particularly effective in influencing US
policy toward South Asia.”43 Although not as significant or dramatic, the repercussions
of countries such as India and China exploding into the American cultural imagination
could be as significant as the explosions that blasted them into the nuclear club.
42 This briefing was the first time the Administration had invited Indians in the United States to tell them
exclusively o f the Administration’s response to a specific incident in India. There have been general routine
briefings, but here was a specific incident being addressed.
43 See Jehangir Pocha, 1-30.
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Recognition of India’s soft power can be traced back to Clinton’s visit to India in
1998. Not only was it symbolic of Washington’s recognition of India’s newfound status
after its nuclear tests (India is now a major power because of its nuclear capability), but
also because United States was now looking at India as its largest market. In all, this was
probably the most extensive and successful visit to India by a US President, made more
so by a decision by both sides to avoid the proliferation roadblock and concentrate on the
expansion of the broader relationship. Even on proliferation issues, the U.S. appeared
convinced by India’s commitment to ‘no more tests’, ‘no first use of nuclear weapons,
and controls on the transfer of sensitive technology’. For most theorists, this signaled the
melting of the ice in the Indo-US relations that had been frozen for fifty years in the
contours of the Cold War.
By the time the Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee returned the visit in
September 2000, the Indian presence in the United States economy had been very evident
with Clinton talking about India’s infotech prowess in almost every speech he made. It
became a foregone conclusion that the Indo-American community had great leverage in
the United States economy and the time had definitely come to further this as mutually
advantageous to both countries. The Diaspora was also influential in bringing about the
relaxation of sanctions that had followed nuclear tests in 1998. Recently, United States
Senator John Comyn, a Texas Republican, who is the founder and co-chair with Senator
Hillary Rodham Clinton, New York Democrat, of the ‘Friends of India Caucus’ in the US
Senate, has begun a lobbying effort to gamer support among his colleagues for the US-
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India civilian nuclear agreement that has virtually hit a brick wall in Congress.44 To
some extent, this can be viewed as a turning point in the power relations between the two
countries since the less powerful country was now using its ‘soft power’, “people” to
change policies and outcomes.
Washington banquets, famous for diplomatic maneuvering among politicians and
business people was busy entertaining heavyweights Indo-Americans such as
McKinsey’s Rajat Gupta, Citibank’s Victor Menezes, and United Airlines’ Rono Dutta
and other ex-IITians45 such as Vinod Khosla, Vinod, Dham, Sabeer Bhatia among others.
At the time of the visit, the Indian presence in the United States IT sector had been so
prominent that many Indian ‘techies’ of the West Coast (California) had accompanied
Clinton on his visit to India. These included Sun’s Anant Agarwal who had designed the
Sparc microprocessor and Bell Labs’ Arun Netravalli.46 Throughout his visit Clinton was
full of glowing reports and references to the role of Indians and their contribution to the
American economy. In addition, Clinton also appointed Raj Reddy, a Carnegie Mellon
academic, to head his task force on Information Technology, and named the chipmaster
Vinod Dham, to the Advisory Commission on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders.47
Subsequently, during his visit to India, President Clinton and India’s Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee on 21st March 2000 resolved to ‘create a closer and
qualitatively new relationship between the United States and India and signed a joint

44 Aziz Haniffa, US Senator Defends Indo-US Civilian Nuke Cooperation, (November 2005). Available
fOnlinel :<http:/7www.indianembassv.org/lndia media/Nov 05/RE 1,htm>r29 November 29 2005].
45 India Institution o f Technology (IIT) represents the best science and computer academic institution in
India.
46 Chidanand Rajghatta, 35.
47 Ibid, 35.
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statement on bilateral relations entitled US-India Relations: A Vision fo r the 21st
AO

Century.

The ‘agreed principles’ on institutional dialogue included many topics of equal

importance for both the sending and receiving countries. These included:
■ Regular India-US ‘summit’ meetings;
■ An annual foreign policy dialogue between the Secretary of State and the Minister for
External Affairs;
■ The continuation of the ongoing Dialogue on Security and Non-Proliferation between the
Deputy Secretary of State and the External Affairs Minister;
■ The Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism would continue to meet regularly;
■ The institutionalization of a bilateral economic dialogue;
■ The creation of a Joint Consultative Group on Clean Energy and Environment and
* The setting up of the US-India Science and Technology Forum to promote research and
development and the transfer of technology.
It had been in fact the last point mentioned above, ‘the setting up o f the US-India
Science and Technology Forum to promote research and development and the transfer o f
technology ’ that proved to be the most defining part of the bilateral relationship. The
economic and trade aspect of the visit went off more successfully with some US$2 billion
worth of commercial agreements and US$1 billion in US export-import financing being
finalized. Most of the agreements related to the information technology (IT) sector in
which India’s exports had been growing at a rate of 50% a year, with about two-thirds of
them going to the United States. With the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to
Washington in July 2005, new rounds of trade agreements have emerged between the two
countries. The visit of George Bush to India in March 2006 has culminated the process
with ‘nuclear deals’ between them.

48 Indian Embassy. Indo-US Relations: A Vision fo r 2 l s> Century. Available
[Online] :<www.indianembassy.org>[3 September 2004],
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It is generally argued that policy decisions in future, being more domestic than
foreign, would depend to a large extent, on flow of goods or people and the leverage they
could exert on bureaucrats and congressmen in the host countries. Here, Diaspora
networks play an important role in pushing forward their issues and those of their home
countries, on the Congressional agenda. Too often, foreign policy is seen as formulated
by the executive branch of the government. However, Congress, private sector
institutions, and lobby groups are fairly effective in developing the consensus needed for
an effective foreign and economic policy. Joseph Nye identifies two main roles that the
Congress plays in these interdependent issues. “First, congressional activity helps to
legitimize the hard-offs involved in many of these issues, and second, congressional
hearings provide for structured public involvement. Usually this includes the
participation of a broad range of groups including scientists, professionals, and special
interest organizations such as Diaspora communities.”49
To this effect, a new caucus was formed in the U.S. Senate, called the “Friends
of India” that pledges to promote and defend unlimited outsourcing to India and to
support the expansion of guest-worker visa programs such as H-1B and L -l. The Indian
Diaspora community worked hard to push for the Senate Caucus since the Bush
administration was seen as having gone totally overboard in its support and promotion of
the military dictatorship of Pakistan. There was also concern in the community over the
unexpected backlash against India over the issue of outsourcing.

49 Joseph S. Nye, 164.
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Listed below is a partial list of the caucus members who are some of the most
powerful and influential lawmakers in the Senate.50
Republicans:
John Comyn (TX) is the leader of the ‘Friends of India’
Bill Frist (TN)
Orrin Hatch (UT)
Charles Grassley (IA)
Thad Cochran (MS)
Democrats:
Hillary Clinton (NY) is co-chair of the ‘Friends of India’
Thomas Daschle (SD), not on the Senate anymore
Paul Sarbanes (MD)
Joe Lieberman (CT)
Edward M Kennedy (MA)
These developments open possibilities that were unimaginable just ten or
twenty years ago. While it may be true that an increasing bilateral trade relationship
between the two countries developed largely due to the change in Indian economic policy
since 1991 and the growing size of India’s middle-class consumer markets: America and
American corporations became more interested in India after the Indo-American
community achieved paramount successes and brought visibility to their country of
origin. Although the two countries have had recent fallouts on many issues (such as
terrorism, the war in Iraq and India’s refusal to send troops, international trade issues,
declaration of Pakistan as Non-NATO ally of United States), both countries have refused
to let their differences derail the progress of their bilateral relations.
The Indian-American community by organizing themselves along political lines,
have raised money for their favorite candidate, got recognition as a separate ethnic
50 Rob Sanchez, Friends o f India Created in Senate - No. 984, (April 2004). Available [Online] :<
http://www.zazona.com/shamehlb/JDNewsArchive/2004/2004-Q412%20Friends%20of%20India%20Created%20in%20Senate.txt >[29 November 2005].
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category on the census forms, influenced the relaxation of sanctions following nuclear
tests in India in 1998, and have created a reverse dependency relationship of sorts with
the United States.51 However, since they are residentially dispersed, they do not form
powerful voting blocs and primarily use their campaign contributions to get desired
results in some sectors where individuals and associations influence U.S. policy towards
India. The points of differences between the two countries have been softened to a large
extent by the transformation of the Indian economy, beginning in the 1990s, and also by
the visibility and presence of the Diaspora community in the country of residence. It is
this new perception of India that has rippled through the bureaucracy and the Congress.
American corporations, with a high degree presence of Indians in high posts, now
actively lobby Congress for legislation favorable to the region.
The question that needs to be addressed here is: if better economic ties create
important political dependencies through ‘lobbies’ in both countries, how does this
change India’s relations with United States? And what can be said of the power
dynamics between the two countries.

SOFT POWER, MIGRATION, AND BRAIN GAIN
The changing nature of power between two countries has always been interesting
since power is multidimensional and changes from actor to actor in specific issue areas.
Much has been written about ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’ in international relations
jargon. Joseph Nye defines soft power as the ability to get what you want by attracting
and persuading others to adopt your goals. It differs from hard power as the ability to use

51 It is premature for Indians to envision the kind o f reverse dependency relationship that China has
achieved with the United States.
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the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will.
Although both hard and soft powers have been important in war, attraction seems much
cheaper than coercion, and an asset that needs to be nourished.52
India’s search for a major power role has gained new proportions since it
conducted nuclear tests in May 1998. India’s foreign policy too, after the tests, has been
driven by the desire to achieve a major power-status in world affairs. However, as
correctly pointed out by Nayar,
“The convergence and divergence among the existing major powers over the
question of a new entrant is likely to depend on the defree of polarization and the type of
alliance patterns in the international system, and the manner in which their interests are
affected by the acceptance of that entrant into their ranks.”
Based on many indicators, it can be argued that the role India will play in global
affairs will give it a major power status and India’s highly skilled entrepreneurial
Diaspora will play a leadership role on the basis of soft power, defined in terms of
educational, affluence, and entrepreneurial appeal rather than hard power defines in terms
of economic and military capabilities.54 Thus important questions that need to be asked
are: What strengths would change India’s status in the relationship with the US and give
it leverage? To what extent can international migration and role of the Diaspora achieve
that end?

52 Joseph S. Nye, “Propaganda Isn’t the Way: Soft Power,” International H erald Tribune, 10 January 2003.
Joseph Nye is dean o f Harvard’s Kennedy School o f Government and author of: The Paradox o f American
power: Why the World's only Superpower Can 'tgo it Alone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
53 Baldev Raj Nayar, India in the World Order: Searching fo r Major Power Status (Cambridge, N ew York:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1.
54 Joseph S. Nye, Bound to lead: the Changing Nature o f American Power (New York: Basic Books
Incorporation, 1990), 191.
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Soft Power and the Indian Diaspora
Until recently, soft power was largely an American weapon. Washington learned
to wield its soft power as intelligently as its hard, or military and financial might. In his
recent book, The Paradox o f American Power (2001), Nye takes the analysis of soft
power beyond the United States to suggest that other countries could also acquire it.
According to him, three types of countries in today’s information age are likely to gain
soft power and succeed. These are: “(a) those whose dominant cultures and ideals are
closer to prevailing global norms (which now emphasize liberalism, pluralism,
autonomy); (b) those with the most access to multiple channels of communication and
thus more influence over issues that are framed; (c) and those whose credibility is
enhanced by their domestic and international performance.”55
Applying these dimensions to India produces some similarities with it. India’s
democratic political system brings it closer to the world community of democratic
countries. Since India’s meta-stable democracy provides governments the legitimacy to
make tough decisions, its leadership has invested heavily in IT and other communication
industries. Looking beyond spiritualism, religion and culture, India’s ‘soft power ’
currently considers its Diaspora as its biggest instrument. Most visible in the ‘IT’
industry, India fits best with the idea of a country whose credibility has been enhanced by
both its domestic and international performance in the information technology (IT)
industry.
In the new information-based economy, developed economies of the world
increasingly rely on the creation, distribution, and use of information and knowledge.

55 Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox o f American power: Why the World’s only Superpower Cant go it Alone
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 69.
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The United States is no exception. More than half of the total GDP is now knowledgebased, including industries such as telecommunications, computers, software,
pharmaceuticals, education, and television. High-tech industries have nearly doubled
their share of manufacturing output in the past two decades. Therefore, it becomes clear
that global financial markets and specialist companies will become powerful sources of
growth, employment, wealth, and power. Thus, the key to competitive advantage will
rely increasingly on the effective recruitment, training, and management of human
resources. And as empirically explained through the example of high Indian presence in
industries in America, we can hypothetically argue whether: skilled migrants with high
levels o f education and income are more likely to influence (economic and political)
investments fo r their country o f origin.
The focus on intellectual resources have not only redefined the boundaries of
organizations, but also placed a greater power on people, personal computers, and
networks. Competing in a knowledge-based economy, has for long advocated the
recruiting and retaining of ‘the best and the brightest’ for successes. Moreover, since
immigrants form a substantial percentage of the work force, the application of this human
capital can go beyond organizational effectiveness, and the domestic economy to further
benefit their countries of origin.
The problem in this argument is the relative lack of empirical evidence to prove
this hypothesis. The visibility of two trends: (1) the presence of a large number o f Indian
in high managerial positions in the United States; and (2) the increasing investments of
some of these companies in India, though parallel in process are not necessarily
correlated. However, many managerial theories have put forward some arguments that
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can be applied here. Through a definition of the elements of human capital, a correlation
can be found between these two trends.
According to one definition of human capital, capabilities, knowledge, skills, and
experience, embodied in the individual forms its human capital resource. The following
table identifies eight key categories or elements, of human capital.
The closest we can come to linking human capital and their influence to benefit
country o f origin is by understanding each of these definitions. Experience and
knowledge, in part having developed in the home country directly ties the skilled migrant
to the country of origin. Values, attitudes, and beliefs have deep roots, but are based
largely on each individual’s knowledge (what he or she has been taught), and since the
formative years were spent in country of origin we can also find a correlation with this
element that links a skilled migrant to the home country (Table 35). Individuals relate to
organizations in multiple ways - as employees, team members, and shareholders. The
assigned responsibilities is most important to this discussion on leverage that the highly
skilled Indian migrant will have on influencing decisions in favor o f the sending country.
In Table 31, of the 47 companies mentioned there, Indians formed an important
percentage of CEOs, Presidents, Vice Presidents, Chief Operating Officers, and Chief
Scientific Officers. About one-third of the engineers in Silicon Valley are of Indian
descent, while 7% o f valley high-tech firms are led by Indian CEOs. Some obvious
successes such as those of Vinod Khosla, Sabeer Bhatia, Massachusetts’ Gururaj
Deshpande, (worth between $4 billion and $6 billion), Rono Dutta, Rakesh Gangwal, and
Raj at Gupta. Although the opportunities for leverage for the sending country and the
approaches that will be most effective will depend, to a considerable degree, on the skills

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

250
Table 35. Elements of Human Capital
More Task-Specific

Less Task-Specific

Communication skills - the ability to listen, Experience - know-how (and perspective) from
communicate, and share information and ideas
having done the task before
Information Processing (cognitive) skills - the
ability to reason, analyze and make decisions

Knowledge - knowledge of the self, the job,
the organization, and the environment

Information Gathering (perceptual) skills sensory, perceptual, and interpretative
capabilities

Social Skills - the ability to interface,
coordinate, and collaborate productively with
others

Motor Skills - the ability to grasp, place, move,
and manipulate objects in coordinated
movements

Values, beliefs and attitudes - personal values
that shape perceptions, performance and
attitudes

Source: Dess and Pickens, Beyond Productivity (New York: AMACON, 1999), 13.
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and capabilities that are addressed by the highly skilled migrant, considerable synergies
are often realized through political collaborations. A large role in the thawing of
relations is played by the Indian Diaspora in the United States, through politically
leveraging human capital. The definition for leverage translates as ‘effectiveness’ and
‘power’.

Hegemons and Pretenders
Many theories are put forward in international relations that would help explain
the nature of relationships between two or more states. The international arena before
and after World War II have seen many Hegemons,56 counting from the end of the
Middle Ages: from Portugal, to Holland, then Britain and finally the United States. Post
World War II has been largely dominated by the power politics between the Soviet Union
and the United States making it essentially a bipolar world till 1971. The eventual fall of
the Soviet empire led to the emergence of a unipolar world with the United States as the
dominating world power.
Robert Gilpin, Stephen Krasner, and other scholars from the realist tradition in
‘International Relations’ have identified the distribution of power among states as a
central factor in explaining the openness and stability of the international economy.
“Hegemonic Stability Theory,” first espoused by Charles Kindleberger in the 1970s,
focuses on the role of leading states for example, Great Britain in the nineteenth and the
United States in the twentieth centuries - and on how changes in the distribution of
capabilities affect the world economy. This theory argues that the overwhelming
56 Hegemony is the dominance o f one group over other groups, with or without the threat o f force, to the
extent that, for instance, the dominant party can dictate the terms o f trade to its advantage; or more broadly,
that cultural perspectives become skewed to favor the dominant group.
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dominance of one country is necessary for the existence of an open and stable world
economy and that such a Hegemon would serve to coordinate and discipline other
countries so that each could feel secure enough to open its markets and avoid beg-thyneighbor policies. Conversely, the theory asserts that the decline of a Hegemon would
tend to be associated with economic closure, instability, and the creation of competing
regional blocs.

cn

Theorists further introduce the concept of a ‘pretender’ to the Hegemon that
would rival its power and authority. After the demise of the Soviet Union there has
existed a strict belief that the world has become unipolar. However, this paper introduces
here two states, namely China and India, as players who could possibly play the role of
“pretender” rivaling the undisputed power of the Hegemon.58 Let us take a look at the
table that gives us an idea of the different Hegemons and their pretenders over time.59
Hegemon

Pretender

Portugal 1494 to 1580
Holland 1580 to 1688
Britain 1688 to 1792
Britain 1815 to 1914
United States 1945 to 1971
United States

Spain
England
France
Germany
USSR
China and India

To be a Hegemon, a state is said to have three attributes: first, the capability to
enforce the rules of the system; second, the will to do so; and third, a commitment to a
system that is perceived as mutually beneficial to the major states. Its capability rests

57 See the classic article by Helen Milner, “International Political Economy: Beyond Hegemonic Stability,”
Foreign Policy 110 (Spring 1998).
58 The European Union can also be considered as a pretender however this research is specifically looking
at states and not organizations.
59 Many theorists have put forward concept o f “pretender” till the high time o f the Soviet Union. After the
decline o f the Soviets, no state has been able to challenge America as the global power.
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upon three attributes: A large, growing economy; dominance in a leading technological
or economic sector; and political power backed up by projective military power. This
typically describes the United States in terms of both attributes and capability.
However, over time, there has been an uneven growth of power within the system
as new technologies and methods have developed. An unstable system has resulted
because economic, technological, and other changes have eroded the international
hierarchy and undermined the position of the dominant state. “Pretenders” to hegemonic
control have emerged since the benefits of the system have been viewed as unacceptably
unfair. Countries such as China and India, both dominant trading partners of the United
States have challenged the HST to some extent. China with its favorable balance of trade
with the United States and India with its burgeoning IT industry and site of many
outsourced companies and jobs from the United States.60 Now, more than ever, the field
of international political economy has become an important field of study since “the end
of the Cold War has helped shift attention to the field’s main focus: how markets and
states affect one another.”61
Focusing on India specifically, it is important to assess the capabilities possessed
by a Hegemon once again. India does have a large, growing economy; it is dominant in a
leading technological or economic sector (software and IT); and has political power
backed up by projective military power (in regional terms at least). Given this evidence
we don’t know as yet how one must redefine the Hegemonic Stability Theory (many

60 India’s burgeoning middle class outnumbers the entire US population. See Om Malik, “The New Land
o f Opportunity,” Business Week, 15 July 2004.
61 Helen Milner, 3.
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scholars have, in the past attempted to do that) , but surely the roles played by other
states in a unipolar world needs reconsideration. Hence an attempt to analyze specific
areas where India’s strength lies and how it can redefine its power relations vis-a-vis the
United States.

Changes in A I between India and United States
Theoretically, the relationship between India and the United States can be best
studied using the ‘Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST)’, that address concepts of hard
power, soft power and interdependence. In interdependence, of particular interest are
studies done on asymmetrical interdependence (AI) and concepts of dependence and the
changing nature o f power. The current literature on interdependence and power focuses
primarily on state behavior and levels of interdependence. What this chapter is looking at
specifically is the concept of dependence and power symmetry in an asymmetrical
interdependent relationship. As can be seen today, bilateral trading relationships have
become very important, changing the dynamics of the ‘asymmetries’ in an interdependent
relationship between two countries. More often than not, AI has been in favor of the
developed country as the more dominating partner in an interdependent relation. An
attempt will be made to identify the AI between India and the United States and see
where and how can this AI be reversed to some extent, making power essentially
multidimensional.

62 See James Chace, “A Grand New Strategy,” Foreign Policy number 70 (Spring 1988): 3-25; John G.
Ikenberry, “Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence o f American Postwar Order,” International
Security 20 number 3 (Winter 1998): 43-78; W. Max Corden, “American Decline and the End o f
Hegemony,” SAIS Review 10 number 2 (Summer-Fall 1990): 13-26; and Michael H. Hunt, “American
Decline and the Great Debate: A Historical Perspective,” SAIS Review 10 number 2 (Summer-Fall 1990):
27-40.
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Thus, rather than viewing the relationship in simplistic terms where one is
powerful and the other vulnerable, it becomes important to understand this relationship
from a viewpoint where asymmetries or dependence could be a variable and not a
constant.
Here, it becomes imperative to look at international migration and role of the
Diaspora as one factor that may be responsible for changing the current perceptions about
India. Therefore, this research is a departure from previous works in the sense that it is
not an evaluation of Indo-US foreign policy towards each other but attempts to look at
the areas where each country has its particular strength and how the more dependent
country, India, can use its Diaspora as soft power.
While it may be true that the Diaspora uses its wealth and influence to gain
benefits for the community and its home country, it remains highly unlikely that this
asymmetry will change in the near future. Soft power in the global information age does
benefit India hugely, in its bilateral relationship with other countries. But as argued by
Nye, it would be a mistake to portray the changing face of power as the problem of
American decline rather than a diffusion of power. At best, a closer relationship with
United States will attempt to influence Washington to better appreciate Indian concerns.
Although the two countries have had recent fallouts on many issues (such as terrorism,
the war in Iraq and India’s refusal to send troops, international trade issues, declaration of
Pakistan as Non-NATO ally of United States), both countries have refused to let their
differences derail the progress of their bilateral relations. To this end, the two million
strong Indo-American Community represents a bridge between the two countries.
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CONCLUSION
In 2000, ‘Time’ magazine featured the extraordinary success of Indian-Americans
vis-a-vis Asian, and other immigrants. Viewed as a case of “triumph of quality over
/T-)

quantity,”

Indians have been labeled by the US media as the ‘smartest immigrant group’

of an era with no fewer than 200,000 Indian millionaires in the United States. This group
is wealthy, higher educated, and having a family median income higher than other groups
in the United States. Their success in Silicon Valley, and other fields have accorded
them high visibility in their country of residence.
In addition to its economic prowess, political implications of the Indian
ascendancy in the United States have become extremely evident in the last couple of
years. However, it may still not be easy to establish convincingly the extent of Indian
knowledge workers’ influence in the United States Congress. By lobbying effectively,
both directly and indirectly, the Indian Diaspora has won many friends and supporters in
the U.S. Senate and Congress, who pursue issues of great importance to India and the
Indians. The ‘Friends of India’ caucus goes a long way to achieving that end. The use of
people as ‘soft power’ is an established theory, but extending it to Diasporic transnational
networks opens up new avenues in studies on soft power and AI. While there may be
some truth to the leverage Diasporic communities can play in the US Congress, it is
probably too soon to formulate this at a conceptual level. The real question however, is
that to what extent will the Indian Diaspora be able to build a vibrant Diaspora network
with their country origin? What efforts will be needed on the part of both the Indian
government and members of the Diaspora for taking this ‘from ideas to action’?

63 Anthony Spaeth, “The Golden Diaspora: Indian immigrants to the U.S. are one o f the newest elements o f
the American melting pot—and the most spectacular success story,” Time, 5 September 2000.
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CHAPTER VII
CULTIVATION OF THE INDIAN DIASPORA: FROM STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
TO POLICY FORMULATION

INTRODUCTION
Policies relating to migration of highly skilled workers are studied primarily
from the viewpoint of receiving countries, through immigration policies and regulations.
Attention to government policies of sending countries is a recent study in international
migration of the highly skilled. Several developing Asian countries, in particular, are
now paying increasing attention to the economic and social implications of labor export
and the potential of their Diasporic communities to improve prospects for economic
development through investments and other such initiatives.
The role of the state in sending countries deserves attention with respect to brain
gain strategies. This is important for both policy implications in general, and
development in particular. Both ‘return’ and ‘non-return’ yields definite benefits for the
sending countries with the roles of the respective governments being deemed as crucial in
encouraging and fostering Diaspora links. The relative success of Chinese Taipei, Korea
and Ireland, among others, in fostering return migration has been attributed to the
opening of their economies and adopting policies that fosters domestic investments in
innovation and in R&D. Developing countries with some infrastructure in R&D, such as
India, are beginning to attract the return of their highly skilled migrants, as well as their
money and business contacts. China represents one of the best examples of how
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governments can carefully cultivate their populations abroad and convert brain drain
trends into a gain for the sending country.
Governments in sending countries can and have done quite a bit in addressing
problems that might encourage its Diaspora abroad to return or invest in their home
countries. As one initiative, they are developing centers of excellence for scientific
research and framing the conditions for innovation and high tech entrepreneurship to
make their country attractive to highly skilled workers, both from within the country and
from outside. Public recognition of Diaspora members through awards and ceremonies
has generated a wave of positive sentiment within the Diaspora and created a platform for
forging new relationships, more constructive than before, with their countries of origin.
Lastly, policy formulation for better facilitation of investment in banking and financial
sectors has been implemented.
Irrespective of these initiatives, common political and bureaucratic hurdles in the
home country goes a long way in explaining the continued driving force behind out
migration of the flow of labor to countries with higher income opportunities and better
working conditions, and a lack of return. Some common hurdles associated with return
include unattractive facilities for work, the recruitment of people remaining selective and
corrupt, and lower salaries than what they were earning abroad.
The role of the Indian state as a major labor-exporting nation deserves increased
attention as it not only directly intervenes through policies in promoting out-migration of
their professionals but also protects and promotes the well being of their migrants abroad.
In addition, it pushes for the maximization of economic development through favorable
policies with respect to remittances, investment, and return. Based on these studies and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

259
observations, this chapter intends to analyze the third hypothesis in this dissertation: a
more positive role played by the state in the sending country determines the level o f
return and non-return benefits.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, it explores and illustrates some of the
strategies adopted by major labor exporting states in promoting out-migration of the
highly skilled migrants as well as their return as a background study. Second, it traces
the initiative and response of the Indian state in cultivating their Diaspora for maximizing
economic development. This is studied primarily through: policies in information
technology; other fiscal and investment policies; and recognition o f the Diaspora through
awards and ceremonies. Last, it concludes with a discussion on the various hurdles
(economic and political bottlenecks) that Diaspora members face while investing in
India.1

LABOR EXPORT AND OTHER STRATEGIES IN SENDING COUNTRIES
Government responses in sending countries usually take on three approaches
(enumerated in Table 36). These include, (a) promoting employment through out
migration of professionals, (b) protecting and promoting the well being of their migrants
in distant lands, and (c) cultivating their Diaspora communities for maximizing economic
benefit. Of importance to this research is the third point, the notion of government’s role
in harnessing the potential of their Diaspora to further investment in the country, either
return or non-return. However, since ‘brain gain’ studies start with brain drain and cost
to the sending country, I first start with the argument that if the voluntary out-migration

1 Although this dissertation is primarily concerned with Diaspora members in the United States, investment
by NRIs from US as well as other countries will be referred as illustrations.
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Table 36. Main types of policies relating to labor emigration in Asian countries
Policy Goal
Promote employment

Government Interventions
Foreign market development
1. Establish diplomatic relations
2. Strengthen placement services, public and private
3. Undertake promotions and marketing missions
4. Gather market information and undertake research
5. Negotiate bilateral agreements
Manpower supply management
1. Create manpower registry
2. Export corporate services

Protect and promote well Standard setting and enforcement
being of migrants
1. Establish minimum standards for employment contracts
2. Implement exit control measures
3. Make arrangements for social security
4. Restrict exit of selected workers (minors and young women)
Supervision o f private recruitment
1. License recruitment firms
2. Set performance guarantees and penalties
3. Censure illegal recruitment and clandestine migration
Welfare services
1. Provide information and counseling prior to departure
2. Provide labor attache services on site
3. Establish community centers for workers
4. Provide support services to families left behind
5. Provide returnee training and employment assistance
6. Prepare plans for emergency evacuation or repatriation
Maximize potential for
economic development

Migrant remittances
1. Implement favorable exchange policies
2. Provide remittance policies and services
Migrant savings and investments
1. Create special financial instruments
2. Provide information and support services to small investors
3. Create special housing programs for migrants
Return o f talent and skills
1. Provide special placement services and incentives
2. Negotiate bilateral training agreements_______________

Source: Hugo, Graeme, and Charles Stahl, “Labor Export Strategies in Asia,” in International Migration:
Prospects and Policies in a Global Market, ed. Douglas Massey and E.J. Taylor (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004), 180-181.
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of highly skilled professional and students renders a cost to the sending country, then
their governments actively support and even encourage this movement. Most of the
labor-exporting countries in Asia such as Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Pakistan,
Philippines, and Thailand increasingly recognize the benefits of encouraging, facilitating,
and endorsing the out-migration of their labor (both skilled and highly-skilled) and
actively promote the movement. “Perhaps the most common form of benefit is the
generation of remittances to pay foreign debts, finance trade deficits, and improve
balance of payments. In this sense, sending workers overseas is seen in the same way as
the export of any other commodity - as a means of generating foreign earnings.”2
Remittances, minor in scale in the 1970s, represents today one the best-measured
-3

and recorded aspect of the migration experience.

Some of the economic costs associated

with migration of the highly skilled and the educated are reduced through remittances.
Not only are remittances critical to the foreign exchange position of many laborexporting countries but also play a vital role in the consumption and investment behavior
of migrant households themselves. Moreover, even those remittances destined for
consumption have significant multiplier effects that strongly promote development.4
Another justification for labor migration is that it provides workers with training and
skills that can be employed later to promote development.

2 Graeme Hugo and Charles Stahl, 175-176.
3 See Sharon S. Russell and Michael Teitelbaum, International Migration and International Trade
(Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1992); and D. Massey, J. Arango, G. Hugo, A. Kouaouci, A.
Pellegrino, and J.E. Taylor, “Theories o f International Migration: A Review and Appraisal,” Population
and Development Review 19 number 3 (September 1993): 431-466.
4 Charles Stahl and A. Habib, “The Impact o f Overseas Workers’ Remittances on Indigenous Industries:
Evidence from Bangladesh,” The Developing Economies 27 (1989): 269-85; and Charles Stahl and Fred
Arnold, “Overseas Workers’ Remittances in Asian Development,” International Migration Review 20
(1986): 899-925., 1986.
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While the literature has long recognized the contribution of migrant remittances
(e.g. from Mexico, India and the Philippines), it is increasingly recognized that highly
skilled immigrants can bring venture capital, as well as managerial and technical
expertise to sending countries. Positively termed as ‘brain circulation’ strategies, it
represents a unique way of looking at brain gain strategies where skills are not lost but
circulated between sending and receiving countries. However, precise data on the
amount of immigrant venture capital flows are not available, partly because they
originate from informal investors and family sources. In the long term, sending countries
encourage the return flow of people and capital as this offsets some negative effects of
brain drain. “In Chinese Taipei, for instance, returnees from the United States started
about 50% of companies emerging from that economy’s largest science park Hsinchu. In
China, the ministry of Science and Technology estimates that returning overseas students
started most internet-based ventures.”5 In Ireland, returnees in the mid-1990s contributed
to the Irish economy positively, by raising the level of GNP.6 Singapore has shifted its
economic strategy from a focus on high technology, high value added industries to a
program of building an external economy through overseas expansion and the promotion
of offshore activities. In this regard the Singaporean government have issued recent
statements that increasingly identify the overseas community as a “valuable link” to
Singapore and to the world economy. Diaspora network approaches in South Africa, the
South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA), provide human resources to their

5 Dominique Guellec and Mario Cervantes, “International Mobility o f the Highly Skilled: From Statistical
Analysis to Policy Formulation,” in International Mobility o f the Highly Skilled, OECD (Danvers, MA:
Clearance Center, 2002), 87.
6 Alan Barrett, “Return Migration o f Highly Skilled Irish into Ireland and their Impact on GNP and
Earnings Inequality,” in International Mobility o f the Highly Skilled, OECD (Danvers, MA: Clearance
Center, 2002).
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countries of origin. This enables them to participate in their country’s development from
abroad. Some 35 countries now use such networks with varying degrees of success.
Returnees in China add human capital and start business at home bringing not only
advanced knowledge of business, trade, science and technology but also precious
information resources that can help the development of China’s economy. What they can
offer far exceeds the investment implied by their period of work or study abroad.8
Recently, China has also launched a project to develop one hundred universities into
world-class institutions that not only provide higher education training, but also academic
employment and research opportunities.9
At the policy level, the challenge for sending countries is the facilitation and
circulation of its highly skilled workers across frontiers with benefits for them. The
South African example illustrates the need for strong policy coherence in the spheres of
migration and development aid, so that the benefits of the international mobility of
professionals are shared in a fair and sustainable fashion. Developing centers of
excellence for scientific research and framing the conditions for technological innovation
and entrepreneurship are important in making a country attractive to highly skilled
workers, both from within the country and abroad. The reverse brain drain in South

7 J.B. Meyer, 91-110.
8 Zhang Guochu and Li Wenjun, “International Mobility o f China’s Resources in Science and Technology
and its Impact,” in International Mobility o f the Highly Skilled, OECD (Danvers, MA: Clearance Center,
2002 ).
9 Billion-dollar initiatives such as the 2/11 campaign and the Elite University Program have boosted the
number and quality o f local universities. Through the 2/11 campaign the government spread about $2.2
billion among 100 universities, while the Elite University Program spread about $1.2 billion among 10 top
universities. Overall, 2.9 percent o f the country’s gross domestic product goes to education. The
government wants every middle school and most primary schools to be connected with the Internet by
2005. Source: Michael Kanellos, Tapping brainpower: New generation o f engineers. Available
[Online]:<http://news.com.com/2009-1001 -940319.html> [15th May 2005],
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Korea serves as a good example of a country where the government directly intervenes in
initiating organized repatriation in selected social sectors and setting up procedures to
achieve these objectives.10 The Ministry of Science and Technology in South Korea
plays a crucial role by organizing professional associations of Korean scientists and
engineers in the United States to develop a ‘reservoir brain pool’ for future ‘reverse brain
drain’.
While sending countries may view their domestic pool of skills depleted and
public investment in human capital lost, those that create opportunities for research,
innovation, and entrepreneurship in leading industries are more likely to benefit from
return flows of migrants, capital, and access to international innovation networks.
“Indeed to the extent that their return with enhanced skills, experience, overseas
economic connections, and economic assets, they may have a greater positive effect on
development than if they had remained at home.”11
Immigrant networks of overseas businessmen and entrepreneurs and “brain
circulation” between India and the United States have been one important driver of
knowledge development in India. The Indian government has contributed to the
emergence of such private networks through legislative and tax rules that foster
remittances and investment by Indians overseas. It is against this background, that the
role of the Indian government is evaluated in the sections below, with a view to providing
a coherent framework for understanding the policies of the government in the successful
cultivation of its Diaspora members.

10 B.L. Yoon, “Reverse Brain Drain in South Korea: State-Led Model,” Studies in Comparative
International Development 27 (1990): 4-26.
11 Graeme Hugo and Charles Stahl, 194.
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ROLE OF THE INDIAN STATE: INITIATIVES AND RESPONSE
Since the beginning o f economic reforms in 1991, there has been structural
change in India allowing it to grow at a healthy rate. Non Resident Indians (NRIs) play a
major part in foreign investment but its contribution to the Indian economy was formally
recognized with the celebration of the “First Pravasi Bharatiya Divas” (Overseas Indians
Day) from 9-11 January 2003, in New Delhi. This was regarded as a historic occasion
since it marked the beginning of a new chapter between India and the Indians abroad to
build the economic future of India. Although there exists evidence of a significant flow
of people back to India from North America, when compared with other countries like
China, the 20 million Indian Diaspora worldwide contributes less than 10 percent as
compared to the 55 million Chinese Diaspora that contributes almost 60 per cent of
China’s total foreign direct investment. This is mainly because Indian governments
policy initiatives and response towards its Diaspora has been varied irrespective of the
age and time.12 “In contrast, the Chinese government, through a decree passed on 18th
August 1990, has offered special rules and regulations for overseas Chinese to encourage
•
•
•
1^
•
investment in China.” The bigger question is whether India can take a cue from the
miracle of the Chinese ‘bamboo network’ to further the investment in their country.
Thus, irrespective of the fact that global Indians are being noticed and recognized in
every comer of the world for their success, the narrowing of the gap between the ‘Global
Indian Society’ and India is what would matter in the long run.

12 Chandrashekar Bhat, India and the Indian Diaspora: A Policy Issues. Available
[Online1:<http://www.uohyd.ernet.in/sss/cinddiaspora/centrel .html>|~14 December 2005], This paper
examines the nature o f policy pursued by India towards her Diaspora and offers some suggestions towards
a new approach in the contemporary context.
13 Sunil Prasad, Can the Indian Diaspora help India overtake China? (2005). Available
FOnline'|:<http://www.gopio.net/India China 0703 .doc>[Tl December 2005],
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The Indian state, conforming to the ideals of a mixed economy in its early years,
had a combination of restrictions along with privatization in its various sectors during the
1960s, and the 1970s the 1980s. Early 1980s represented a conscious attempt by the
government in promoting private entrepreneurship in the high technology industries.
This was reinforced even more strongly with the liberalization of the economy in 1991.
Thereafter, the policies relating to the information technology, in particular software has
been given prime importance. In this regard, the state has increasingly recognized the
role its Diaspora members can play in promoting economic development and has
attempted to formulate policies to encourage this trend. The Indian government’s
response can be summed up as: (a) history of investment and fiscal policies; (b) policies
in information technology (IT); and (c) recognition of the Diaspora through awards and
ceremonies.

Engaging the Diaspora: Early Years
During the early years of India’s independence Jawaharlal Nehru was widely
criticized for his particular brand of Fabian socialism in the economic sphere, and foreign
policy blunders (Himalayan) in the political arena. However, in spite of his insistence on
self-reliance, centralized planning, and protectionism, he can be, indirectly, credited with
creating the second largest pool of trained scientists and engineers without parallel
outside the developed world specializing in ‘research and development’.14 It is this pool
of highly skilled groups of professionals, scientists, doctors and engineers that had
significantly begun to emigrate for greener pastures to the developed world. With partial

14 Shashi Tharoor, Nehru. The Invention o f India (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2003).
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liberalization and new industrial policies beginning in the 1970s, the government now
sought their involvement in investing in India in both capital and technology.
The late 1970’s, owing to political defeat of the Congress Party in 1977, ushered
in a variety of leftist and rightist forces, who, as ruling party, embarked on a reversal of
policies in place. One o f the biggest setback decisions of the new government was its
decision to limit foreign investment by companies such as IBM and Coca Cola. IBM was
one of the first multinational companies to be admitted into the country after
independence and ‘Big Blue’s exit created a vacuum that was filled by indigenous
hardware production and software writing companies in India such as Hindustan
Computers Ltd (HCL), Patni Computer Systems, Wipro, and Infosys.15
The assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984 and the arrival of her son Rajiv on the
Indian political arena ushered in a new era for the Indian economy. Rajiv with his
youthful looks and background as a commercial airline pilot proved to be an attractive
proposition for the American companies. On its part, the Indian government with new
visionary ideas was once again eager to bring back all the expelled MNCs. Thus, after a
five year exile many foreign companies such as Texas Instruments (TI)16, HewlettPackard (H-P), digital Equipment Corporation (DEC), General Electric and Nortel
Networks came back to India and tied up with Indian firms such as Wipro, Infosys and
Satyam.

15 These companies had joined early birds like Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), PSI - Kalinga, training
institutes such as NUT and Aptech, all o f which ahd been less fancied in those times than now and were
equivalent o f startups.
16 TI is a Dallas-based chip giant that has pitch-forked Bangalore on to the international infotech map by
locating a Computer Aided Design (CAD) center there and tinning it from a ‘Garden City’ to a ‘Silicon
Plateau’
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Coinciding with the visibility of Indian abroad, the 1980s was ripe with ideas to
cultivate the Diaspora for investments in India. Early on, most of these took the form of
NRIs joining up with Indian companies in joint ventures. Although there is no specific
date one can put on the government’s interest in the Diaspora, it cannot have escaped
their notice that their Diasporic community was not only vast in numbers but also
abundantly rich and influential in their countries of residence. Common to most
enterprises in the world was the presence of Indian executives at senior levels. To what
extent were they influential in directing investment is not known, but some examples
illustrate their willingness to promote collaborations with their Indian counterparts.
Prominent among these are NRI’s such as Thampy Thomas who began joint ventures
with the Tatas17 to build mainframe computers in the Silicon Valley. Sam Pitroda, a
prominent Diaspora member, returned to India from the US to boot up C-Dot (a company
that tackles India’s telephone infrastructure).18
Following the balance of payments crisis in late 1980s and liberalization of the
economy in early 1990s it was clear that the government was looking at new and
improved ways of maintaining and facilitating the initial growth achieved. Political
debates no longer revolved around boons of a liberalized economy vis-a-vis the mixed

17 The Tata Group operates business in seven key industry sectors such as materials, engineering, energy,
consumer products, chemicals, communications and information systems, and services. The Tata Group
figures for the year 2002 - 03 has been (in Rs. Million) 5,42,270 for total turnover and 1,30,764 for
exports.
18 Today CDOT is embarking upon research and development efforts to provide ISDN, ATM, satellite
communication, and Intelligent Network capabilities. In order to solve some o f its more research-oriented
problems, CDOT has already formed alliances with academia. Whereas so far these have been related to
streamlining product development, the aim is to attract academic researchers to work in more technical
areas related to telecom.
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one, but within liberalization, on “how far, how fast.”19 However, as strongly pointed out
by various economic critics, the quality of fiscal adjustment was lacking in homogeneity
as too much of it was coming out from a cut in investment and too little from a rise in
public savings. Much of the debate remained focused on macro-stabilization and
managing balance of payments. Areas such as agricultural and financial reform were
seen as sectors not dealt with adequately by the government in the initial years.
The underlying features of the ongoing economic reforms included: decontrolling
and deregulation of the licensing regime; procedural simplification and streamlining of
the system; distribution-investment in public sector; privatization of economic activities;
drastically changing FERA and MRTP rules; increasing foreign direct investment, and
foreign technology with minimum controls on fiscal, trade and industrial policies; and to
provide impetus to attract inflow of foreign investment into India. Many politicians and
bureaucrats increasingly started engaging the Diaspora to try and get increasing returns
for the country since non-resident Indians (NRIs) were well known for having sizeable
resources in terms of finance, scientific talent, and technical know-how.
Finance Ministers touched on issues of foreign direct investment20 in their budget
speeches throughout the 1990’s. Probably the first time that a Finance Minister had a
special category marked ‘NRF in the budget speech was the 1998-99 speech of Shri.

19 R. Cassen and Vijay Joshi, India: the Future o f Economic Reform (Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1995), 4. In June 1993, various economists met in Oxford to discuss the future o f India’s reforms. Most o f
the debates really focused on macro-stabilization and managing balance o f payments. Areas such as
agricultural and financial reform were seen as sectors not dealt with adequately by the government in the
initial years.
20 See Budget speech o f the Finance Minister P. Chidambaram for 1997- 98: Available
rOnline1:<http://indiabudget.nic.in/ubl997-98/bs/BSMAIN.HTM>['25 may 2005],
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Yashwant Sinha.21 Among the general investment related issues was the significant
announcement of the issuance of ‘Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) Card’ for those living
abroad and having foreign passports. The PIO Card would extend persons of Indian
Origin settled abroad a visa-free regime, and also confer some special economic,
educational, financial, and cultural benefits. With the globalization of the economy, the
Government o f India (GOI) decided to get increasing involvement of NRIs in the
industrial development of the country. The ambitious growth plans on which India has
embarked had been based on mobilization of considerable resources both internal and
external.
In the preceding two decades several facilities and incentives had been announced
for Non Resident Indians/Persons of Indian Origin and Overseas Corporate Bodies to
encourage them to invest in India, with the right of repatriation of investment and profits
as well as on non-repatriation basis. Other kinds of investment include portfolio
investments, bank accounts, and immovable property. Besides this the Government of
India had also offered a number of other facilities and incentives to NRI/PIO and OCB22
to enlist their greater participation in the economic development of the country.23 As a
result of these measures and the vast investment opportunities available to Non Resident
Indians and foreign companies, the inflow of foreign investment including NRI
investment had significantly increased from 1991 to 2002 (Figure 21).

21 Ministry o f Finance, Government o f India, Union Budget Speech: Non Resident Indians, (1998-99).
Available [Online]:<http://indiabudget.nic.in/ubl998-99/bs/bsl4.htm>[10 June 2005].
22 Appendix A gives the definition for NRI, PIO, and OCBs
23 India Investment Center, NRI related policies, (2002). Available [Online] :<
http://iic.nic.in/iic3 b.htm>[23 June 2003].
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Figure 21. Actual Inflow of Foreign Direct Investment Including NRI Investment: 1991 - 2002
Source: India Investment Climate, Actual Inflow o f Foreign Direct Investment Including NRI Investment: 1991 - 2002.
AvailablefOnlinel:<http://iic.nic.in/iic2 c04.htm>f 17 June 2003],
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INDIAN IT INDUSTRY: GOVERNMENT POLICY INITIATIVES IN THE 1990s
The commitment towards IT (especially software) was given prime importance
because of two important trends. The first was the growing importance of IT industry
and ‘Indian Siliconnaires’24 since this group of Indian professionals alone comprised
millionaires and billionaires that found themselves in the right place, at the right time to
exploit all available opportunities in the ‘infotech revolution’. Efforts to engage them in
mutually reinforcing roles with India were viewed as rendering important benefits for the
home country. Second, since India’s ‘comparative advantage’25 lay in its abundance of
qualified software engineers, with competency in English language, coupled with the
government’s timely national action plan for rapidly improving communications
infrastructure, the education system in India increasingly started focusing on computerrelated knowledge for its workforce, through training in schools and colleges.
Consequently, computer education was introduced at the primary level and made
compulsory in certain standards. Computer science professionals can be divided into two
categories - engineers and programmers. Engineers have to go through a four-year phase
in the any state of India (approximately 96 engineering colleges) before they are certified.
Entry to these colleges is very rigorous based on competitive exams. It is estimated that
about 15,000 computer science and electronics majors graduate from these engineering
colleges every year. A high number o f software programmers are also certified in the

24 Chidanand Rajghatta, 36. The term has been coined to describe millionaires in the Silicon Valley,
California. By the late 1990s the area was said to be producing sixty-four millionaires every day.
25 Comparative advantage has been a powerful principle o f economics since David Ricardo first proposed it
in 1817. In simplistic terms, the theory states that countries can achieve a higher level o f wealth if each
focuses on maximizing its own natural resources and capacities in Production.
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thousands of software training institutes (such as NUT).26 Most institutes require only a
high school diploma for students to enroll. It is estimated that over 200,000 people have
taken classes in these institutes to get certified in software languages and packages.
Similarly, the government has consistently reinforced its commitment to the IT industry
by its simple and encouraging policies and a vibrant economy. In ‘The Horse that Flew:
How India’s Silicon Gurus Spread their Wings ’ Rajghatta27 offers very interesting
insights that he had acquired by interviewing scores of “techies’, CEOs, and others
members of the Indian diaspora. The book is full of personalities in the IT industry that
have collaborated with the Indian government at various times to boost up the Indian
economy. Although there is considerable variation in the number and quality of these
programs, the Indian government has various policies and programs to assist the social
and economic integration of returning migrants. Among the many initiatives taken by the
government, in the field of IT, by the creation of ‘Software Technology Parks (STPs)’,28
the creation of the National Association of Software and Service Companies
(NASSCOM), and reforms in the department of electronics of the central government.

26 National Institute o f Information Technology
27 Chidanand Rajghatta, bom in Bangalore, earned his M.S. from Bangalore University in 1982. He has
worked with in Indian Newspapers and Journals such as The Indian Express, The Telegraph, India Today
and the Times o f India. He was The Indian Express ’ correspondent in the United States from 1995 to 2000
and is currently Washington correspondent for The Times o f India. The Horse that Flew is his first book.
28 Autonomous Society Under Ministry o f Communications & Information Technology, government o f
India. STP scheme is a 100% Export Oriented Scheme for the development and export o f computer
software using data communication links or in the form o f physical media including export o f professional
services.
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Software Technology Parks (STPs)
STPs play a major role in influencing high-tech companies, many o f them headed
and staffed by highly skilled workers from India, to set up plants and subsidiaries
southern states of Karnataka29 and Andhra Pradesh with Bangalore and Hyderabad
respectively, emerging as the twin technology cities.30 The creation of these STPs
increasingly encourage brain circulation with migration of people was no longer being
required for acquiring better skills. The Karnataka government, identifying the potential
of software as an engine of industrial growth employment and valuable foreign exchange
earner has come up with a number of incentives to encourage exports as well as
investment.
STPs have been set up in various cities including Bangalore and provide physical
infrastructure, a centralized computing facility along with multiple dedicated satellite
links to companies operating within the premises of the STP. A good number of
returning overseas professionals find the attractiveness of Bangalore as important for
reintegration into the home economy. Bangalore, described as India’s Investment
Destination of the 21st Century and its fifth largest city, is home to over 6 million people,
and serves as a base for over 1,00,000 industries. Out of the 10,000 industries that
Bangalore boasts of, IT industry is the one that has makes it the fastest growing city in
Asia. Out of an annual average growth rate of 58% in IT, Bangalore alone contributes
about 40%. In recent years, Karnataka has emerged as the computer capital and the centre
29

Karnataka has always been a proactive state, which has today made it into the most sought after IT
destination in the country. In Karnataka, Bangalore takes the lead, as the most preferred IT destination for
its year round salubrious climate, excellent social, education & health facilities. 10% o f the Indian
Graduates are produced in Karnataka, which has historically been a place for technology and R&D based
institutions in India. Karnataka also boasts o f one o f the best available IT infrastructure in the country.
30 STPs have been created in many states o f India and are not limited to these two states as might be the
general conception
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for high-tech industries, especially in the area of the computer hardware, software,
electronics, instrumentation and telecommunication. The state government on its part has
inducted a full-fledged secretariat for Information Technology in May 2003. The
secretarial mission is to implement the state’s IT policy that had been formulated in early
1997. This happens to be the first IT policy by any state in the country. Moreover, the
state government has been committed to improving the infrastructure and constantly
working to provide better facilities for companies who already have set up their base in
Bangalore and for those who are likely to invest there.

National Association o f Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM)
NASS COM’s basic objective had been to change government policy in early
1990’s so that India’s nascent and emerging software industries collaborate with arriving
US based multinationals. One of their best uses has been to provide an ideal forum for
overseas and domestic companies to explore the vast potential available for Joint
Ventures, Strategic Alliances, Marketing Alliances, Joint Product Development, etc., by
■j i

organizing Business Meets with delegations of various countries.

Nasscom has been

acting as the advisory, consultative and co-ordinating body for the IT software and
services industry. Nasscom has representatives in various committees of the Government
of India including the Ministry of Information Technology, Ministry o f Commerce and
Industry, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of External Affairs, Department of
Telecommunications and Ministry of Human Resources Development. Lately, Nasscom
has also started lobbying with various foreign governments, whenever there is a

31 NASSCOM: National Association o f Software and Service Companies, Aims and Objectives, (2006).
Available [Online] :<http://www.nasscom.org>[23 July 2004],
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requirement related to the growth and development of the Indian IT software and services
industry. For this purpose, Nasscom has signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs)
with various international industry associations. O f prime importance here is ‘The Indus
Entrepreneurs’ or more popularly the ‘TIE’ that recruits successful veteran
entrepreneurs, corporate executives and senior professionals who have reached a stage in
their professional life when they are ready, willing and able to contribute to the industry
at large both in their countries of residence and their countries of origin. International
affiliations with organizations such as the ‘Asian Oceanian Computing Industry
Organisation (ASOCIO)’33 and the ‘World Information Technology and Services
Alliances (WITSA)’34 have also been vital to spread their global networking.

Department o f Electronics (DoE)
The Department for telecommunications and electronics of the government of
India has also undertaken various measures to boost its IT industry sector that has
recorded impressive growth since the mid-eighties. As one of its most important aims the
government has resolved to make India a global IT superpower and a front-runner in the
age of ‘Information Revolution’. One of the first tasks has been to make revisions and
additions to the existing policies and removing infrastructural bottlenecks.

32 The Indus Entrepreneurs (TiE), A Global Not-For Profit Network o f Professionals Dedicated to the
Advancement o f Entrepreneurship, (2004). Available
[Online) :<http://www.tie.org/newsletter/02/articles2.htm>[24 January 2006],
33 ASOCIO or a group o f computing industry associations from the Asian Oceania Region and comprises o f
representative from 16 countries
34 This forum comprises o f member associations from 32 leading countries o f the world.
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National Task Force on Information Technology and Software Development
The government further came up with a National Task Force on Information
Technology and Software Development in May 1998. The Task Force had a mandate to
formulate the draft of a long term National IT Policy and to recommend immediate steps
for the removal of infrastructural bottlenecks to provide a boost to the IT industry. The
Task Force formulated three key reports for the government during July 1998 - April
1999.35
While the first report focused on recognizing the impressive growth achieved in
the IT industry and making policies for removing bottlenecks, the second focuses on new
policy paradigm for the IT hardware industry. The Third looks at recommendations for
long term National IT Policies. The major recommendations included opening of internet
Gateway access; encouragement for private sector Software Technology Parks (STPs),
zero customs and excise duty on IT software, income tax exemptions for software and
service exports, encouragement to set up venture capital funds, 1-3 per cent of the Budget
of every Ministry/Department for IT applications, networking of all Universities and
research institutions, allowing US dollar linked stock options to employees of Indian
software companies, new schemes for students, including attractive package for buying
computers and many other measures. The government has also accepted all the
recommendations and set up a new Ministry of Information Technology in October 1999.
This agency has been responsible for integrating all the different components associated

35 The three reports are Information Technology Action Plan - Part I (4 July 1998), Information
Technology Action Plan - Part II (October 26, 1998), and Information Technology Action Plan - Part III
(16 April 1999). While the first two reports are on software and hardware industries respectively, the third
one is on long-term national IT policy.
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with IT such as the Central Government, the State Government, academia, the private
sector and very importantly, successful Indian IT professionals or the Diaspora abroad.

PRAVASIBHARTIYA DIVAS (NRI DAY) INITIATIVE
The government of the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) had been somewhat more
proactive in cultivating the Diasporic community. It is during their reign that we find
specific policies formulated specially keeping the Diaspora in mind. Previously, the
government had policies in place generally catering to foreign investments and FDI
inflows into the country. Later they have been included as a separate category in Union
Budget speeches.
This government also put in place a High Level Committee on the Indian
Diaspora36 chaired by Dr. L.M. Singhvi that has a detailed list of all recommendations for
the government on behalf of the Diaspora community. This has a list of all major issues
pertaining to the Indian Diaspora such as culture, education, media, economic
development (Investment, International Trade, Industrial Development And Tourism),
health, Science and Technology, Philanthropy, Consular and other Issues, Dual
Citizenship and many other issues.
Interim Recommendations include
a. The PIO Card Scheme
b. The Pravasi Bharatiya Divas
c. Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Awards.

36 FICCI, Report o f the high Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora Ministry o f External Affairs.
Available [Online] :<http://indiadav.ora/government policv/singhvi-detail.asp#5>[5 August 2003],
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Of these the Pravasi Bhartiya Divas (Indian Diaspora Day) has been a first in
forging a constructive relationship between the government and the Diaspora. This
gathering of over 3000 participants of the members of the Indian Diaspora from 61
countries has helped the government to create linkages with its Diaspora. The first
th

Pravasi Bhartiya Divas (PBD) was held on January 9 2003 and has become an annual
event since. Among various themes discussed in the 2003 PBD was the significance of
the “Global Business Matrix” as espoused by the Finance Minister, Shri. Jaswant Singh
where he announced the relaxation of important policy parameters governing the flow of
funds and investments. In this regard important comparisons were made with China and
other countries in Southeast Asia where the network of Diasporic communities have
contributed greatly to their countries. In addition the announcement of dual citizenship37
was greatly appreciated by the Diaspora and was seen as a landmark decision.
Essentially it provides that:

For those who have taken foreign passports, the grant of dual citizenship will
remove the obstacles in travel to and from India with no multiple visa
requirements
Persons of Indian origin settled in economically more advanced countries of the
world have skills and expertise in vital sectors. There is no doubt, that
investments are induced principally by the logic of business considerations and
the investment climate. The facility of Dual Citizenship would foster better co
operation in these sectors by way of investments and transfer of skills and
resources.
The principal rationale of the demand of the Diaspora for dual citizenship,
however, is sentimental and psychological. Desire of PIOs to forge emotional and
cultural bonds with their country of origin is quite evident in the amount of
37 Dual citizenship, the main concern o f the Diaspora in developed countries, had been a long-standing
demand. It took an event like Pravasi Bharatiya Divas to bring it to fruition. The Draft bill was introduced
in Rajya Sabha on May 9th 2003 to amend the Citizenship Act, 1955, as a follow up to the announcement
made during the First Pravasi Bharatiya Divas, January 9-11, 2003
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Philanthropic activities done by them in India. Dual Citizenship shall strengthen
this bond and facilitate Diaspora's contribution in India's social Development.
Dual Citizenship would also help to perpetuate and cement links of the younger
generation o f the Diaspora with India, as they may be keen to keep in touch with
their roots.38
The PBD initiative taken by the Government has generated a wave of positive
sentiment within the Diaspora and created a platform for forging new relationships, more
constructive than before. Through this event the government has enhanced its image both
within and outside the country. As a follow-up on the proceedings of the First Pravasi
Bhartiya Divas, the Federation of the Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry
(FICCI) has launched a new division to service and leverage the global network of
NRIs/PIOs.
A report by the Federation of the Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry
(FICCI) has also identified some clearly visible areas where the government has made
significant progress to develop partnerships with and among the Diaspora to substantially
strengthen the partnership through a strong leadership, a win-win mindset and sustained
implementation. These are:
■ Public visibility o f the Diaspora Opportunity: the report by the High Level
Committee on the Indian Diaspora provides data on the strength and breadth of
the Diaspora.
■ Ease o f travel fo r overseas Indians: the cost of the PIO card, a multiple entry visa
for 20 years, has been reduced from about US $1000 to US $ 310.
■ Public acknowledgement o f Diaspora contributions: through annual ‘Pravasi
Bhartiya Divas (PBD)’ and ‘Pravasi Samman’ awards to 10 prominent PIOs and
NRIs.

38 FICCI, Dual Citizenship: Eligibility, Procedure, Benefits, and Privileges. Available
[Onlinel:<http://indiadav.org/govemment policy/dual citizenship.asp>[29 July 2003],
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■ Financial instruments to channel funds: the government continues to issue bonds
to finance infrastructure investment, and had raised over US $ 10 billion from
overseas Indians.
■ Communication with and among the Diaspora: FICCI is creating a database of
overseas Indians to attend their annual functions like the PBD.
* Specialized services fo r overseas Indians: initiatives like invest India of the
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), provide information on foreign investment
policy, advisory services to investors, and access to a network of 33 offices in
India and 10 offices internationally.
■ Continued progress on investment and foreign exchange policies: NRI rupee
deposits are largely convertible, talent tax credits encourage companies to hire
expatriates, and simplified laws facilitate property acquisition.
■ Organic developments in the Diaspora: the Indian Diaspora is already beginning
to cluster on its own accord, such as in Chambers of Commerce, and proactively
establish avenues for collaboration with India.
■ Early business successes: there are now several success stories of Diaspora
collaboration that offers a guidebook for others to follow.39

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BOTTLENECKS
Notwithstanding all these initiatives by the government one has to bear in mind
that in spite of recommendations and policy formulation several other factors, both
economic and political and other bottlenecks still remain. Studies by various economists
and analysts40 have revealed that foreign participation in terms of joint-venture
corporation or subsidiary organization still remains limited in the Indian software
industry. Besides, the industry is still represented by private domestic limited companies.
The study confirms that a majority of these firms are engaged in contractual
programming and designing activities and very few of these have assets larger than

39 See McKinsey & Company.
40 See Chandana Chakraborty and Dilip Dutta, “Indian Software Industry: Growth Patterns, Constraints,
and Government Initiatives,” in Indian Economic Reforms, Raghabendra Jha (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2003).
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Rupees 300 million. The domestic market explains only 17.5% of the total software
revenue and contrasts strikingly with that in the developed countries such as United
States, Western Europe and Japan. There is also a significant dependence on one
principal market, the United States that accounts for more than 60% of all ventures. In
sharp contrast to other Asian countries that have diversified their exports, India’s
software exports are concentrated towards custom software work and programming
services. Thus India falls behind its competitors only in regard to government initiatives
and the size of the domestic market.
Another problem faced in India is the change of government itself. Not all
parties in power have shown equal enthusiasm towards cultivating the Diaspora. The
national elections in 2004 have heralded the coming back to power of the Congress Party.
The Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, India’s 13-year old economic reform
architect, leads the country with a greater emphasis on the “human element” with
stronger emphasis on developing agriculture and creating job opportunities41 as opposed
to engaging the Diaspora. Likewise, although the new Finance Minister Mr. P.
Chidambaram, a Harvard educated lawyer, has made promises to continue the previous
government’s broad reform agenda, has made extremely clear that the new government’s
main agenda will be in the fields of agricultural reform and rural development.42 In fact
he has gone on record for having made fun of the defeated party for trying to portray

41 Edward Luce, “Singh to be India’s Prime Minister,” Financial Times, 20 May 2004.
42 Edward Luce, “Markets See Minister’s Selection as a Sign India is Still on the Reform Path,” Financial
Times, 25 May 2004.
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India as “India Shining”43 during elections. The new government is most likely to focus
on policy reforms at the state level, with more privatization, and labor reform being ruled
out for political reasons. At the outset, the Indian government has come up with a
“common minimum program (CMC)” that will include both rural development at the
state level and accelerate liberal economic reforms at the same time.44
Another source of problem comes from the World Bank withdrawing loans
approved for the “focus states”45 after the defeat of Chandrababu Naidu, chief minister of
the Southern state of Andhra Pradesh, who had so far received a loan worth more than $2
billion for providing electricity to the state. Chandrababu Naidu has been a champion
for the state in promoting the IT industry there and for putting its capital Hyderabad on
the world map as one of the twin cities of India that leads in IT. Some have gone as far
as to say that he should have been the Prime Minister of the country to harness the full
potential of IT in India. The World Bank has also withdrawn its loan worth $250 million
from the neighboring state of Tamil Nadu, with capital Chennai, after the defeat of Ms.
Jayalalitha’s regional party. There are many critics46 of the Bank who are looking at this
as the Bank’s failure to recognize on how to pursue reform. In addition they are also
pointing to the Bank’s mistake of linking its program so closely with one politician - Mr.
Naidu and not to the state or country itself - a grave mistake in a democracy.

43 India Shining was the election theme for BJP during the 2004 national elections owing to the success rate
achieved by the government in the field o f IT. This became a matter of mockery among the opposition
party as the growth achieved by the IT industry to the GDP o f India was less than 2 %
44 Edward Luce, “India’s Common Minimum Program: Singh Vows Reform with a ‘Human Face’,”
Financial Times, 28 May 2004.
45 All these Focus States are also the venues o f very highly developed Software Technology Parks STPs
46 Edward Luce, “India’s Polls Teach World Bank a Lesson,” Financial Times, 29 May 2004.
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Both markets and investors have reacted very strongly47 to the victory of the
Congress Party, with the likes of leftists and Communists dominating the political scene.
Regardless of the fact that the state of West Bengal, political ground for the Communist
Party of India (Marxist), has attracted private investors along with promoting vital
reforms in agriculture and land ownership, fear is that privatization will probably slow
down.48
Although these problems and bottlenecks remain, the government has in the
past and will continue, in the future, to channelize the resources of its Diaspora for the
home country. Providing state-of-the-art infrastructure for investment and formulating
policies and incentives to grab the attention of its Diaspora community remain at the
forefront of all initiatives.

CONCLUSION
Since the 1960s, skilled migration was viewed as a loss of scarce human capital
and public resources, leading to proposals such as a tax on the brain drain. However, in
recent years, coinage of terms such as ‘brain gain’ and ‘brain circulation’ reflects a shift
in this thinking. Skilled outflows are being seen as a potential positive force for the
source country of migration. In India, the changing perception about skilled migration
has been driven by the role of NRIs in sectors like IT and health. There is growing
awareness about the Diaspora’s contribution towards investment flows, skill, knowledge,
technology transfer, trade and business opportunities, and India’s brand equity.

47 On 17th May after election results the main stock exchange index plunged by 11 per cent creating major
upheavals in the market
48 Edward Luce, “Incredible India and its Reformers,” Financial Times, 20 May 2004.
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Recent government initiatives such as the Persons of Indian Origin Card
introduced in 1999, the High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora set up in 2000, the
annual Pravasi Bharatiya Divas, and the recent move on dual citizenship, reflect this
recognition of positive externalities. It is difficult to say how effective such initiatives on
skilled migration will be in future and whether the fanfare with which the Pravasi
Bharatiya Divas is celebrated will be backed by concrete measures. Initiatives such as
networking with scientists and technologists of Indian origin based abroad, which aim to
strengthen India’s education and research capabilities in frontier areas and establish India
as a global R&D platform, remain statements without supporting measures.
On a positive note, leaders in India are actively looking at their Chinese or
Jewish counterparts that are actively harnessing their Diaspora for more benefits. The
Chinese network is chiefly oriented around wealth creation and economic growth. The
Jewish Diaspora is well known for its cultural cohesion and support for the Jewish way of
life. In both cases, in-country leaders had encouraged outreach to their global community,
overseas talent had been recruited, and teams of potential leaders have been trained.
The Indian Diaspora has the potential to play important roles in India’s
development and can be a valuable network for its members. With its judicious mix of
academics, government, and industry, one can imagine the importance of the Diaspora
towards the growth of IT industry in India. China and Israel have shown the way in
building win-win partnerships with their overseas communities. The Indian leadership
has also embarked on a journey to transform its far-flung Diaspora into a vibrant
community for economic growth.
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CHAPTER VIII
GENERATIONAL EFFECTS OF INDIA’S BRAIN DRAIN AND GAIN: A
CONCLUSION

HOPE AND DESPAIR
The discussion over ‘brain drain’, stemming as far back as thel960s, has
undergone various phases in the last four - five decades with important implications for
both source and receiving countries. Since the U.S. and the U.K. first opened their doors
to skilled workers and students, they have been accused of luring the best and the
brightest to the West, draining the LDCs of their educated manpower. For years the
transfer of human capital from developing to the developed countries has generated a
sense of despair for the LDCs with frequent alarms from various international
organizations such as the United Nations. Receiving societies, on their part, have also
despaired over the extent to which foreign-born professionals displace native workers in
various professions. Altogether, concern over brain drain in the early decades had
acquired a negative connotation with frequent references to the cost of emigration. The
literature remained deficient in conceptualizing other facets of the phenomenon.
In recent decades, the discourse on brain drain has shifted to include other aspects
of brain drain: such as the benefits that could potentially undo the harm borne by the
sending countries. Popularly termed as ‘brain gain’, it primarily looks at contributions
(both monetary and knowledge) that ‘Western trained knowledge workers’ can make to
their home countries. Increasing importance of networks as well as monetary benefits
has led to many conceptual and empirical developments in the study of international
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migration of the highly skilled. Other stylized terms such as ‘brain exchange’ and ‘brain
circulation’ have also come to the fore. Here the former refers to no net loss or gain of
human capital, but movement between areas, and the latter to the circulating immigrants
who would bring back valuable experience and know-how to their local economies. This
positive aspect of brain drain thus ushers in a sense of hope: both for the Diaspora
members in their countries of settlement, and for their home countries.
From Boston to Beijing to Bangalore, expatriates in the United States are now
returning to their homelands or at least sending their investments. In some cases, the
reasons behind this ‘brain gain’ have been purely economic - technology professionals
who have struck it rich in Silicon Valley are finding that their money goes a long way
back home. The business-process outsourcing (BPO) has become a $200 billion industry
in the case of India that with a fifty million potential English speakers serves as one of
the most sought after destinations in the world. For some, building the networks
(technologically and monetarily) for their countrymen is almost a duty (as seems to be the
case in China); for others, it’s the chance to be a bigger fish in a smaller pond (case study
Taiwan). Developing countries like India are in fact accelerating the migration,
sweetening the rewards for high-tech workers by pushing development in their
technology sectors, cutting taxes and loosening immigration laws. “O f all the NICs and
developing countries, India stands out for the degree to which its government has
intervened in the IT sector and for the complexity and nuance of that intervention.”1
With renewed interest in emerging global economies such as China and India, the
choice of India as case study for both ‘brain drain’ and ‘brain gain’ is both timely, and

1 Jason Dedrick and Kenneth L. Kraemer, “Information Technology in India: The Quest for SelfReliance,” Asian Survey 33 number 5 (May 1993): 463-492.
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relevant. With continuing migration of human capital to the United States on one hand,
and reaping the benefit of its manpower on the other, the Indian Diaspora plays a
significant role in bridging India and the United States, impacting the bilateral
relationship between them. The Indian ‘Silicon Valley experience’ further underscores
far-reaching transformations of the relationship between immigration, trade, and
economic development in the 21st century. Where once the main economic ties between
immigrants and their home countries were remittances sent to families left behind, today
more and more U.S. trained skilled immigrants eventually return home. Those who
remain in America often become part of transnational communities that link the United
States to the Indian economy. These new immigrant entrepreneurs thus foster economic
development directly, by creating new jobs and wealth, as well as indirectly, by
coordinating the information flows and providing the linguistic and cultural know-how
that promote trade and investment with their home country, India. Furthermore, through
the 1.6 million Indo-Americans, India has created a positive image of itself that is both
visible and tangible. The direct and indirect lobbying efforts of this group have resulted
in political benefits for India, first during the Clinton years and now through the Bush
Administration.2
As a conclusion to this discourse on brain drain and/or gain, this chapter
summarizes the main findings from the empirical discussions of this dissertation. It also
returns to some of the theoretical and policy-oriented concerns raised in Chapter II,
Chapter IV, and Chapter VII.

2 The co-operation agreement in March 2006, between India and the U.S., which is still to be ratified by the
US Congress, gives India access to US technology, although it has not signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty.
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LINKING THEORY AND EVIDENCE: MAIN FINDINGS
This dissertation had made an attempt to link theory and evidence associated with
brain drain. After having discussed the origins, concepts, theoretical models, and
counter-measures of brain drain in Chapter II, it goes on to discuss the current literature
available on brain gain (through remittances, return, and network approaches).
The literature and evidence for remittances and savings was the best quantified
and discussed, with an increasing number of studies available annually by the World
Bank and the IMF. By providing information on the top receiving, and the top source
countries of remittances, the discussion cuts across countries and regions. The traditional
literature on remittances, that painted a rather negative picture, was also tackled, and to
some extent countered. Diaspora networks and the evidence for ‘brain circulation’ were
also well defined and well documented for many countries such as China, Colombia,
India, Singapore, South Africa, and Taiwan. The biggest problem encountered here was
that of measurement, as knowledge and technology transfers and know-how remain
intangible and less visible. Brain circulation remains closely linked to the claims made
by ‘growth theories’ in the ‘human capital paradigm’ that skills and education are lost
through movement o f people. Growth theories further emphasize the role of ‘knowledge’
that is not location-specific and through ‘knowledge networks’ consider this to be a
paradigmatic shift from the earlier literature on brain drain.
The available literature on motives for return migration proved to be most
inconsistent with the available empirical evidence, specifically for emerging global
economies. The classic literature on return motives classifies it as four distinct types: (1)
voluntary, at the end of the migration period; (2) other factors such as intolerable working
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conditions, changes in motivation, or family issues prompting return; (3) end of the
project with the completion of the economic activity; and (4) return generated by crises
such as health or legal reasons, or war-like situations. By introducing a fifth category,
return generated by pull factors at origin,3 this work adds to the literature on push-pull
theories with country examples.
The choice of case studies for understanding this phenomenon proved to be
challenging initially. United States was a clear choice for receiving country as the U.S.,
more than any other country, has conducted research and documented immigration
statistics since 1820. The initial choice for sending countries in this research had
included Brazil, India, and Ireland, three countries with an ongoing record of brain drain.
However, due to lack of data/available of data for some countries in a different language
prompted me to decide on India as the sole sending country. Furthermore, an internship
with the Ministry o f External Affairs in may 2003 in the PBD division (Non Resident
Indian NRI division) provided me with the necessary documents, such as the high-level
committee reports and hands-on experience of a sending country government in its policy
choices vis-a-vis its Diaspora.
The relationship between India and the United States is also currently in its most
evolving phase with increasing visits by heads of states of both countries and economic
and nuclear deals, reversing decades of disengagement by them. Chapter III provides a
good historical background of the relationship between the two countries both during,
and after the Cold War. In addition to economic and political, migration linkages
between them has impacted their bilateral relationship in new and innovative ways. Their

3 Investments in businesses, health, and education sectors back in the sending countries.
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sheer numbers, 65,472 in 2004,4 has rendered for them the second highest immigrant
group after Mexico. Incidentally, Indian immigrants are also second in Canada. Among
Asians, Indians are the third highest immigrant group after Filipino American, and
Chinese American communities. With these new linkages, between political, economic,
and migration, with visible benefits for the home country, the literature on brain drain
takes a departure from its traditional stance to explore new avenues for gain (explained
through the second hypothesis).
The maxim, “give us your tired, your p o o r . . . your scientists and your
mathematicians ” at the beginning of Chapter IV, perhaps best describes the future of
immigration laws and brain drain into the United States. Through milestones in the
history of major immigration laws in the U.S. it can be inferred that the massive influx of
foreigners were better educated and skilled than their contemporaries, either in their
home countries or even in the United States (in some instances). Concerns about brain
drain were heightened when the United States abandoned the national quotas enacted in
the 1920’s and changed its immigration laws in 1965 from one of discrimination, based
mainly on national origins, to one of discrimination based on skill. Brain drain can be
measured best by observing the trend o f selective recruitment of skilled workers and
students. According to Table 18, it can be noted that a tremendous increase took place in
the employment-based category of the non-immigrant class almost doubling in nine years
from 85,336 in 1995 to 155,330 in 2004. Asians, from the top five sending countries of
China (People’s Republic), India, Philippines, Republic of Korea, and Vietnam,
predominate this wave of immigrants admitted after 1965. As an illustration, temporary
admissions in the HI B (specialty occupations) and FI (student) categories, although
4 Refer to Table 10 in Chapter III
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smaller as compared to other non-immigrant categories, such as tourists and business
people, remain important in the discussion on brain drain. Their significance further lies
in the fact that an increasing number o f HI B beneficiaries take legal steps to adjust their
status from temporary to permanent. Students too, usually settle in their new countries of
residence, incurring huge losses to their home countries. India features in a big way
through the HI B category. It remains the highest beneficiary in the last three years,
2002 (64,980), 2003 (79,166), and 2004 (85,536). In comparison, China was second in
2002 and 2003 with 18,841 and 20,063 respectively, a marked contrast with India. For
2004, the United Kingdom was second with 32,134 HI B beneficiaries. In fact, a typical
HI B beneficiary in 2002 was Indian, median age 29, median income $60,000, with an
education of either bachelors’ or masters’ in computer-related occupations.
Immigration and immigration laws have been viewed negatively by sending
countries, since it represents a much-calculated attempt to drain the LDCs of their
trained, and educated manpower. For the receiving country, in the recent U.S. debate
over making more Hl-B visas available for highly skilled immigrants, the discussion
began— and ended—with the extent to which immigrants displace native workers,
without accounting for the effect of these high-tech immigrants on new jobs, and wages
at home.
Very often, the discussion on brain drain focuses on the broad statistical
implications of exit and entry, especially those of the highly skilled and educated. These
views have not been broad enough to describe what is happening in the United States
today, specifically with regard to brain drain from India. The concern that Indian
immigrants displace native workers needs to be weighed against the fact that foreign-born
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scientists and engineers have been starting hundreds of new businesses and generating
jobs and wealth for the U.S. economy on the one hand, and returning to their home
countries and generating capital and investment on the other, thereby converting it into a
gain. In a new policy environment, analysts and policymakers must recognize this new
reality. Economic openness has its costs, to be sure, but the strength of the U.S. economy
has historically derived from its openness and diversity—and this will be increasingly
true as the economy becomes more global. As Silicon Valley’s new immigrant
entrepreneurs suggest, Americans should resist viewing immigration and trade as zerosum processes.
Regardless of this, it is difficult to predict the future of immigration of the highly
skilled manpower to the United States. At best, current data and facts suggest that there
is little likelihood of it going down in future. The fact that Asian immigration has
increased almost tenfold between 1965 and 1990, suggests that legislative policies within
the United States will support this trend. Although the events of September 11th have
reshaped the debate over immigration in general, there is no way of predicting one-time
factors - such as terrorist attacks, wars, revolutions, and natural disasters - impact on
migration patterns, on the whole.
Chapters V to VII apply the case studies of India and the United States in the
discussion on brain drain by providing empirical evidence for the three hypotheses
postulated in Chapter I. Since the subject of brain gain is increasingly linked to
development for the home country, hypothesis 1 - Diasporic communities can become
agents o f development fo r their home countries by direct benefits that will outweigh the
costs - measures (tangible and intangible) benefits in Chapter V. Before embarking on
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the benefits, the chapter begins with a brief discussion on the costs of emigration to the
sending country. According to empirical evidence available in India, the number and
category of skilled people actually migrating remains patchy and inaccurate. In addition,
in a highly populated country like India, out-migration is seen as a logical consequence of
the imbalance created between education and employment. Finally, since a large part of
benefits comes through networks, it is not easy to quantify the benefits but it is very easy
to quantify the costs.
Remittances alone could count for a reverse brain drain when looking at India. In
recent years NRI remittances have played an extremely important role in India’s
economic development at the micro-economic level. NRI deposits have helped India in
averting its balance of payment crisis, carrying developmental work, and servicing
international debt. This has also been sharper for India as compared to many other
countries. As the world’s largest recipient of remittance inflows in 2003-2004, rising to
over US$17 billion in 2003 (Table 25), a strong growth in remittances and services has
contributed to a current account surplus of 1.7 % of India’s GDP. Despite the
significance of NRI deposits for India’s balance of payments, there was relatively little
research to date on their determinants or stability. Thus, it is fairly difficult to conclude
whether the decision to remit was altruistic in motive. What can be observed is that with
an increase in the number of migrants from India to the United States and the migration
of high skilled worker’s, over time, private transfers to India on current account have
been very robust in the past decade. Additionally, NRI foreign direct investment (FDI) of
an amount close to $ 1 billion and deposits to over $25 billion sheds light on important
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questions relating to motives or reasons for investing in India and why should the world
look at it as an important investment site.
Examples of return migration, few and far between throughout the 1970s and
1980s, enumerate the high rate of return o f professionals from the U.S. to invest in start
ups and other ventures in India. The reasons for this have been both pecuniary
(monetary) as well as non-pecuniary (personal reasons, family ties, philanthropy, etc). It
is generally observed that returnees voluntarily come back to by choice rather than
compulsion (category 5 in Table 2, as discussed earlier). Most of the data collected for
return have been secondary sources, owing to the lack of data on return. This is the only
phase of migration that remains elusive as a field. On the positive side, returned migrants
invest in business, health, and education sectors.
The professional and social networks that increasingly link Indian entrepreneurs
to their counterparts at home, not only provides shared information, contacts, and trust,
but also allow local producers to participate in an increasingly global economy. This
concept of ‘brain circulation’ is an increasing form of brain gain with the importance of
knowledge networks becoming primary. The various links between Silicon Valley and
the twin cities of Bangalore and Hyderabad in India, exemplifies this theory. Indian
entrepreneurs have thus been able to build a two-way bridge, connecting them with
India’s technology community. Furthermore, overseas Indians have taken advantage of
their position in the American companies they work for to invest directly in India,
especially in the Information Technology (IT) industry.
Chapter VI examines the second hypothesis: skilled migrants with high levels o f
education and income are more likely to influence (economic and political) investments
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fo r their country o f origin and whether they can be utilized as soft power to redefine
asymmetrical relationships between country o f origin and destination. Indian migrants in
the U.S. have accorded for themselves a level of visibility through their successes,
affluence, and education. Prominent in fields such as IT, media, liberal arts, finance,
hospitality industry, and the academia, Indo-American names and faces have become
commonplace in the United States. Registering high numbers in virtually all states of
America, the Indo-American community has exercised their political influence for
benefits to India through their lobbying efforts, both directly and indirectly. There
benefits were both economic and political in nature. Important examples include: (1)
providing generous funds to Presidential elections in 2000 and 2004; (2) mobilizing their
concerns through political organizations such as the ‘Indian American Center for Political
Awareness’ (IACPA) and the ‘Indian-American Forum for Political Education’ (IAFPE);
(3) registering an increasing number of South Asian candidates in the U.S. Senate, U.S.
House of Representatives at the State and Mayoral level; (4) working hard with the
Senate Caucus groups such as the ‘Friends of India caucus’; and (5) registering a high
level of involvement visits of heads of state by both countries. This political benefits
coming out of Diaspora efforts, rendered the relaxations U.S. economic sanctions after
India conducted nuclear tests in 1998, setting up of the U.S - India Science and
Technology forum, and currently, in a new round of nuclear deals (transfer of nuclear
technology) between the two countries.
These developments have changed Indo-U.S. relations to some extent. The
question I raised in Chapter II and again in Chapter VI, is that to what extent does this
change the asymmetrical interdependent (AI) relationship between them? The study of
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Diaspora groups as elements of soft power is also a recent phenomenon. Joseph Nye, the
creator of the term ‘soft power’ in his latest book, “Power in the Global Information
Age”, refers to Diaspora as recent in the study on soft power. In three pages of a book
that totals 223, he identifies a greater Congressional role for them and impacting policies
through policy coordination and coalition building. This is a serious gap in the literature
on ‘soft power’ and ‘AI’ as Diaspora takes on stronger roles in politics in their countries
of settlement. Although I realize that ‘soft power’ primarily remains an American
weapon, its application to other countries, and industries (such as IT) deserves
reconsideration. This research is a departure from previous works in the sense that it is
not an evaluation of Indo-US foreign policy towards each other but attempts to look at
the areas where each country has its particular strength and how the more dependent
country, India, can use its Diaspora as soft power. I conclude by saying that, while it
may be true that the Diaspora uses its wealth and influence to gain benefits for the
community and its home country, it remains highly unlikely that this asymmetry will
change in the near future.
The role of the sending country, traditionally ignored in the debate on brain drain,
takes on new dimensions with increasing brain gain strategies. Consequently, its role visa-vis its Diaspora and future policy options is explored in Chapter VII through the third
hypothesis in this dissertation: a more positive role played by the state in the sending
country determines the level o f return and non-return benefits.
In the 1970s, the Indian government acted as a regulator of private sector and as a
producer of computing products and services. In the 1980s, it increased its role in the
private sector under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi and acted more as a promoter of
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production by the private sector with increased roles for the Diaspora. The commitment
to IT was given prime importance in the 1990s with the growing importance of ‘Indian
Siliconnaires’. Consequently, various measures were taken by the government such as:
(1) introduction of computer education at all levels of education; (2) creation of Software
Technology Parks (STPs); (3) the creation of the National Association of Software and
Service Companies (NASSCOM); and (4) reforms in the department of electronics (DoE)
of the central government.
Recent government initiatives such as the Persons of Indian Origin Card
introduced in 1999, the High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora set up in 2000, the
annual Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (NRI Day held annually, and in its third year o f success),
and the recent move on dual citizenship, reflect this recognition of positive externalities.
Notwithstanding all these initiatives by the government, economic and political
bottlenecks still remains a problem for active Diaspora involvement. On a positive note,
leaders in India are actively looking at their Chinese or Jewish counterparts that are
actively harnessing their Diaspora for more benefits to render similar successes in India.
The real question however, is that to what extent will the Indian Diaspora be able
to build a vibrant Diaspora network with their country origin? What efforts will be
needed on the part of both the Indian government and members of the Diaspora for taking
this ‘from ideas to action’?

AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Political, economic, and migration linkages between India and the United States,
also resonates in different spatial and temporal contexts. Other countries like Brazil,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

299
China, Colombia, Ireland, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Africa have also experienced
similar problems as India regarding the movement of the highly skilled and brain drain.
Most of these countries have been able to overcome their brain drain problems and
convert it to a gain for their home countries through return and Diaspora options.
Meaningful partnerships with their home countries and a will to contribute have
translated into successes for them.
However, the above discussion on brain drain, although providing various insights
for India and the United States, remains fairly limited in geographical space and time
frame. Other source and receiving countries deserve an equal focus to present a fair
discussion on brain drain and gain. Furthermore, many related questions needs to be
answered with respect to the impact of losses in the source country. First, many studies
conclude that when the “cream of the labor force”5 is skimmed off for export, the
vacancies that are created are filled by less competent and efficient workers. In addition,
emigration leads to a decline in productivity in that sector, leading to significant increase
in wage levels. This causes severe dislocations in the labor market and also impairs the
development potential for that country. Second, the problem for a source country is
especially severe if the bulk of the emigrants include those who impart skills, thus
impairing the accumulation of skills in the long term. Third, even though there is little
doubt that remittances (and deposits) have a strong positive impact on the balance of
payments of recipient countries, sometimes it creates a demonstration effect on non
remittance receiving households that could have a negative impact on balance of
payments, savings, and investments. Additionally, remittance flows augments income

5 Reginald T. Appleyard, “Migration and Development: Myths and Reality,” International Migration
Review 23 number 3 (Autumn 1989): 489.
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and wealth inequalities. And fourth, although no one can dispute the long-term benefits
of the out-migration, the emigration of individuals can have negative socio-political
impact, especially in countries at an early stage of development and modernization. The
departure of a male worker from a village, where he left his family, to a city in his own
country, and then to a foreign country, causes significant changes in the type and level of
responsibilities for those who remain.
Limitations also include lack of data for the fiscal year 2005, by the receiving
country statistical data, and especially by the source countries. The department of
Homeland Security, that prints yearbook of immigration statistics, has reports till the
fiscal year 2004. Furthermore, special reports on HI B have not been updated after 2002
as per March 2006.
Some of the other limitations in this dissertation have been the absence or brief
mention of related themes such as: (1) the impact of immigrant work force on native
labor force; (2) comparison of the Indian Diaspora with other Asian and non-Asian
Diaspora groups in the United States; (3) impact on other legal and illegal immigration in
the United States; (4) assimilation of Indo-Americans in native societies; and (5) the
cultural and social assimilation of second generation Indians. These are important topics
and could serve as themes for future research.
Outsourcing of businesses is another prominent issues at the turn of the century
that takes on a two-fold approach, both in the political and economic sectors. As seen
from the lens of ‘brain drain’ and ‘migration of talent’, the outsourcing phenomenon
takes on unprecedented importance in the debate with businesses and not people,
spanning the globe for greener pastures.
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APPENDIX A

1. NON RESIDENT INDIAN NATIONALS (NRIs)
Non Resident Indians generally fall under the following broad categories:
• Indian citizens who stay abroad for employment or for carrying on any
business or vocation or for any other purpose in circumstances indicating
an indefinite period of stay outside India.
• Indian citizens working abroad on assignments with foreign Governments,
Government agencies or international/multinational agencies such as the
United Nations Organization (UNO), the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the World bank, etc.
• Officials of central and state Governments and public sector undertaking
deputed abroad on assignments with foreign Government/ agencies/
organizations or posted to their own offices (including Diplomatic
Missions) abroad.
NOTE: Non-resident Indians become resident in India only when they come
back to India for employment or for carrying on in India any business or
vocation indicating an indefinite period of stay in India. They are not regarded
as persons resident in India during their short visits to India for example on
holiday, leave etc.
2. PERSONS OF INDIAN ORIGIN (PIOs)
For the purpose of the facility of opening and maintenance of various types of
bank accounts and making investments in shares and securities in India, a
foreign citizen (not being a citizen of Pakistan or Bangladesh) is deemed to be a
person of Indian origin if:
• He, at any time, held an Indian passport, or
• He or either of his parents or any of his grand parents was a citizen of India
by virtue of the Constitution of India or Citizenship Act 1955 (57 of 1955).
A spouse (not being a citizen of Pakistan or Bangladesh) of an Indian citizen or
of a person of Indian origin is also treated as a person of Indian origin for the
above purpose provided the bank accounts are opened only jointly with their
NRI/PIO spouses.
3. OVERSEAS CORPORATE BODIES (OCBs)
Overseas Corporate Bodies (OCB) means a company, partnership firm, society and other
corporate body owned directly or indirectly to the extent of at least sixty percent by Non
Re alumni have become CEOs of the world's leading corporations sident Indians and
includes overseas trust in which not less than sixty percent beneficial interest is held by
Non Resident Indians directly or indirectly but irrevocably.1
1 Source: Reserve Bank o f India
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